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Samenvatting 
De afgelopen 20 jaar waren jobcreatie en de daling van de werkloosheid prioritaire 
beleidsdoelstellingen.  Sinds kort staat ook de kwaliteit van het werk op de beleidsagenda.  De 
Lissabon-strategie stelt de creatie van meer én betere jobs als globale doelstelling om volledige 
tewerkstelling te bereiken.  Om de doelstelling van een hogere activiteitsgraad te bereiken zou werk 
lonend maken onvoldoende kunnen zijn en de kwaliteit van werk bevorderen essentieel.  
Kwaliteitsvolle jobs kunnen uittrede tegengaan en goede arbeidsvoorwaarden voorzien kan de 
productiviteit van ondernemingen bevorderen   
 
Het welzijn van werknemers wordt door vele factoren beïnvloed: enerzijds door de karakteristieken 
van het werk zelf maar anderzijds ook door verwachtingen omtrent het werk, de waarden die men 
belangrijk vindt in het werk en diverse individuele- en omgevingsfactoren.  In dit doctoraal proefschrift 
staan de karakteristieken van het werk centraal en ligt de focus op een aantal sleutelindicatoren die 
de arbeidstevredenheid en kwaliteit in de eerste job beïnvloeden.  Voor onze analyses maken we 
gebruik van data over de transitie van school naar werk voor Vlaamse jongeren (SONAR-data). 
 
De eerste vraag die we stellen betreft de relatie tussen het opleidingsniveau en arbeidstevredenheid. 
Op deze relatie na is het onderzoek naar de determinanten van arbeidstevredenheid vrij consistent.  
In de eerste bijdrage postuleren we de hypothese dat de positieve relatie tussen opleidingsniveau en 
arbeidstevredenheid die in vele studies wordt gevonden, het gevolg is van de invloed van jobkwaliteit 
op de tevredenheid.  Onze empirische analyse bevestigt deze hypothese.  Hoger opgeleiden blijken 
meer tevreden dan hun lager opgeleide collega’s, maar deze samenhang is toe te schrijven aan het 
feit dat de hoger opgeleiden diegene zijn met de betere jobs.  Wanneer we controleren voor 
indicatoren van de kwaliteit van het werk, wordt de correlatie tussen opleidingsniveau en 
arbeidstevredenheid negatief: de hoger opgeleiden zijn minder tevreden met hun eerste job.  
Verschillen in waarden of verwachtingen ten aanzien van werk kunnen een verklaring bieden voor 
deze verschillen.  De grootste impact op jobtevredenheid is afkomstig van de jobkarakteristieken.  De 
resultaten geven echter aan dat wanneer een lager opgeleide een kwaliteitsvolle job heeft, hij een 
hogere kans zal hebben om tevreden te zijn dan zijn hoger opgeleide collega in exact dezelfde job.  
 
Het tweede belangrijke thema bouwt verder op twee sleutelindicatoren van kwaliteit op het werk: 
werkinspanning en autonomie, in de literatuur aangewezen als de belangrijkste determinanten ter 
verklaring van de daling in de Britse arbeidstevredenheid.  We bestuderen de werkdruk in relatie tot 
hun autonomie in intrede jobs en maken daarvoor gebruik van het Karasek Job-Demand-Control 
(JDC) model.  Dit model verfijnt de notie ‘werkdruk als belastend aspect van het werk’, door de 
balans tussen werkdruk en controle die men heeft over het werk (dit is de autonomie) te 
benadrukken.   Enkel een job waarin hoge werkdruk samengaat met lage autonomie (een 
hooggespannen job) wordt verondersteld stressvol te zijn.  Een job waarin hoge werkdruk gepaard 
gaat met hoge autonomie (een actieve job) resulteert in groei- en leermogelijkheden.  De resultaten 
van onze analyse bevestigen alle hypothesen van het JDC model.  Jobontevredenheid is hoger in 
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jobs met weinig autonomie en in jobs met veel werkdruk.  Autonomie lijkt een buffer te zijn voor de 
negatieve impact van werkdruk op job ontevredenheid.  De mate waarin jongeren nieuwe 
vaardigheden verwerven is hoger in jobs met veel autonomie en in jobs met veel werkdruk.   
Daarenboven versterkt autonomie de positieve invloed van werkdruk op de groeimogelijkheden.   
 
In een volgende fase gaan we na of jongeren een looncompensatie krijgen voor de werkdruk die ze 
ervaren.  Dit blijkt evenwel niet het geval te zijn voor jongeren in hun eerste job.  Werknemers in 
hooggespannen jobs zijn er dus duidelijk slechter aan toe.  Eerst en vooral hebben ze een 
stressvolle job en voelen ze zich (bijgevolg) minder tevreden.  Daarenboven krijgen ze geen 
compensatie voor deze minder gunstige situatie.  We observeren ook dat jongeren in een actieve job 
– en in het segment van jobs met veel autonomie in het algemeen - beter betaald zijn dan hun 
lotgenoten in jobs met lage controle.  Deze resultaten leiden tot de conclusie dat er een dualiteit is op 
de arbeidsmarkt voor jongeren.  Enerzijds de beter betaalde actieve jobs met gemiddeld genomen 
een hoge tevredenheid en anderzijds de minder betaalde en ontevreden makende stressvolle jobs.  
 
Tenslotte stellen we de vraag of jongeren in een hooggespannen job mobieler zijn dan hun collega’s 
in een actieve job.  Onze resultaten bevestigen deze hypothese.  Gebruik makend van verschillende 
modellen voor duurdata komen we tot de consistente vaststelling dat jonge werknemers in een 
hooggespannen job deze sneller verlaten dan jongeren in een actieve job.  We onderzoeken ook of 
deze jongeren beter af zijn later in hun carrière.  Een vergelijking van het jobtype in de eerste job met 
dat op 26 jaar leert dat een aanzienlijk deel van de starters in een hooggespannen job nog steeds in 
zo’n job zitten op 26 jaar.  Voor diegenen die hun job gedwongen hebben verlaten, is het jobtype niet 
bepalend voor hun toekomstige kans op werkloosheid.  Alhoewel starters in een hooggespannen job 
dus een vroeger slachtoffer zijn van gedwongen mobiliteit, heeft het jobtype geen invloed op de 
toekomstige kans op werkloosheid.  Enkel het opleidingsniveau is een bepalende factor voor die 
kans. We kunnen dus besluiten dat de last van een hooggespannen job maar tijdelijk is.  Er is echter 
een aanzienlijke kans om later in de carrière opnieuw in een hooggespannen job terecht te komen.   
 
Het derde thema dat aan bod komt is de onzekerheid van het werk.  We onderzoeken of tijdelijk werk 
voor schoolverlaters als een opstap kan fungeren naar vast werk.  Met behulp van simulaties 
vergelijken we de transitiesnelheid naar vast werk tussen schoolverlaters die werkloos blijven en 
schoolverlaters die voor een tijdelijke job kiezen.  Schoolverlaters die een tijdelijke job aanvaarden, 
hebben aanvankelijk een lagere transitie naar vast werk, waardoor een lager percentage een vast 
contract heeft op korte termijn (in vergelijking met de hypothetische situatie waarin deze jongeren 
werkloos waren gebleven).  Op lange termijn (vanaf 40 maanden voor de steekproef van alle 
schoolverlaters, vanaf 21 maanden voor de steekproef van werkloze schoolverlaters) doen 
participanten in tijdelijke tewerkstelling het beter dan schoolverlaters die werkloos blijven tijdens hun 
zoektocht naar een vaste job.  We kunnen besluiten dat gemiddeld voor onze steekproef van alle 
schoolverlaters een tijdelijke job de transitie naar een vaste job vertraagt.  We vinden evenwel een 
sterk significant opstapeffect van tijdelijk werk voor de steekproef van werkloze schoolverlaters. 
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Summary 
 
Over the past twenty years creating jobs and reducing unemployment were main policy objectives.  
In recent years work quality has entered the policy agenda.  The Lisbon strategy sets the overall goal 
of moving to full employment through creating “not only more jobs but also better jobs. “Making work 
pay” may not be sufficient and fostering quality of work is essential to achieve the policy goals of 
higher employment rates.  Good jobs can prevent exit from labour market, and providing good 
working condition can foster productivity of firms.   
 
The well-being of workers is determined by many factors: on the one hand by characteristics of the 
work itself but on the other hand also by expectations, work values and individual and environmental 
factors.  In this doctoral thesis the work features take a central place and we focus on a number of 
key indicators influencing well-being and quality in the first job.  For the analysis we use data 
concerning the transition from school to work for Flemish youngsters (SONAR-data). 
 
The first question we raise concerns the relation between education and job satisfaction.  Research 
concerning the determinants of job satisfaction is rather consistent with the exception of the relation 
between the level of education and job satisfaction.  In the first contribution, we hypothesize that the 
positive relationship between educational level and job satisfaction, found in several studies, results 
from the impact of indicators of job quality on satisfaction.  Our empirical analysis confirmed this 
hypothesis.  More highly educated workers seem more satisfied than their less educated 
counterparts. This association, however, is caused by the fact that the more highly educated also 
obtain a job of better quality. When we control for the indicators of the quality of the first job, the 
correlation between the level of education and job satisfaction becomes negative: the more highly 
educated report that they are less satisfied with their first job. Different work values or different 
expectations might explain these findings.  The largest impact on job satisfaction was due to job 
characteristics. The results however indicated that when a lower educated worker obtains a job of 
good quality, his or her probability of being satisfied will be considerably higher than that of his higher 
educated counterparts, working in exactly the same job.  
 
The second important subject of our contributions builds on the two key indicators of job quality: work 
effort and autonomy, by literature suggested as the main determinants to explain the decline in 
British job satisfaction.  We study the workload in entry jobs in relation to the autonomy using the 
Karasek Job-Demand-Control (JDC) model.  This model refines the qualification of ‘workload’ as 
burdensome aspect of work, by highlighting the importance of a balance between demands in the job 
(i.e. workload) and the control one can exercise in that job (i.e. the job autonomy one has).  Only a 
job with high workload and low autonomy (a ‘high strain job’) is supposed to be stressful, whereas a 
high demanding job with a lot of autonomy (an ‘active job’) results in learning opportunities.  The 
results of our analyses confirmed all hypotheses derived from the JDC-model, also the learning 
hypothesis for which empirical evidence is limited. Job dissatisfaction is higher amongst those with 
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low autonomy and amongst those with high workload.  Autonomy seems to buffer the negative 
impact of workload on dissatisfaction.  The extent to which people acquired new skills was higher 
amongst those who score high on autonomy and amongst those working under high workload. 
Moreover autonomy appeared to increase the positive impact of workload on learning.   
 
In a next step we investigate whether young workers get a wage compensation for high workload.  
Our results do not support this hypothesis for young workers in their first job.   Workers in high strain 
jobs are thus really worse off.  First of all, they have a stressful job and (as a consequence) feel less 
satisfied. In addition to this, we have found that they are not compensated for this less favourable 
position.  We also observe that young workers in active jobs - and workers in the high control 
segment in general - are better paid than their counterparts.  These results lead to the conclusion of 
a duality in the labour market for young people.  On the one hand the better paid active jobs with on 
average higher job satisfaction and on the other hand the less paid dissatisfying stressful jobs.    
 
Finally we raise the question whether workers in a high strain job leave their job sooner than their 
colleagues in active jobs.  Our results confirm this hypothesis.  Using different models for estimating 
duration data we consistently find that young workers leave their high strain jobs sooner compared 
with those in active jobs.  We also examine whether they were better off later on in their career.  The 
results of a comparison the job type of the first job with the job type at the age of 26 show that a 
considerable part of the young starters in high strain jobs remain in a high strain job later on.  For 
those who had to leave their first job, their job type does not influence the probability of being 
unemployed later on in the career.  So, although starters in high strain jobs are premature victims of 
forced mobility, their initial job type does not affect their probability of becoming unemployed 
afterwards.  Only the educational level was a relevant determinant of that probability.  We can thus 
conclude that the strain of a high strain first job is only temporary.  There is however a significant 
probability to remain in a high strain job later on in the career.   
 
The third topic we handle is the insecurity of the job itself.  We investigate whether temporary 
employment can act as a stepping stone for school-leavers.  We compare the transition rate into 
permanent employment between school-leavers who stay unemployed and those taking up 
temporary employment.  Simulations are used to investigate the effect of temporary employment on 
the transition to permanent employment.  Workers who accept a temporary job have a low transition 
rate into permanent employment at the start of the temporary employment spell, which results in a 
lower fraction of those obtaining a permanent contract in the short run (compared with the 
hypothetical situation where these individuals remained unemployed).  In the long run (from 40 
months in the sample of all school-leavers, 21 one months in the sample of unemployed school-
leavers) participants in temporary employment do better than school-leavers who remain 
unemployed during their search for a permanent job.  So we can conclude that on average for all 
school-leavers taking a temporary job delays the transition to a permanent job for the observed 
sample.  We do find a strong stepping-stone effect for our sample of unemployed school-leavers. 
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1. More and better jobs for Europe 
 
Over the past twenty years one of the main policy objectives has been to create jobs and reduce 
unemployment.  In recent years, work quality has entered the policy agenda.  The concept of “quality 
in work” rose to prominence at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000.  The Lisbon strategy 
sets the overall goal of moving to full employment through creating “not only more jobs but also 
better jobs”.  Since the Stockholm European Council in 2001, quality in work is also a general 
objective in the Employment Guidelines.1   The subsequent Council Meetings have all kept quality in 
work on the agenda. 
 
In its Communication, "Employment and social policies: A framework for investing in quality" (2001), 
the European Commission identified 10 main elements of quality in work within two broad 
dimensions, the characteristics of the work itself and the wider labour market context: 
 
Dimension I: Characteristics of the job itself 
1. Intrinsic job quality 
2. Skills, life-long learning and career development 
Dimension II: The work and wider labour market context 
3. Gender equality 
4. Health and safety at work 
5. Flexibility and security 
6. Inclusion and access to the labour market 
7. Work organization and work-life balance 
8. Social dialogue and worker involvement 
9. Diversity and non-discrimination 
10. Overall economic performance and productivity 
 
This interpretation of the job-quality concept appears to combine the interests of workers and 
employers in one concept – “quality in work”.  Some aspects of job quality seem to be omitted (e.g. 
work effort and average pay), perhaps because they include conflicting interests between workers 
and employers.  The last element – overall economic performance and productivity - clearly indicates 
the intended balance between workers and employers.  Moreover Green (2006) argues that this list 
“appears to be largely driven by pre-existing policy objectives of the European Commission” and so 
“has the appearance of a repackaging exercise”. 
 
When we try to formulate some policy implications we will return to this European policy approach of 
taking the considerations of both workers and employers into account.  However in our contributions 
                                                 
1 The Guidelines present common priorities for the national employment policies of Member States.  
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we restrict our attention to the concept of quality of work and thus only focus on the well-being of 
workers.   
 
In the next part we argue why well-being of workers is important for economists to look at.  In the 
third part we define the different concepts more clearly and discuss our key indicators.  Using these 
definitions and key indicators we then situate the different contributions of this doctoral thesis.  In the 
fifth part we discuss the specificity of our sample of young workers.  Afterwards we summarize the 
main results and we end with a reflection for further research and for policy. 
 
 
2. Well-being and economics 
 
Is well-being a subject for investigation in economics?  Green (2006) states that, “Trying to 
understand the sources of well-being at work is exactly what labour economics should ultimately be 
about”.  However, doubts arise because the empirical information is mainly drawn from subjective 
reports of workers. Mainstream economists tend to believe what people do and not what they say.  
Sen (1973) argues that there are problems with the interpretation of behaviour as well.  He thinks 
that, “We have been prone, on the one hand, to overstate the difficulties of introspection and 
communication and on the other, to underestimate the problems of studying preferences revealed by 
observed behaviour”.  Layard, one of Britain’s most prominent economists, and proponent of 
“happiness” studies, argues in favour of happiness reports of individuals.  Psychologists have found 
quite well correlated answers about the happiness of people whether they were asked themselves, 
whether their friends were asked or whether independent observers were asked (Layard, 2005).  
Layard defends interpersonal comparisons based on evidence from neuro-science.  Neuroscientists 
have identified the areas in the brain which are active when people feel good and when people feel 
bad, and different methods give good correlations between reported feelings and brain 
measurements (Layard, 2003).  Ward and Sloane (2000) argue that the level of satisfaction of 
workers reporting “very satisfied” may differ, but they will be less likely to quit and/or be more 
productive than workers reporting lower levels.  Clark (1996) also mentions that psychologists and 
sociologists have been validating these data for years.  
 
So we conclude, in line with Green (2006), that one should abandon the complete distrust of what 
individuals tell us, in a critical approach of careful validation and reliability testing of the data 
 
The main argument for the use of these data despite their shortcomings is the correlations found 
between these “subjective reports” and other (economic) variables.  Productivity, absenteeism and 
turnover are especially seen as influenced by job satisfaction (e.g. Hall, 1994).  Freeman (1978) has 
introduced job satisfaction as an economic variable, pointing to its relationship with mobility 
behaviour.  Clark (2001) offers a non-exhaustive overview of research papers, showing that 
“happiness measures predict observable future behaviours or outcomes”.   
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Another reason for economists to study job quality and well-being is the relation between quantity 
and quality of jobs.  Davoine (2006) investigated this relation and he came to the unambiguous 
conclusion of a strong correlation between quantity and quality of jobs.  So “improving employment 
quality does not endanger employment growth”.  The comparative analysis also shows that there is 
“no trade-off between social and economic goals, between efficiency and equity”. 
 
The “Employment in Europe” reports of 2001 and 2002 (European Commission) analyse the 
relationship between quality in work, social inclusion and labour market dynamics. The reports 
conclude that there exist important synergies between quality in work, productivity and overall 
employment performance. Improvements in quality in work are important not just for the well-being of 
workers but also to promote social inclusion and drive up employment levels. 
 
Economists thus have more than enough reason to study quality of work and job satisfaction.  
“Making work pay” may not be sufficient, and fostering quality of work is essential to achieve the 
policy goals of higher employment rates.  Good jobs can prevent exit from the labour market, and 
providing good working conditions can foster productivity of firms.  Moreover accidents at work and 
occupational disease have an economic cost.  “Labour becomes a production factor, which could 
boost growth in a knowledge-based economy” (Davoine, 2006). 
 
 
3. Concepts and key indicators 
 
Different concepts are used when talking about quality of work; job satisfaction, well-being and utility.  
Economists, sociologists and psychologists focus on various aspects relating to these concepts.  In 
figure 1 we offer an interdisciplinary overview of the different concepts and determinants.   
 
Well-being was defined by Bentham as “the excess of pleasure over pain” (Collard, 2006).  “The 
person’s conception of his well-being” is called utility (Sen, 1979).  We consider job satisfaction as a 
proxy to measure utility.  As discussed earlier, some measurement error is possible when using the 
subjective report (ie. job satisfaction) as a measure for utility.  Against this, there are circumstances 
that reduce the measurement errors when using self-reported data - individuals know much better 
what happens in their job than observers.   As Green (2006) puts it, “The countless people who were 
selected by chance…telling their own story.  Whose story is more accurate than theirs?”. 
 
We use the terms “utility” and “job satisfaction” for the workers’ view, whereas we use the term 
“quality” to offer a judgment from the perspective of society and policy.  This is in line with Barbier 
and Sylla (2004) who say that, “Quality of work is an internal normative category from a political 
discussion, which is – as a principle – flexible, and can change meaning and significance depending 
on circumstances”.   
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Figure 1: Concepts concerning job quality and main determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central in figure 1 and in our contributions are the work features as determinants for utility and quality 
of work.  Figure 1 shows that, next to work features, the utility of an individual worker is also 
influenced by some other factors.  When looking for the determinants of utility, and thus job 
satisfaction as a proxy for utility, economists, psychologists and sociologists stress different factors.  
Economists will mainly focus on the wage as crucial element, although Blau (1991) argues for the  
inclusion of non-pecuniary characteristics into the economic modelling.  Hedonic theory pushes the 
approach of a job as a collection of non-pecuniary characteristics to its extreme (Elliott, 1990). 
Sociologists place emphasis on work values, which Kalleberg (1977) defines as “meanings that 
individuals attach to their perceived job characteristics”.  Psychologists stress expectations as an 
important determinant for job satisfaction.  The difference between values and expectations is 
explained by Kalleberg (1977):  “Expectations denote one’s beliefs about what will occur in the future, 
but what is expected may not correspond to what is wanted and, conversely, what is valued may or 
may not correspond to what is expected”. 
 
Next to the work values and expectations there is also a consensus that individual factors might have 
their influence on the perceptions of well-being.  In figure 1 we indicate that this impact on utility 
might be direct or indirect through differences in expectations or work values.  When we consider the 
special case of our sample of young workers, we will return to the concepts of work values and 
expectations and discuss why they might be different for young workers.  Various individual variables 
are added as control variables through our work.   
 
Utility 
=conception of own well-being 
Work features 
Quality of work 
=well-being at work 
Moral principles Expectations Work values 
Individual variables: eg 
gender, place of residence 
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The quality of work is determined by the work features as figure 1 shows. Next to these work 
features, society’s norm of what a good quality job is depends on what we call moral principles.  The 
European definition in the first part offers some examples of considerations which may be taken into 
account to judge the quality of the work (eg. gender equality, non-discrimination).   
 
Figure 1 also shows an influence in both directions of the individual and society’s perception of well-
being at work.  There is agreement that environmental variables such as policy influence the worker’s 
reported job satisfaction.  On the other hand, society’s view is influenced by the view of the individual 
workers on what is important, which seems obvious in a democracy.  This is in line with the 
consistent distinction in labour psychological literature between two types of variables; the stressors 
(objective characteristics of the work), and stress reactions (eg, job satisfaction) (De Witte, 2001):. 
According to De Witte (2001), a useful analysis of the extent to which work is “good” or “bad” involves 
the objective characteristics as well as the subjective consequences being taken into account.  In a 
welfarist tradition, quality of work should only be judged on the individual utilities.  This principle is 
however the subject of several critiques.2  The most common critique is that welfarism can defend 
outcomes which are contrary to our moral intuitions.  Therefore we do not follow this welfarist idea, 
and consider job quality as being different from individual utilities and allow that non-utility information 
is taken into account.  We do not however take up the discussion on which grounds exactly policy 
makers should judge the quality of work. 
 
In the continuation of this doctoral thesis, we will only consider the work features that foster the well-
being of workers.  We focus on work features for which there is an agreement that they influence 
worker’s well-being and we try to provide some more insight into these concepts and their influence.  
In line with Green (2006) we distinguish five key work features: skill utilisation, work effort/pressure, 
personal discretion, wages and risk.  Green distinguished these key aspects based on an 
interdisciplinary conceptual and theoretical approach.  
 
Skills utilisation is seen as an intrinsic value.  Changes in skill requirements take a prominent role in 
recent debates.  The belief exists that the new economy requires more highly skilled jobs - the so-
called “knowledge economy”.  Krugman (1994) argues that the increase in the ratio of skilled to 
unskilled employment is due to technological change.  However Wood (1994) provides evidence for 
a rising inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.  On the other hand lots of authors also pay 
attention to the under-utilization of skills (Borghans & De Grip, 2000). 
 
Work effort is the second key element.  It is a crucial element in efficiency wage theories, which are 
studied in different disciplines.  Workers who believe they are treated fairly are likely to put in more 
effort, those who think their treatment is unfair withhold effort - psychologists call it ‘equity theory’ 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003).  Efficiency wages are the economic answer to the principal-agent 
problem of motivating employees to help advance the employer’s objectives and to prevent shirking.  
                                                 
2 See Sen (1979) for an extensive discussion of welfarism  
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Akerlof (1982) argues that worker effort depends on the work norms of the relevant reference group.  
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) introduced the “fair wage-effort hypothesis”: workers form a notion of the 
fair wage and if the actual wage is lower, they withdraw effort in proportion.  In psychology most of 
the leading models on job stress (Karasek’s Job-Demand-Control model, Warrs’ Vitamin model, the 
Effort-Reward Imbalance model) consider high work effort as a stressor (Le Blanc et al., 2003).  
  
By discussing in brief the efficiency wage theory we have already introduced the third key aspect, 
namely wages.  From an economic point of view, wages are a main determinant of labour supply and 
thus a key aspect of job quality.  Is the economic focus on the wage of the job justified, or are the 
other characteristics more important?  Several studies seem to indicate that intrinsic aspects (i.e. the 
work itself) are more important than pay.3  However Kalleberg (1977) argued that intrinsic work 
factors might have become more important in producing job satisfaction because of a reduced 
variance in pay. 
 
Personal discretion is another key aspect of job quality according to Green.  This idea of assigning 
value to personal discretion is not common in economic thought except in the capabilities approach 
of Sen. Sen’s approach attributes high value to the process of determining and choosing activities 
(Green, 2006).  In contrast to mainstream economics, sociology and psychology consider discretion 
and autonomy as essential to high quality work.  Sociologists see the extent to which work becomes 
alienated as fundamental for the analysis of job quality and thus the personal discretion is a central 
element  (Green, 2006).  The central role for autonomy in psychological models is clearly illustrated 
in the Job-Demand-Control model of Karasek (1979). 
 
The last key aspect of job quality is personal risk and security.  Green (2006) identifies health and 
safety as the most important aspects of intrinsic security.  Intrinsic security has improved 
considerably over recent decades.  However insecurity of the job itself becomes more and more 
important given fundamental changes in our economic system: more temporary employment, 
mergers and reorganisations.  In psychological literature, job insecurity has been the subject of 
several studies.4 
 
Green (2006) concludes that job satisfaction in Britain declined between 1991 and 2000.  He tried to 
find whether the key indicators he identified could explain this decline.  His results show that “roughly 
half of the decline in job satisfaction is directly attributable to the decline in task discretion…Another 
third of the fall in job satisfaction resulted from the work intensification that took place during the 
decade”. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 For example Braus (1992), Lowe (2001), Jencks et al. (1988), Clark (1999b) and Sousa-Poza 
(2000). 
4
 For an overview, see De Witte (2005). 
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4. Setting of the contributions  
 
As mentioned, our contributions mainly focus on the work features determining job quality and job 
satisfaction.  We focus on the same key indicators as distinguished by Green (2006); skill utilisation, 
work effort, autonomy, pay and risk. 
 
Education and job satisfaction (chapter 1). 
The first question we raise concerns the relation between education and job satisfaction.  Research 
concerning the determinants of job satisfaction is rather consistent; see, for example, Spector (1997). 
The exception is the literature regarding the relationship between the level of education and job 
satisfaction, which is rather ambiguous. Most empirical research suggests a positive relationship 
between both variables, but some studies have found no relationship or suggest a negative 
correlation.  Therefore the aim of the first contribution is to clarify the relationship between job 
satisfaction and educational level.  From an economic point of view, the relation between education 
and job satisfaction seems a very important one.  Human capital analysis explains that schooling 
raises earnings and productivity (Becker, 1993).  We want to find out whether schooling also raises 
well-being at work.  Our hypothesis is that the positive relationship between educational level and job 
satisfaction, found in several studies, results from the impact of indicators of job quality on 
satisfaction.  Our further hypothesis is that better educated workers are more satisfied because they 
have a better job, and we want to estimate the impact from the educational level on job satisfaction 
when the quality of the work is corrected for.  At the same time we estimate the impact of different 
“objective” job characteristics (stressors) - which can be seen as indicators for the quality of the job - 
on the well-being at work. 
 
Workload and autonomy: the Karasek Job-Demand-Control model (chapters 2,3 and 4).   
The second important subject of our contributions builds on two key indicators of job quality:  effort 
and autonomy.  According to Green (2006), these are the main determinants to explain the decline in 
British job satisfaction (see above).  We study the workload in entry jobs in relation to the autonomy 
using the Karasek Job-Demand-Control model.  The Karasek model dominates in the field of work 
and organisational psychology. One of the reasons for this may be its parsimony, since it reduces a 
divergent series of stressors at work to only two dimensions, workload and autonomy, which make it 
easily testable. The Karasek model (1979), refines the qualification of “workload” as the burdensome 
aspect of work, by highlighting the importance of a balance between demands in the job (i.e. 
workload) and the control one can exercise in that job (i.e. the job autonomy one has).  Only a job 
with high workload and low autonomy (a “high strain job”) is supposed to be stressful, whereas a 
highly demanding job with a lot of autonomy (an “active job”) results in learning opportunities.  The 
Karasek model thus has two main hypotheses; an imbalance between demands (workload) and 
control (autonomy) increases strains, whereas a balance between both job characteristics increases 
learning and development in the job.   
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Table 2 gives an idea of the kind of jobs that are in the different Karasek job types by offering the 
distribution of some characteristics over these job types.   
 
Table 2: Distribution of some characteristics over the Karasek job types. 
(%) 
Passive jobs  
(low workload, 
low autonomy)  
Low strain jobs  
(low workload, 
high autonomy)  
High strain 
jobs 
(high workload, 
low autonomy)  
Active jobs 
(high workload, 
high 
autonomy) 
Gender     
   Men 22.3 27.3 31.7 18.8 
   Women 21.6 28.5 29.2 20.7 
Educational level attained     
   Primary education 25.0 18.8 48.8 7.5 
   Lower secondary education 31.2 19.9 39.7 9.2 
   Higher secondary education 26.6 22.9 37.2 13.4 
   Lower tertiary education 15.8 36.2 20.7 27.4 
   Higher tertiary education 8.0 39.6 10.8 41.6 
Fulltime or part-time job      
   full time 21.9 26.3 32.1 19.7 
   part time 26.9 29.7 30.4 13.05 
Company size      
   less than 10 employees  26.5 29.5 25.8 18.2 
   11 to 49 employees   19.4 25.2 34.6 20.8 
   more than 50 employees 20.1 27.2 31.5 21.1 
NACE classification of economic 
activities      
Primary sector 34.6 26.9 26.9 11.5 
Manufacturing 25.4 20.7 39.5 14.3 
Construction  32.8 21.1 34.4 11.7 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods  27.4 25.8 30.3 16.5 
Hotels and restaurants ' 17.2 8.6 60.3 13.8 
Transport, storage and 
communication 23.0 16.8 38.1 22.1 
Financial intermediation  14.5 28.9 20.5 36.1 
Real estate, renting and 
business activities  14.6 26.3 23.9 35.1 
Public administration and 
defence, compulsory social 
security 23.3 41.7 13.3 21.7 
Education 13.2 53.7 7.8 25.4 
Health and social work  18.4 30.4 36.7 14.5 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities or 27.0 28.4 35.1 9.5 
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activities of households  
Type of contract      
   Permanent contract 19.0 25.7 33.1 22.3 
   Temporary contract 25.4 27.8 30.8 16.0 
 
Source: SONAR C76(23) 
 
All differences, except the difference between the job types of men and women, are significant.  The 
more highly educated seem more represented in the high autonomy jobs (the low strain and active 
job types).  Workers in part-time jobs experience less workload than their full-time counterparts.  The 
number of high strain jobs is particularly high in the transport, storage and communication sectors, in 
manufacturing, and especially in the hotels and restaurant sector (60% of all jobs). Low-strain jobs 
seem to occur more in public administration and defence and in education.  A lot of active jobs 
appear in the sector of financial intermediation and in the real estate, renting and business activities 
sector. 
 
As noted above, the Karasek JDC model thus has as central hypotheses that an imbalance between 
demands (workload) and control (autonomy) increases strains, whereas a balance between both job 
characteristics increases learning and development in the job.  Chapter 2 will test these hypotheses 
using the data from the SONAR surveys of school-leavers in Flanders (see below).  Our focus is on 
the rarely tested but crucial hypothesis that work leads to active learning.  
 
In chapter 3, we examine the relationship with pay as key indicator of job quality.  We examine 
whether workers in a stressful job (defined according to the Karasek model) receive compensation 
for high workload.,.  If we consider high workload in a job as a stressor, which constitutes a burden 
for the worker, the “compensating wage differentials” model predicts that workers accepting a job 
with high workload will receive a wage compensation.  Combined with the predictions of the Karasek 
model, we might expect that the wage compensation for high workload will be lower in a job with high 
autonomy (active job).  Because people starting in a stressful job seem to be worse off, we want to 
find out if this “pain” is only temporary.  Do young people starting in a high strain job leave their job 
faster than those in an active job?  What is the influence of the job type on the probability of being 
unemployed in the next spell?  And are these young people really better off later on in their career or 
do they stay in stressful jobs? Chapter 4 answers these questions, offering a wider view on the 
transition period from school to work.  Here we thus focus on the possible career perspective for 
young workers and we also highlight the importance of indicators of job quality for mobility behaviour. 
 
Temporary employment  (chapter 5) 
The third main topic we raise considers the insecurity of the job itself.  In chapter 5 we therefore 
focus on how youth are integrated in the labour market: do they enter through a temporary job or do 
they get a permanent job immediately?  From a theoretical point of view two different approaches to 
temporary employment are possible.  Temporary employment is sometimes seen as a bad 
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characteristic.  Adam Smith (1776) suggested that the agreeableness of the job depends on “the 
constancy of employment”.  Segmentation theory sees a temporary contract as a characteristic of the 
secondary labour market.  “The secondary market has jobs that, relative to those in the primary 
sector, are decidedly less attractive.  They tend to involve low wages, poor working conditions, 
considerable variability in employment, harsh and often arbitrary discipline, and little opportunity to 
advance.” (Piore, 1970).   
 
Signalling and screening theory offers a positive view on temporary employment.  Temporary 
contracts are seen as possible signals for employers as a solution for the asymmetric information 
through hiring, or they can be used as a screening device.  The employer can, in the case of 
unobserved productivity, hire the employee on a temporary basis, during this period the employee 
can be screened.   
 
If we look to the first job of employees only, the SONAR sample for Flanders shows that about 50% 
enter the labour market through a fixed-term contract or through a contract with a temporary work 
agency (table 3).  The presented figures indicate clearly that temporary employment is very common 
among young people and it is especially used to hire school-leavers. 
 
Table 3: Contract type of the first job of employees in Flanders 
Contract type in the first job (%) 
Permanent contract 42.1 
Fixed term contract 31.9 
Temporary agency contract 18.4 
Active labour market policy 7.6 
Source: SONAR C76-78 (23-26) 
 
Table 2 has shown that temporary jobs are underrepresented among the active jobs, matched by an 
overrepresentation among the passive jobs. Are temporary jobs therefore bad jobs or are they just a 
step towards permanent employment?  In chapter 5, we focus on those starting their career in a 
temporary job.  We investigate whether temporary employment increases the transition rate from 
school to a permanent job.  We contribute to the literature by focusing on school-leavers, a group for 
whom the stepping stone hypothesis is almost never tested.  In addition we join the group of studies 
which answer the question whether temporary contracts are a ‘stepping stone’ and thus compare a 
temporary contract with the alternative of staying unemployed.  The aim is to determine whether the 
intermediate temporary job shortens the duration of the period it takes for school-leavers to find a 
permanent job.   
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5. The special case of young workers  
 
All the data in this doctoral thesis is derived from the SONAR data.  The aim of the SONAR5 
consortium is to study a representative sample of young Flemish adults in their transition from 
various educational institutions to the labour market. This aim is achieved in two phases. First, a 
survey of a large and heterogeneous sample of young adults of the same age is taken at regular 
intervals. Next, the same age group is surveyed again at a later stage (longitudinal follow-up design).  
The samples were randomly selected and trained interviewers at the interviewees’ home address 
performed the oral interviews.  The data is thus all self-reported information of the respondents.  
Since the database was constructed during the period in which the different researches were 
running, the different papers make use of different SONAR samples.  The first chapter makes use 
only of one cohort questioned at 23.  Only the last chapter includes the information at 26 (which was 
available by that time).  The used data is always discussed in detail in the different chapters. 
 
Does this sample of Flemish school-leavers differ from the Flemish population in general with respect 
to their job satisfaction?  Table 4 presents the frequency distribution of questions on job satisfaction, 
both general (job satisfaction with the work as a whole), and with different aspects of the job, 
comparing two groups; the group central in this thesis, namely school-leavers (SONAR) and 
employees of all ages (APS).6  This table shows that youth as well as workers from all ages are 
rather satisfied with their work.  Both categories are especially satisfied with their employment 
relations (colleagues and direct boss) and with the content of their job and the working hours and 
holiday arrangements.  A lower satisfaction is reported for the wages, the learning possibilities, the 
work pressure and especially the promotion opportunities.  
 
When we compare the percentage of people who are satisfied with different aspects of their work 
between both samples, we conclude that the SONAR sample is less satisfied on most aspects 
compared to the employees of the APS-survey.  For both wages and colleagues, the sum of those 
satisfied and those rather satisfied is similar for both groups, but for all other items the satisfaction 
differs between both groups.  The young group seem somewhat more satisfied with their work 
pressure but they are considerably less satisfied with their promotion opportunities: only 36% are 
satisfied, compared with 43% in the APS sample.  Also with regard to job security and the content of 
the job, the young people score lower. The differences between both samples are reflected in the 
satisfaction with the work as a whole: 73% of school-leavers are satisfied against 88% of the 
employees in general. 
 
                                                 
5 ‘SONAR’ is an abbreviation for the Dutch title Studiegroep van Onderwijs naar Arbeidsmarkt, which 
can be translated as ‘Research Consortium for the Study of the Transition between Education 
and Labour Market’.  
6 For more information on the comparison of job satisfaction in the SONAR and APS data, see De 
Witte & Verhofstadt (2006). 
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Table 4: APS and SONAR sample and their degree of job satisfaction (%) 
 
APS = survey titled ‘Sociaal-culturele verschuivingen in Vlaanderen’ 1998 en 2000 (Ministerie van de Vlaamse 
Gemeenschap, Administratie Planning en Statistiek).  
SONAR = SONAR C76(23). 
 
Figure 1 offers some ideas as to why well-being reports of young people might differ from the 
population in general.  There are several reasons why certain age groups might, on average, report 
higher or lower feelings of well-being at work: 
1) Certain job characteristics occur more often within this group; 
2) Different work values - factors which do not occur more often but have a different impact 
on the groups; 
3) Differences in expectations about the job. 
 
The first reason gives rise only to average higher or lower levels of reported well-being.  This is also 
called the “job-change hypothesis” and is supported by Wright and Hamilton (1978).  The other 
reason might explain why given the same objective characteristics, different groups report different 
well-being levels. 
 
According to Lowe (2001), those over the age of 45 place greater emphasis than workers under the 
age of 30 on performing work that provides a sense of accomplishment and on feeling committed to 
their employer. In contrast, younger workers are more likely to emphasize job security and having 
opportunities for career advancement.  Kalleberg and Loscocco (1983) argue that the observed age 
differences in job satisfaction partly reflect “more general processes of aging and development” and 
they highlight the importance of non-work roles.   
 
To which extent are you satisfied 
with…? 
Very satisfied Rather satisfied Not satisfied, 
not unsatisfied 
Rather 
unsatisfied 
Very unsatisfied 
  APS SONAR APS SONAR APS SONAR APS SONAR APS SONAR 
Content            
- Content of your job 38.3 33.6 48.4 38.2 9.4 13.3 3.2 9.2 0.7 5.6 
- Learning possibilities 20.5 23.5 38.1 31.9 22.1 16.9 14.4 14.8 5.0 12.9 
- Possibilities to take initiative 29.8 22.9 44.3 35.1 17.1 18.6 7.1 12.3 1.6 11.1 
Circumstances           
- Physical circumstances  22.0 27.3 50.6 38.5 18.3 17.7 7.5 11.3 1.5 5.3 
- Work pressure 11.6 16.8 40.8 41.2 27.9 22.8 16.4 14.0 3.3 5.3 
Conditions           
- Wage 14.7 23.6 52.2 41.7 20.8 17.4 10.1 10.3 2.3 7.0 
- Hours arrangements 31.9 34.8 48.7 40.2 12.6 11.4 5.3 8.7 1.7 4.7 
- Holiday arrangements 34.5 36.3 42.4 35.2 11.4 12.1 9.3 10.0 2.5 6.4 
- Job security 33.5 29.1 44.2 32.8 16.1 14.5 4.6 14.8 1.6 8.8 
- Promotion opportunities 13.7 13.3 29.2 22.4 34.9 24.1 14.7 19.6 7.6 20.6 
Relations           
- Colleagues 38.8 48.3 47.0 37.5 11.9 8.0 1.8 4.3 0.5 1.9 
- Direct boss 34.8 38.7 44.0 34.2 14.1 11.2 4.9 7.7 2.4 8.3 
Work as a whole 33.1 34.2 54.8 39.1 10.0 14.9 1.6 7.4 5.0 4.4 
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As described above, our sample is even more specific than “young people” in general, since it 
contains young people in the transition period from school to work.  It might be that these school-
leavers see their first job in a long-term career perspective and thus accept temporary jobs of a lower 
quality in the hope of getting a better job later on. 
 
 
6. Main results  
 
In the first research question, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between educational level 
and job satisfaction, found in several studies, results from the impact of indicators of job quality on 
satisfaction.  Our empirical analysis indeed confirmed the hypothesis that various indicators of job 
quality explain the relationship between the educational level and job satisfaction. more highly 
educated workers seem more satisfied than their less educated counterparts. This association, 
however, is caused by the fact that the more highly educated also obtain a job of better quality. When 
we control for the indicators of the quality of the first job, the association between the level of 
education and job satisfaction becomes negative: the more highly educated report that they are less 
satisfied with their (first) job. Two possible explanations for this finding could be offered.  The first one 
is that the more highly and and the less educated have different values towards their work. If the 
more highly educated attach more value to characteristics that are less available in their job (eg. 
promotion opportunities) their reported well-being will be lower.  An alternative explanation is that a 
higher standard of education induces higher expectations. These higher expectations could result in 
dissatisfaction when they are not met. This could be particularly true in the first job, because these 
young workers are still rather inexperienced.  
 
The largest impact on job satisfaction was due to job characteristics. The results however indicated 
that the less educated will profit more from the psychological benefits of a ‘good job’ than the more 
highly educated. When a less educated worker obtains a job of good quality, his or her probability of 
being satisfied will be considerably higher than that of his more highly educated counterparts, 
working in exactly the same job.  
 
In the second chapter, several aspects of Karasek’s Job-Demand-Control (JDC) model were tested.  
The results of the analyses confirmed all hypotheses derived from the JDC model, and also the 
learning hypothesis for which empirical evidence is scarce. Job dissatisfaction is higher amongst 
those with low autonomy (main effect of autonomy) and amongst those with high workload (main 
effect of workload). Low job autonomy combined with high workload leads to a level of job 
dissatisfaction which exceeds the combined effect of both taken separately.  Autonomy thus seems 
to buffer the negative impact of workload on dissatisfaction, as expected in Karasek’s interaction 
hypothesis.  The extent to which people acquired new skills was higher amongst those who score 
high on autonomy (main effect of autonomy) and amongst those working under high workload (main 
effect of workload). Furthermore, the combination of high autonomy and high workload leads to an 
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increase in the percentage of respondents who acquired new skills.  Autonomy thus appeared to 
increase the positive impact of workload on learning, as expected in Karasek’s interaction 
hypothesis. 
 
The “compensating wage differentials” framework predicts that workers should receive  
compensation for unattractive features in the job.  We thus hypothesised that workers receive a wage 
compensation for taking a job with high workload.  However the main conclusion of our third chapter 
is that young workers are not compensated for high workload in their job.  If we combine this with the 
conclusion of the previous contribution, that the combination of low autonomy and high workload 
does indeed result in stressful jobs, we can conclude that workers in high strain jobs are really worse 
off.  First of all, they have a stressful job and (as a consequence) feel less satisfied. In addition to 
this, we have found that they are not compensated for this less favourable position.  The other job 
type that Karasek distinguished is the active job (characterised by high workload but also high 
autonomy). According to Karasek, this combination leads to growth.  In this research, we also 
observe that these young workers - and workers in the high control segment in general - are better 
paid than their counterparts.  These results lead to the conclusion of a duality in the labour market for 
young people.  On the one hand, the better-paid active jobs with on average higher job satisfaction, 
and on the other hand, the lower-paid, dissatisfying, stressful jobs.   
 
Young workers with a high strain job (according to the Job-Demand-Control model of Karasek) are 
less satisfied with their job and do not receive a wage compensation for the strain that is associated 
with their job.  In the fourth chapter we therefore raised the question whether they tend to leave their 
job sooner than their colleagues in active jobs.  Our results confirm this hypothesis.  Using different 
models for estimating duration data (non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric), we 
consistently find that young workers leave their high strain jobs sooner compared with those in active 
jobs.  
 
As well as the test of our main hypothesis (do starters in high strain jobs leave their jobs sooner?), 
we also examined whether they were better off later on in their career.  The theoretical model 
predicts that young workers will leave their first job if they have a better alternative.  Due to a lack of 
data, we could not test if this was true.  Data only permitted comparison of the job type of the first job 
with the job type at the age of 26.  The results of this comparison show that a considerable proportion 
of the young starters in high strain jobs remain in a high strain job later on.  For those who had to 
leave their first job, we examined whether their job type also influenced the probability of being 
unemployed later on in their career.  The estimation showed that this was not the case.  So, although 
starters in high strain jobs are premature victims of forced mobility, their initial job type does not 
affect their probability of becoming unemployed afterwards.  Only the educational level was a 
relevant determinant of that probability. 
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We can thus conclude that the strain of a high strain first job is only temporary.  There is however a 
significant probability of remaining in a high strain job later on in the career.   
 
In the last main contribution (chapter 5), we investigate whether temporary employment can act as a 
stepping stone for school-leavers.  We compare the transition rate into permanent employment 
between school-leavers who stay unemployed and those taking up temporary employment.  Our 
estimation results indicate that there is no selection in unobserved characteristics.  Simulations are 
used to investigate the effect of temporary employment on the transition to permanent employment.  
The results differ for our two samples but for both we observe a time varying effect.  Workers who 
accept a temporary job have a low transition rate into permanent employment at the start of the 
temporary employment spell, which results in a lower fraction of those obtaining a permanent 
contract in the short run (compared with the hypothetical situation where these individuals remained 
unemployed).  In the long run (from 40 months in the sample of all school-leavers, 21 months in the 
sample of unemployed school-leavers) participants in temporary employment do better than school-
leavers who remain unemployed during their search for a permanent job.  So we can conclude that, 
on average, for all school-leavers, taking a temporary job delays the transition to a permanent job for 
the observed sample.  We do find a strong stepping stone effect for our sample of unemployed 
school-leavers. 
 
 
7. Further research reflection  
 
Given our specific sample of Flemish school-leavers, an obvious suggestion for further research is to 
compare the results of our analysis with results of similar analysis for a more general population of 
working people.  It would also be interesting to conduct a similar analysis for the same sample on a 
later age to see how job quality changes over the career.  Further research should also include the 
potential role of social support as a moderator in the identified relationships. 
 
Regarding our first main question, a topic for further research is trying to explain the relation between 
education and job satisfaction.  Two possible explanations could be offered for the finding that, once 
controlled for the quality of their job, the more highly educated are less satisfied than less educated 
workers.  The first one is that the more highly and the less educated have different values towards 
their work. Research into the work values of workers with higher and lower levels of education could 
help to test this possible explanation. An alternative explanation is that a higher level of education 
induces higher expectations. These stronger expectations could result in dissatisfaction when they 
are not met. This could be particularly true in the first job, because these young workers are still 
rather inexperienced. Further research is needed to check whether these results also hold for a 
sample of workers of all ages. This could indicate whether or not the obtained results are indeed due 
to the high expectations of highly-educated young workers at the start of their career. We would 
expect no relationship at all between education and job satisfaction for older workers, since their 
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expectations are based on their past labour market experience and their job satisfaction will only be 
influenced by the quality of their work. Testing our hypothesis for different samples is thus needed to 
check whether expectations do indeed explain why young, more highly educated workers are less 
satisfied than their less educated counterparts.  The results of our study should also encourage 
empirical studies on job satisfaction to control for the quality of the job, in order to obtain the true 
impact of the educational level on job satisfaction. As a result, diverging empirical results concerning 
this relationship might gradually converge. 
 
The results of our test of the Karasek JDC model are encouraging for theory as well as practice in 
occupational health psychology. As a consequence, future research should further focus on the test 
of Karasek’s learning hypothesis, and on the analysis of the interaction between both job dimensions 
of workload and autonomy of the JDC-model in determining learning and growth. Future research is 
also needed in order to meet some of the weaknesses of our study.  The measurement of the two 
core job dimensions needs to be strengthened in future research. Only a few items were used in this 
study to measure job control and workload.  One should also measure how far the work-family 
relation influences the perception of demands at work. 
 
The results of our study have shown that only jobs with an imbalance between the demands upon 
one and the control one has, cause stress.  We also found that a proportion of those starting in a 
high strain job, obtain a “better” job later on in their career, a smaller proportion seem to stay in high 
strain jobs.  Some of our findings suggested that the less educated who start in a high strain job are 
particularly vulnerable.  Further research should therefore focus on the characteristics and 
antecedents of young workers who are unable to leave high strain jobs on their own. 
 
With respect to temporary employment, our third main topic, many suggestions for further research 
can be given.  The performed analysis was a basic analysis and can be refined by distinguishing 
different types of temporary employment and by running similar analyses for separate groups (eg. 
according to educational level).  Institutional factors can be included, for example, by also modelling 
the sector of work.  Given the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, it would be interesting to 
compare the results of our analysis with the same analysis using propensity score matching.   
 
 
8. Policy reflection  
 
The results of our contributions can help in a better understanding of the key work characteristics 
influencing well-being of workers and offer some suggestions on how to increase well-being at work.   
We first discuss how our results can add to actual public debates concerning the “knowledge 
economy”, “stress” and “flexibility”. Afterwards we will discuss briefly what can be done - how one 
can intervene to increase worker’s well-being.  We will end by summarising our three main 
suggestions for policy. 
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The knowledge economy 
According to those who believe in the “knowledge economy”, competition between firms occurs 
through superior knowledge.  This concept is not wrong, as Green (2006) argues, but it is too 
simplistic.  In reality there is a mix of skilled and unskilled jobs.  The results of our first contribution 
indicated that skill utilisation is a very important determinant for job satisfaction.  Providing adequate 
skills through education is a main task of government, but government should pay more attention to 
the demand side as well.  Concern is needed for a balance between supply and demand for skills.  
However some warning has its place, since increasing skill utilisation of workers can only be 
achieved by increasing the possibilities to use skills in jobs, and not just increase the skill demands in 
job offers.  Over-education negatively affects job satisfaction and should thus be avoided.  
Government could give the example by pursuing high skill strategies in its departments. 
 
Stress 
Stress is another concept much used in recent public debate, with reason given that the expenditures 
on it are huge.  On average, in the European Union, 9.6% of GNP is spent on the consequences of 
job stress such as diminished productivity and medical costs (Le Blanc et al., 2000).  The Karasek 
JDC model however refines the qualification of “workload” as the burdensome aspect of work, by 
highlighting the importance of a balance between demands in the job and the control one can 
exercise in that job.  The statistical interaction in our results suggests that job autonomy moderates 
the relation between workload and job satisfaction, as supposed in the Job-Demand-Control model.  
Autonomy can thus buffer the negative consequences of workload on job satisfaction.   
 
We also found that a considerable part of those starting in a high strain job, obtain a “better” job later 
on in their career.  So, a high strain first job seems to be temporary for some young workers, and 
could be a stepping stone to a “better” job later on.  We do not want to minimize the current problem 
of job stress among young starters with this statement.  Stress is indeed a problem, but mostly for 
those who are not able to escape to another job and who must stay in high strain jobs or become 
unemployed.  As a consequence, it is important to target these young workers.  Some of our findings 
suggested that the less educated who start in a high strain job are particularly vulnerable.   
 
Flexibility 
Temporary employment has risen in most European countries over the last few years, making the 
flexibility debate more relevant than ever.  Especially for the younger workforce, temporary 
employment is very important (Ryan, 2001). Opponents of flexibility argue that temporary 
employment is bad for employees. However our results point to a stepping stone effect of temporary 
employment for unemployed school-leavers.  This means that temporary employment helps 
unemployed school-leavers in speeding up the gaining of permanent employment and that it 
increases their eventual probability of finding a permanent job.  This stepping stone effect of 
temporary employment should encourage employment offices to help young unemployed people to 
find a job as soon as possible, even if it is a temporary job, since it enhances their chances 
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afterwards.  The recent OECD report “Jobs for Youth” for Belgium also recommends “eventually 
abolish the waiting allowance and at the same time modify substantially the rules applying to new 
entrants to the unemployment offices” in order to reduce youth unemployment.  For the unemployed 
school-leaver, this would increase his or her search effort and the likelihood of accepting a temporary 
job, which ceteris paribus, shortens the duration of the period before he or she gets a permanent job 
afterwards.  However it is not certain that the same results would appear given a different school-to-
work context.  Therefore one should also take the macro effects of such a reform into account.   
 
Given the potential positive effect of temporary employment one might also advocate the easing of 
employment protection legislation for temporary employees in order to give more opportunities to 
unemployed people to use the stepping stone effect of temporary employment.  A recent study by 
Salvatori (2007) on the well-being effects of recent reforms easing restrictions on temporary 
employment in different European countries, generates positive results for both permanent and 
temporary employees. 
 
 
Intervention 
Intervention can have two targets; the individual or the work situation. One can also distinguish 
between two types of intervention; preventive interventions (interventions aimed at removing the 
causes) and interventions to soften the effects (Kompier, 2003).  Arrangements like career 
interruption and time credit can be considered as preventive interventions for individuals.  
Counselling and coaching can help individual employees to soften the effects of dissatisfying work 
features.  However our results offer some possibilities to ameliorate job quality.  The core idea is the 
need to increase job control.  The increase of job control enables to achievement of a double goal;  
the increase of job satisfaction and of the possibilities to acquire new skills in the job. The finding of 
an interaction between job control and workload strengthens this conclusion even more. The 
association between job demands and outcomes seems to be moderated by the possibility of 
exerting control in the job.   
 
Of course there is no such thing as a free lunch and, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
policy takes considerations of both workers and employers into account.  As Green (2006) argues, 
policies aimed at changing management culture need not be at the expense of productivity.  Modern 
technology does not require firms to choose more regimented forms of work control, while changing 
workers’ control has a considerable effect on their well-being.  With respect to workload, things are 
different - changing work effort does influence workers’ well-being, but for firms it might be beneficial 
to extract more effort from their workers where possible.  This again supports our proposition that 
control becomes an important tool to realise growth and well-being in jobs.  
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Job enrichment or job redesign might be a good solution to intervene in the work situation to increase 
skill utilisation and autonomy and thus to increase the well-being of workers.  Several ideas could be 
considered to redesign jobs in practice; removing unnecessary controls, combining tasks, allowing 
scheduling of own work, allowing workers to plan and control their own work (Kompier, 2003).  The 
potential success of interventions depends not only on the steps taken but also on the way they are 
chosen and implemented.  The employee can resist good measures when they are badly 
implemented. Therefore it is important to change the work situation together with employees 
(Kompier, 2003).  Unions and collective representation bodies could play an important role in this, if 
they changed their primary emphasis away from pay. 
 
Government could diffuse best practice by reducing central control in the state sector.  Green (2006) 
gives the education sector as an example.  He argues that the costs of extensive central controls on 
what school-teachers do are underestimated:  “The hidden costs lie in the reductions in discretion 
and the freedom to do satisfying work”.   
 
Conclusion 
The main suggestions from our research for policy can be summarised in the following three points: 
1) Stop focusing on work pressure only as the indicator for stress at work, and instead consider 
the balance between demand and control in jobs. 
2) Work on success stories of job enrichment and job redesign in order to increase skill 
utilisation and discretion in jobs, especially for less educated employees. 
3) Take the potential stepping stone effect of temporary employment for unemployed school-
leavers into account in the flexibility debate 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Higher educated workers: better jobs but less satisfied? 
 
Abstract 
The quality of the job of higher educated workers is better than that of their lower educated 
counterparts. This is certainly true regarding their wage and (non pecuniary) job characteristics. It is 
less clear, however, whether the level of education of workers is associated with their job 
satisfaction. We argue that the quality of a job plays an important role in the relationship between 
educational level and job satisfaction. The positive relationship between educational level and job 
satisfaction, reported in previous research, seems caused by the relationship between the level of 
education and job quality. We use survey data on Flemish 23 year old workers, to determine the 
effect of educational level on job satisfaction. The results show that higher educated workers are 
more satisfied than their lower educated counterparts, because they get a better job. When we 
control for all job characteristics, a negative relationship appears, with higher educated people 
reporting less job satisfaction.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On the labour market, higher educated workers seem to be in a favourable position. They are better 
paid and work in jobs of better quality (e.g. less physical demanding job characteristics). It is unclear, 
however, whether they are also more satisfied with their jobs. Most research supports the hypothesis 
of a positive relationship between the level of education and job satisfaction, although sometimes, 
also a negative relationship is found. In this study, we want to clarify the relationship between the 
educational level and job satisfaction, using the Flemish SONAR-survey data. In this survey, 2212 23 
year olds were surveyed regarding their labour market career and education. 
 
In section 1 we give a brief review of the relevant job satisfaction literature. Section 2 introduces our 
hypotheses and explains how to test them. Section 3 presents the data and empirical results. Section 
4 summarises our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Determinants of job satisfaction: a brief review of the literature 
 
Job satisfaction – “affective orientations on the part of individuals towards work roles, which they are 
presently occupying” (Vroom, 1967) - is a psychological concept, commonly used in (work and 
organisational) psychology (e.g. Spector, 1997). Freeman (1978) introduced it as an economic 
variable, assuming that it could explain economic behaviour too.  
In this study (see section 3), we will include several possible determinants of job satisfaction in order 
to clarify the impact of the level of education. Three categories of possible determinants can be 
distinguished. First of all, the level of education itself will be considered, since this variable is the 
focus of our research. According to Hall, the evidence regarding the relationship between education 
and job satisfaction is mixed (Hall, 1994). Most studies find support for a positive relationship (for 
example Hamilton & Wright, 1981; Glenn & Weaver, 1982; Burris, 1983; in: Hall, 1994). Clark & 
Oswald (1996), Clark (1999), Grund & Sliwka (2005) however find a negative relationship between 
the level of education and job satisfaction. These authors obtained the negative results after 
controlling for various income effects.  Grund & Sliwka (2005) interpret this negative relation as a 
confirmation of the hypothesis that job satisfaction is strongly influenced by aspirations.  The 
extensive overview of the literature on e.g. education and (job) satisfaction of Veenhoven (1984), 
also points to diverging results. Again, most studies suggest both variables to be positively related. 
Some others, however, suggest a negative correlation, or no relationship at all. In this study, we 
examine whether these inconsistent results are due to variables related to the job of the respondents.  
The second category therefore considers job characteristics, as indicators of the quality of work of 
our respondents. It is not easy to define the characteristics of a ‘good job’, however, and scientists of 
various disciplines tend to use different criteria. Based on the literature (and because of some data 
restrictions), we first of all opt to analyse the wage (or income) as an economic indicator for a good 
job. The literature on job satisfaction indeed suggests that wage has a positive impact on job 
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satisfaction (e.g. Furnham, 1997). Note, however, that some authors do not find a (strong) empirical 
relationship between the absolute income level and job satisfaction. Lévy-Garboua & Montmarquette 
(1999) state that youth have a long term view and invest in their job, so that their actual wage has 
only a small impact on their level of satisfaction. Groot & Maassen Van den Brink (1999) argue that 
employees adapt to their higher wage, which diminishes the wage effect on satisfaction. Hamermesh 
(2001) indicates that changes in wage have an impact on job satisfaction. Clark & Oswald (1996) 
support the idea of a comparison income, which is significantly correlated with reported levels of job 
satisfaction.   
Next to the income, several job characteristics will be considered. In work and organizational 
psychology, several theories have been developed, suggesting a specific set of job characteristics to 
indicate job quality, which subsequently leads to job satisfaction. Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman 
(1959) were among the first to identify work intrinsic aspects like recognition, achievement and 
responsibility as factors, which increase job satisfaction. Later on, Hackman and Oldham (1976) 
developed their ‘Job Characteristics Model’ in which satisfaction depends upon the presence of five 
core job dimensions: variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback. O’Brien added 
skill utilization to this list (O’Brien, 1986). Karasek and Theorell (1990) discuss the importance of 
autonomy (an aspect of job control) and of workload (an aspect of job demands). Warr’s ‘Vitamin 
Model’ (1987) encompasses the largest list of job characteristics indicating job quality (and 
subsequent job satisfaction). This list adds to the already mentioned job characteristics (such as 
income and variety) aspects such as the opportunity for control and for skill use, externally generated 
goals and physical security, among others.   
In accordance with dual labour market theory (Piore, 1970), contract type is added as a possible 
indicator of job quality. An overview of research on the consequences of temporary work indeed 
suggests that temporary work can be considered as an indicator of reduced job quality (De Witte & 
Näswall, 2003), which is sometimes also associated with lower job satisfaction (for an overview, see 
e.g. De Cuyper, Isaksson & De Witte, 2005). Pénard et al. (1998) for instance, report that young 
workers in France are less satisfied with their job when they work on a temporary contract, compared 
to those with a permanent contract.  
The third category of determinants of job satisfaction relates to background characteristics. These 
variables are included as control variables. A review of the job satisfaction literature shows that 
aspects such as gender (Clark, 1997), occupational level of the parents (Godechot & Gurgand, 2000) 
and company size (Dunn, 1986; Idson, 1990) are all associated with job satisfaction.  
 
 
3. The role of indicators of a “good job” in the relationship between 
educational level and job satisfaction 
 
We will test the hypothesis that job quality acts as a crucial (‘contaminating’) variable in the 
relationship between the educational level and job satisfaction. We hypothesize that the positive 
relationship between educational level and job satisfaction, which is found in several studies, results 
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from the impact of job quality on satisfaction. We assume that the higher educated have jobs of 
‘better quality’ (e.g. with better job characteristics), which in turn results in an increase in satisfaction. 
Figure 1 summarises our hypotheses. 
 
Figure 1: Hypothetical relationships between educational level, job quality and job satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test the ‘true’ impact of the educational level on job satisfaction, we estimate three models.  
In the first model, we examine the impact of the educational level (X) on job satisfaction (Y): 
1Y Xβ ε= + . 
We assume a positive relation between the educational level and job satisfaction: 0β >  (hypothesis 
1). 
 
In a second model, we estimate the impact of the educational level on job quality (Q):  
2Q Xα ε= + . 
We assume a positive relation between educational level and the various job quality indicators: 
0α >  (hypothesis 2).  
 
The third model will reveal the ‘true’ impact of educational level on job satisfaction, when the job 
quality indicators are added as independent variables:  
3'Y X Qβ δ ε= + + . 
We assume a positive impact of the job quality indicators on job satisfaction: 0δ >  (Hypothesis 
3a). For the resulting relationship between educational level and job satisfaction, three alternatives 
are possible (assuming that hypothesis 2 0α >  is valid): 
1. A less significant (positive) association between job satisfaction and educational level, 
indicating that the higher educated have jobs of better quality and at the same time are 
(intrinsically) more satisfied with their work: 'β β< (hypothesis 3b.1). 
2. No remaining significant association between job satisfaction and educational level, after 
controlling for the job quality indicators. This suggests that the higher satisfaction levels 
of the higher educated are only due to the (better) quality of their jobs. When the lower 
Educational level (X) 
Job quality (Q) 
Job satisfaction (Y) 
Higher educated workers: better jobs but less satisfied?                                                                               27 
and higher educated have a job with similar characteristics, their satisfaction levels would 
be similar: ' 0β =  (hypothesis 3b.2). 
3. A negative association between the educational level and job satisfaction, indicating that 
the higher educated are less satisfied with a job of similar quality than the lower 
educated: ' 0β <  (hypothesis 3b.3). 
 
The first two assumptions are supported by literature. Research suggests that the level of education 
is positively associated with job satisfaction in most studies: the higher educated are generally more 
satisfied with their jobs (e.g. Hall, 1994; Veenhoven, 1984; Spector, 1997). The level of education is 
also strongly associated with the occupational position of workers, partly because the educational 
level is used as an access criterion in order to achieve a higher occupational position (see e.g. 
Marshall, Newby, Rose & Vogler, 1988). A higher occupational position is related to most indicators 
of job quality, such as income, and job characteristics, such as autonomy and skill use (Spector, 
1997; Warr, 1987). The third hypothesis relates to the controversy in literature, which will be tested in 
this study. We assume that the job quality indicators will be associated with job satisfaction 
(hypothesis 3a), as suggested in many theoretical models in work and organizational psychology 
(e.g. Herzberg et al., 1959; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; O’Brien, 1986; Karasek & Theorell, 1990; 
Warr, 1987). The ‘true’ relationship between the educational level and job satisfaction will be 
explored, after controlling for all job quality indicators (see the three alternatives mentioned above; 
hypotheses 3b.1 until 3b.3).  Job satisfaction literature offers two main reasons why certain groups 
(in our case higher and lower educated people) might on average report higher or lower feelings of 
well-being at work, besides the obvious reason that certain job characteristics occur more often 
within a certain group.  A first reason is different work values: factors that do not occur more often but 
have a different impact on the groups.  The second reason might be differences in expectations 
about the job. (Spector, 1997) 
 
 
4. Education and satisfaction with the first job: results of an empirical 
study on Flemish youngsters 
 
4.1 Design and sample 
 
Sample 
The data used in this study was collected by the research consortium ‘SONAR’ (SONAR, 2001) in 
Flanders (Belgium). Belgium is known as a country with a low participation rate (below the EU 
average) due to a later entrance of youth on the labour market and the early retirement of many older 
workers (Vrind, 2000).  The primary locus of wage negotiations in Belgium is the joint industrial 
committee organised at the national level for each economic sector, resulting in central agreements 
covering a variety of issues (wage an non-wage aspects).  Subsequent bargaining takes place at 
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regional, enterprise and plant level.  Union density (the fraction of the wage and salary earners 
(augmented by the unemployed) who belong to a union) is relatively stable around 55%; union 
coverage is about 90% (Wallerstein et al., 1997).  
In Belgium there are large differences in economic performance between the regions Flanders, 
Wallonia and Brussels.  Flanders performs better in investing, export and economic growth, resulting 
in better labour market indicators compared to the other Belgian regions. The Flemish unemployment 
rate (5.4% of the labour force in 1999) is below the European level (Vrind, 2000).  The female 
unemployment rate (about 7%) is higher than the male unemployment rate, but much lower than the 
European average of about 11% in 2000.  Women in Flanders more often work part time than the 
European average (41% versus 34%).  There is however a huge difference in Flanders between men 
and women with regard to part time work, with almost no men working part time in Flanders. 
(Steunpunt WAV, 2000)  
‘SONAR’ is a Dutch abbreviation (‘Studiegroep van Onderwijs naar Arbeidsmarkt’), which can be 
translated as ‘Research Consortium for the Study of the Transition between Education and Labour 
Market’. The aim of the consortium is to study a representative sample of young Flemish adults’ 
transition from various educational institutions to the labour market. This aim is achieved in two 
phases. First, a cross-sectional survey of a large and heterogeneous sample of young adults of the 
same age is taken at regular intervals. Next, the same age group is surveyed again at a later stage 
(longitudinal follow-up design).  
 
This study will use the data of the first survey (young adults born in 1976) consisting of 3 010 young 
Flemish adults, interviewed between October 1999 and March 2000 (see Sonar, 2001). At that point 
in time, all the respondents were 23 years old. The sample was randomly selected and trained 
interviewers at the interviewees’ home address performed the oral interviews. About 51% of the 
respondents were male and 49% were female, a ratio which is also found in the Population Statistics. 
At the time of the interview, about 15% of the respondents were still in training (e.g. higher 
education). The others were either unemployed (11.4%) or working (73.4%). In this contribution, we 
restrict the analysis to working respondents (n= 2212).  Respondents who were unemployed at the 
time of the interview (n=347) are thus deleted from the sample.  We confine the analysis to data of 
the first job even though, at the time of the interview, some of the respondents were already working 
in a second (or third) job (n=1125) or were unemployed (n=93). The gender division of this reduced 
sample did not differ much from that of the larger sample (52% men as opposed to 48% women). 
About 11.1% of the respondents had obtained a university degree, and 28.1% had obtained a non-
university higher education diploma (amounting to 37% of highly educated respondents). More or 
less 52.2% had obtained the higher secondary education certificate, 5.5% had obtained a lower 
secondary education certificate and 2.7% the primary education certificate. Respondents with the 
lowest degree of schooling were to a certain extent under-represented in this sample. For an 
explanation of the various levels of education, see Appendix 1.  About 81.8% were employed by the 
private sector (41.2% as blue-collar workers and 40.6% as white-collar workers), and 12.4% by the 
public sector. The remaining 5.6% were self-employed. About 17% were working part-time and no 
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less than 57% had a fixed term contract (temporary work). Only 15.6% of the respondents were 
married, and a small number (1.8%) were not of Belgian nationality.  
 
Job satisfaction in the SONAR-data 
In the SONAR-questionnaire the workers were surveyed regarding their satisfaction with 12 aspects 
of their job, and with the job as a whole. The response-scale varies from ‘very satisfied’ to ‘very 
unsatisfied’. Respondents were fairly satisfied with their first labour market experience: almost three-
quarter of the respondents were rather or very satisfied with their work as a whole.  
Respondents were surveyed about their satisfaction with their first job. All individuals who have once 
started working thus had to give a retrospective evaluation of their job satisfaction at the beginning of 
their first job.  We will limit the analysis to satisfaction with the job as a whole (one item measurement 
of ‘global satisfaction’, see: Spector, 1997). The results of a meta-analysis of job satisfaction 
research suggest that one can adequately measure this concept with only one item (Wanous et al., 
1997).  
 
Job characteristics 
The job characteristics were measured with self-reports by the respondents. All individuals who once 
started working were asked to give a retrospective evaluation of these aspects at the beginning of 
their first job. We use ratings of 30 aspects of their job. This battery of items was previously used in 
Belgian research (see e.g. Hooge & De Witte, 1998). The respondents had to score whether they 
completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree, or completely disagree with each item. Principal 
components analysis was used, and items loading on the same factor were added in order to obtain 
a reliable scale. We distinguish seven characteristics of the job. In appendix 2 we present these 
characteristics with their factor loadings (i.e. the correlation between the original variables and the 
factor). In the subsequent analysis, we only use the newly created variables (scales) as substitutes 
for the original variables (items). In doing so, the job characteristics are reduced to 7 aspects (instead 
of 30), because many of them were highly correlated. The following aspects were measured: 
dangerous working conditions (‘physical demanding job’), the extent to which one can use one’s 
skills (‘skill utilisation’), job related learning, autonomy, workload, complexity (a composite of 
responsibility and complexity) and variety. These aspects cover most job characteristics as 
discussed in recent models of work stress (e.g. Warr, 1987; O’Brien, 1986; Karasek & Theorell, 
1990).  
Regarding wage, the respondents had to indicate the category in which their net monthly wage falls. 
Consequently, this variable is a categorical variable in the analysis. We also include an indicator of a 
‘comparison income’ in the analysis.  This variable was constructed in two steps. First, we estimated 
the wage category in which we could expect the respondent to be, when we take his/her background 
and job characteristics into account.  Next, we compared this position with his/her actual wage, to 
determine whether this respondent obtained a higher or lower wage in reality.  This variable is 
included in the analysis by use of two dummies: one for obtaining a higher wage than predicted and 
one for obtaining a lower wage than predicted.   
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The contract type is a dummy variable, distinguishing a permanent from a temporary contract. 
 
Control variables 
Gender, occupational level of the parents and company size are included in the model as control 
variables.  Next to these, two additional variables are included in the analysis.  The first indicates the 
duration of ‘recall bias’, expressing the amount of months that passed since the start of the first job 
(date of the interview minus start date of the first job).  By including this variable, we control for the 
time span since the respondent started to work, because the first job is longer ago for some 
respondents than for others. This difference could affect their recollection of the data.  
Because the sample consists of workers in their first job as well as of workers who already had more 
than one job, we also include a dummy variable which contrasts those working in their first job to 
those who found a second (or third) job.  This variable also covers the influence of job change. As a 
consequence, also this variable could be used as an indicator of the quality of the first job. We 
therefore only include this variable in the final model. 
 
 
4.2 Empirical analysis 
 
In model 1 and 3 we regress job satisfaction on the educational level. Because the dependent 
variable (satisfaction with the job as a whole) is an ordered variable (from low to high satisfaction), 
we opt for an ordinal regression analysis. Such a model is based on an underlying latent variable 
*
i i iy xβ ε= + , which follows a standard logistic distribution1.  The latent variable *iy  is related to 
the observed job satisfaction variable: *j-1 j  if  i iy j yγ γ= < ≤ , with j the job satisfaction category 
(going from 1 to 5) and lγ  (l=0,…,5) the threshold parameters ( 0 5,γ γ= −∞ = +∞ ).  The 
probabilities have the following form, given the parameters jγ  and β  and explanatory variables 
ix : 
*
exp( )( )  ( )  
1 exp( )
j i
i i j
j i
x
P y j P y
x
γ βγ
γ β
−
≤ = ≤ =
+ −
.  
 
In the third model also the indicators of job quality ( iQ ) are included as independent variables, so 
*
'i i i iy X Qβ δ ε= + + .  
 
                                                     
1  We estimated the model with a different distributional assumption. The logit model fits the data better than 
alternative models (probit, complemantary log-log). 
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The interpretation of the β  coefficients is in terms of the latent variable or in terms of the 
probabilities. A positive coefficient kβ  means that the latent variable *iy  increases if ikx  increases. 
Correspondingly the probability of being very satisfied will increase, whereas the probability of being 
very unsatisfied will decrease (Verbeek, 2000)2. 
 
The second model consists of regressing the job quality indicators on the educational level. Since 
wage was measured in categories, we also use an ordinal regression model. The various job 
characteristics are measured as continuous factors. For these variables, OLS regressions were 
used. In the modelling of the contract type as indicator for job quality, the dependent variable is a 
binary variable. As a consequence, we opt for a binary logit model when analysing this variable 
(Greene, 2003). The choice of the logistic distribution for the error term of the underlying latent 
variable (cf. ordered logit model) results in the following probability of obtaining a temporary contract 
in the first job: 
exp( )(permanent contract )
1 exp( )
i
i
i
XP X
X
β
β= + . 
 
We restrict the sample to full-time workers. All determinants except the characteristics of the job are 
entered as dummy variables. The reference category is always indicated.  
 
The results of the regressions regarding the second model are presented in appendix 3.  The results 
show that the educational level has a significant positive impact on the majority of the job quality 
indicators (hypothesis 2). In general, respondents with a higher (e.g. tertiary) level of education report 
more job related learning, skill utilisation, variety, autonomy, a higher income and a more complex 
job. These respondents also report less dangerous working conditions than their lower educated 
counterparts. No significant effect is found for the variable “work load”. The impact of the educational 
level on the probability of getting a temporary contract is opposite to our assumption. Having a 
degree of lower tertiary education increases the probability of obtaining a temporary contract, 
compared with those having a degree of higher secondary education. For the other educational 
levels, no significant effect was found.  
 
In table 1, we present the results of the first and third model, in which job satisfaction was regressed 
on the educational level.  Since the Heckman selection model was not supported, we report the 
model without the correction terms.  In the first step, only background characteristics were introduced 
as control variables. In the third step of the model, also the job quality indicators were introduced as 
independent variables.  
                                                     
2The results of the job satisfaction regression analysis could be biased: respondents with a low score on job 
satisfaction are omitted from the estimation, leading to a censored sample. Following standard procedures we 
tested whether sample selection occurred using the Heckman procedure (1979).  We concluded that selection 
issues did not disturb our results.  The results of this test can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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Table 1 
 
The results of the first model show that the educational level has a significant (positive) impact on job 
satisfaction, which confirms hypothesis 1. The results of the third model show that the job quality 
indicators have a significant impact on job satisfaction, as hypothesized (hypothesis 3a). Wage and 
job related learning however show no significant association with job satisfaction. For ‘job related 
learning’, this could be due to the high correlation with the level of educational (Pearson correlation 
equals 0.425).  The additional variable “duration of the recall bias” has only a very limited impact in 
the first model.  Respondents who are still in their first job are significantly more satisfied with that 
job.  We can assume that those who were dissatisfied about their first job changed to a new job, 
because their first job did not correspond well with their wishes or aspirations.  Important in this 
context is that we controlled for this recall bias when analysing our results: the relation between 
educational level and job satisfaction cannot be attributed to the effect of switching from the first to a 
new job. 
The effect of the educational level has significantly changed in the third step, from a significant 
positive relationship (step 1) to a significant negative relationship. This finding is in line with the third 
alternative relationship, mentioned earlier (Hypothesis 3b.3). The first model thus seemed to confirm 
a positive relationship between education and job satisfaction, with higher educated workers showing 
a higher probability of being very satisfied. After controlling for background variables and job 
characteristics, however, we found a significant negative relationship in the third step of the model. 
This suggests that higher educated youngsters are more satisfied with their first job compared to 
their lower educated counterparts, because they have a ‘better’ job, with characteristics of higher 
quality. Once these differences in the quality of the first job are taken into account, the higher 
educated workers are less satisfied, however. These results thus indicate that the relationship 
between the educational level and job satisfaction as such is a negative one. Due to the impact of job 
quality indicators, this relationship becomes positive.  According to literature (cfr supra) these 
differences among higher and lower educated might be due to two main reasons.  The first reason 
might be that higher and lower educated have different values towards their work.  Higher educated 
might attach more value to certain characteristics which are possibly less available in their job.  A 
potential candidate to explain the differences between higher and lower educated might be the value 
they attach to promotion opportunities.  Workers in general and young worker in particular are rather 
unsatisfied with their promotion opportunities (De Witte & Verhofstadt, 2006).  Thurman (1977) in his 
international overview on job satisfaction also points to promotion prospects as the job aspect 
concerning which there is least satisfaction.  It is plausible that higher educated value promotion 
opportunities higher then lower educated do and are therefore on average less satisfied with their 
work in general.  A second possible explanation for the negative association of educational level and 
job satisfaction could be that a higher education induces higher expectations. When these 
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expectations are not met, dissatisfaction results (Hall, 1994). This could be particularly true in the first 
job, because these youngsters did not yet gain experience with jobs and with the labour market.3   
Table 1, however, does not show the size of the impact of the various variables. Therefore, we 
calculated the probability of being ‘unsatisfied’ and ‘satisfied’ for persons with different educational 
levels, for both models in table 1 (results displayed in table 2). In the first model, the reference 
person is a man with a higher secondary degree, whose father and mother had an intermediary job. 
In the third model, several additional variables are included. The reference man works still in his first 
job in a large company with a permanent contract and earns between 1,000 and 1,250 EUR a month, 
which is also his predicted wage. The values for the 7 job characteristics and the duration of the 
‘recall bias’ are the mean values of the sample (because we used factor scores for the job 
characteristics, the mean values are zero). For these reference persons, the probabilities of being 
unsatisfied and satisfied are calculated.  
The results in table 2 show that in the restricted model, the probability of being satisfied increases 
with an increase in the educational level. The probability that the reference man will be satisfied is 
73% when he has a degree of primary education. This probability increases to 82% when this person 
obtained a degree of higher tertiary education. The extended model, which also includes the job 
quality indicators, reveals quite different results, however. The probability to be satisfied is lower for 
those with a tertiary degree than for those with a secondary degree. The results in table 1 suggested 
that this difference is due to the inclusion of the various variables used to indicate job quality. To 
illustrate this point, satisfaction probabilities for the reference person with extreme job characteristics 
values are included in table 2. These scores are based on scale values. There are no outliers: all 
values (or cases) are realistic ones4. The reference man (with a degree of higher secondary 
education and with mean job characteristics) has a probability of 82.04% to be satisfied. When this 
person gets a job with the highest (e.g. maximum) score on skill utilisation, his probability of being 
satisfied increases to 94.54%. His probability of being unsatisfied decreases to less than half of this 
percentage. When he works in a job with maximum variety, his probability of being satisfied will be 
87.77% (also compared to 82.04%). Assuming that he has both advantages in his job (maximum skill 
utilisation and maximum variety) his probability of being satisfied increases further to 96.45% (figure 
not reported in table 2). This underpins the importance of the job characteristics ‘skill utilisation’ and 
‘variety’ for job satisfaction.  
We can thus conclude that the higher educated have a higher probability of being satisfied because 
of their favourable job characteristics and not because of their educational level as such. The better 
quality of their job is due to their higher level of education. It is remarkable, however, that they are 
less satisfied with ‘good’ job characteristics compared to the lower educated. This can be illustrated 
                                                     
3 The results for gender show that women are more satisfied than men.  A separate analysis for men and 
women did not result in different effects regarding the relation between educational level and job satisfaction.  
We however found that the negative effect of education on job satisfaction (after controlling for job quality) is 
somewhat stronger for men than for women. 
[4 ] For example the maximum value of skill utilisation appears 387 times in the sample, the minimum value of 
workload 242 times. 
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with the percentages regarding a job with dangerous working conditions in table 2. The reference 
man with a degree of lower secondary education degree would have a probability of 88.28% to be 
satisfied, if he was working in a job with the lowest score concerning dangerous working conditions. 
Working in the same job would lead to a much lower probability to be satisfied (e.g. 73.32%), if this 
person has a degree of higher tertiary education.  
 
Table 2 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The existing literature regarding the relationship between the level of education and job satisfaction is 
rather ambiguous. Most empirical research suggests a positive relationship between both variables, 
whereas others found no relationship or suggest a negative correlation.  In this paper, we 
hypothesize that the positive relationship between educational level and job satisfaction, found in 
several studies, results from the impact of indicators of job quality on satisfaction.  Our empirical 
analysis indeed confirmed the hypothesis that various indicators of job quality explain the relationship 
between the educational level and job satisfaction. Higher educated workers seem more satisfied 
than their lower educated counterparts. This association, however, is caused by the fact that the 
higher educated also obtain a job of better quality. When we control for the indicators of the quality of 
the first job, the association between the level of education and job satisfaction becomes negative: 
the higher educated report that they are less satisfied with their (first) job.  
Two possible explanations for this finding could be offered.  The first one is that higher and lower 
educated have different values towards their work. If higher educated attach more value to 
characteristics which are less available in their job (e.g. promotion opportunities) their reported well-
being will be lower.  Research into the work values of higher and lower educated workers could help 
to test this possible explanation. An alternative explanation is that a higher education induces higher 
expectations. These stronger expectations could result in dissatisfaction, when they are not met. This 
could be particularly true in the first job, because these young workers are still rather inexperienced. 
Further research is needed to check whether these results also hold for a sample of workers of all 
ages. This could indicate whether or not the obtained results are indeed due to the high expectations 
of high-educated young workers at the start of their career. We would expect no relationship at all 
between education and job satisfaction for older workers, since their expectations are based on their 
past labour market experience and their job satisfaction will only be influenced by the quality of their 
work. Testing our hypothesis for different samples is thus needed to check whether expectations do 
indeed explain why young higher educated workers are less satisfied than their lower educated 
counterparts.   
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The results of our study should encourage empirical studies on job satisfaction to control for the 
quality of the job, in order to obtain the true impact of the educational level on job satisfaction. As a 
result, diverging empirical results concerning this relationship might gradually converge. 
 
The largest impact on job satisfaction was due to job characteristics. Especially the possibility to use 
one’s skills, and variety in the job contributed to job satisfaction. The results however indicated that 
the less educated will be more satisfied in a ‘good job’ than the higher educated. Companies and 
policy makers should keep this in mind. Investing in the job quality of lower educated young workers 
might boost their job satisfaction and as a consequence also their productivity.  
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Appendix 1: Educational variables 
Primary less than a degree in secondary education or BUSO education 
Lower secondary the highest level attained is a second degree in secondary education 
Higher secondary the highest level attained is a third degree in secondary education, a 
seventh year of secondary education or a fourth degree of vocational 
secondary education 
Lower tertiary up to a higher degree of the short (non-university) type 
Higher tertiary education at the university level 
 
 
Appendix 2: Characteristics of the job 
 Dangerous working conditions  
Dirty work       0.793 
Smelly surroundings      0.724 
Noisy surroundings      0.705 
Dangerous or insecure conditions    0.703 
Requiring much physical effort     0.660 
 Skill utilisation  
 I can show my abilities      0.863 
 I can see the results of my work     0.792 
 I can indulge myself in my work     0.788 
 Job related learning  
Study regularly to keep up-to date    0.926 
Follow courses regularly     0.926 
 Autonomy  
Being able to decide what to do on a particular day  0.892 
Being able to decide how much to work on a day  0.891 
Being able to decide in which way to do the job   0.798 
 Workload  
Work at a great pace      0.908 
Work under time pressure      0.908 
 Complex job  
Many responsibilities      0.792 
Many creative ideas      0.777 
Much mental effort      0.724 
Direct others       0.635 
 Variety  
I can learn new things      0.908 
Varied work       0.908 
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Appendix 3: Results of the regression analysis in the different models 
Model 2  Coeff (st. error) 
Dependent variable wage   
primary education -0.327 (0.244) 
lower secondary -0.253 (0.194) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 1.639*** (0.112) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary 2.287*** (0.161) 
      
Dependent variable Temporary contract   
primary education 0.166 (0.256) 
lower secondary 0.159 (0.192) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 0.495*** (0.115) 
higher tertiary -0.171 (0.163) 
Independent variables 
    
Dependent variable dangerous working conditions 
 
primary education 0.219** (0.101) 
lower secondary 0.150* (0.079) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary -0.560*** (0.045) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary -0.947*** (0.065) 
Dependent variable autonomy 
  
primary education -0.107 (0.108) 
lower secondary -0.120 (0.083) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 0.536*** (0.048) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary 0.969*** (0.069) 
Dependent variable pressure of time 
  
primary education 0.003 (0.979) 
lower secondary -0.044 (0.089) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary -0.077 (0.051) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary -0.043 (0.073) 
Dependent variable complex job 
  
primary education -0.130 (0.108) 
lower secondary -0.353*** (0.082) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
Independent variables 
lower tertiary 0.669*** (0.047) 
Higher educated workers: better jobs but less satisfied?                                                                               38 
 higher tertiary 0.749*** (0.068) 
Dependent variable variation in the work   
primary education -0.222 (0.136) 
lower secondary -0.283** (0.100) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 0.488*** (0.056) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary 0.646*** (0.081) 
Dependent variable skill utilisation 
  
primary education -0.204* (0.114) 
lower secondary -0.162* (0.088) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 0.339*** (0.050) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary 0.391*** (0.072) 
Dependent variable learning 
  
primary education -0.135 (0.102) 
lower secondary -0.275*** (0.079) 
higher secondary (ref) 
  
lower tertiary 0.777*** (0.045) 
Independent variables 
higher tertiary 1.007*** (0.065) 
Other control variables included in all the models: gender, occupational level of the father, and 
occupational level of the mother 
Standard error in parentheses 
* significant 10% level   ** significant 5% level   *** significant 1% level 
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Table 1: Determinants of job satisfaction with the job as a whole (first job) 
 
 Model 1 Model 3 
Gender 0.174** (0.083) 0.207* (0.116) 
Education   
Primary education -0.208 (0.216) 0.329  (0.301) 
Lower secondary education -0.126 (0.147) 0.132 (0.190) 
Higher secondary degree (reference)   
Lower tertiary education 0.287 ** (0.118) -0.597 *** (0.173) 
Higher tertiary education 0.332 ** (0.167) -0.876 *** (0.235) 
   
Wage   
Less than 750 € a month  0.005 (0.263) 
Between 750 and 1,000 € a month  -0.199 (0.167) 
Between 1,000 and 1,250 € a month (reference)   
More than 1,250 € a month  0.115 (0.230) 
Higher wage scale than predicted  -0.172 (0.171) 
Lower wage scale than predicted  0.064 (0.178) 
   
Job characteristics   
Dangerous working conditions  -0.282 *** (0.060) 
Skill utilisation  1.028 *** (0.072) 
Job related learning  -0.045 (0.066) 
Autonomy  0.222 *** (0.065) 
Workload  -0.262 *** (0.057) 
Complex job  0.230 ** (0.071) 
Variety  0.417 *** (0.067) 
   
Contract   
Temporary contract  0.198* (0.106) 
Permanent contract (reference)   
   
Duration of ‘recall bias’ -0.006** (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 
At 23 still in first job  0.702*** (0.123) 
   
N 2106 1612 
Nagelkerke R2  0.010 0.214 
Other control variables included in the model: occupational level of the father, occupational level of 
the mother and company size. 
Standard error in parentheses. 
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* significant 10% level 
** significant 5% level 
*** significant 1% level 
The reported results are for the ‘very satisfied’ category. The threshold values for the other 
categories in theses models are:  
Treshold Model 1 Model 3 
Very unsatisfied -3.324 -4.398 
Rather unsatisfied -2.246 -3.003 
Satisfied, nor unsatisfied -1.209 -1.519 
Rather satisfied 0.534 1.155 
 
We do not report the log-likelihood statistic since these are biased due to the large number of empty 
cells (especially in the third model, in which also continuous variables are included). McCullagh & 
Nelder (1989) however showed that the difference of log likelihoods between the full model and the 
‘intercept only’ model can still be interpreted as chi square distributed statistics. It thus is a valid 
instrument to evaluate the model. Like the 2R  measure, this statistic shows that the more extensive 
model is better than the first model (SPSS, 1999). 
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Table 2: Probability of being satisfied  
 
 
Unsatisfied Satisfied nor 
unsatisfied 
Satisfied 
Model 1: reference person with    
    
Primary education 11.52% 15.34% 73.14% 
Lower secondary education 10.71% 14.57% 74.72% 
Higher secondary degree (reference) 9.57% 13.41% 77.02% 
Lower tertiary education 7.36% 10.94% 81.70% 
Higher tertiary education 7.05% 10.58% 82.37% 
    
    
Model 3: reference person with    
    
Primary education 3.45% 10.16% 86.39% 
Lower secondary education 4.17% 11.93% 83.90% 
Higher secondary degree (reference) 4.73% 13.23% 82.04% 
Lower tertiary education 8.27% 20.18% 71.54% 
Higher tertiary education 10.65% 23.81% 65.54% 
    
Minimum of dangerous working 
conditions 3.32% 9.84% 86.84% 
Maximum skill utilisation 1.29% 4.17% 94.54% 
Maximum job related learning 5.16% 14.19% 80.65% 
Maximum autonomy 3.12% 9.32% 87.56% 
Minimum workload 2.99% 8.98% 88.03% 
Maximum complex job 3.16% 9.42% 87.42% 
Maximum variety 3.06% 9.17% 87.77% 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Testing Karasek’s learning- and strain hypothesis  
on young workers in their first job 
  
 
Abstract 
Both hypotheses of Karasek’s ‘Job Demand-Control’-model are tested: an imbalance between 
demands (workload) and control (autonomy) increases strains (job dissatisfaction; strain hypothesis), 
whereas a balance between both job characteristics increases learning and development in the job 
(here: learning new skills in the first job; learning hypothesis). Both hypotheses are tested in two 
ways: (a) the mere combination of both job characteristics is associated with the expected outcomes, 
and (b) a statistical interaction between both job characteristics occurs. A large- dataset (n = 2.439) 
of young workers in their first job is used to test all hypotheses. The results confirm both the strain 
and the learning hypothesis. We found a combined effect of both job characteristics, as well as a 
statistical interaction between both variables. The lowest level of job satisfaction is found in the ‘high 
strain’ job, whereas the highest increase in skills is found in the ‘active’ job. All predictions of 
Karasek’s JDC-model are thus corroborated. The consequences of these findings for theory and 
practice are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Karasek’s ‘Job Demand-Control’-model (1979; also see Karasek & Theorell, 1990) has rapidly 
moved into a dominant position in the field of work and organisational psychology. One of the 
reasons for this may be its simplicity: the model integrates various older research traditions (e.g. 
Hackman & Oldham (1980) and the ‘Michigan model’ (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek & Rosenthal, 
1964)), and reduces a divergent series of stressors at work to only two dimensions. This leads to an 
economical model, which can be tested easily, and can be used to deduce unequivocal suggestions 
for redesigning job functions or -tasks.  
 
Not surprisingly, the model inspired extensive research. However, not all assumptions have reliably 
been confirmed thus far, and one crucial assumption is rarely tested: the hypothesis that work leads 
to active learning. Testing this hypothesis will be the main focus of this article. To complete the test 
of the Karasek model, its strain hypothesis will also be tested. The dataset used enables an 
adequate test of these hypotheses, because it relates to young people working in their first job.   
 
 
2. Karasek’s ‘Job Demand-Control’ model 
 
2.1 The model’s basis dimensions: psychological job demands versus decision 
latitude 
 
The original ‘Job Demand-Control’ model’s (further on: JDC-model) point of departure is that two 
basis dimensions can be distinguished when discussing the consequences of a specific work 
environment (Karasek, 1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). On the one hand there are the 
‘psychological job demands’ placed on the worker. The ‘job demands’ refer to a series of 
psychological stressors that are present in the work environment, such as time pressure and role 
conflicts. Generally, the combination of high working pace and high time pressure (high ‘workload’) is 
considered as the most important aspect of this dimension. Psychological job demands thus refer to 
the amount of work to be carried out and the time frame provided. A demanding job implies that one 
has to perform a lot of work within a limited time span. 
 
The second dimension refers to possible ‘control’ within the job environment: the possibilities at one’s 
disposal in deciding how to meet the job demands. This control dimension comprises two sub-
dimensions: ‘decision authority’ (the extent to which employees are able to take autonomous 
decisions on the job), and ‘skill discretion’ (the extent to which people can utilize their skills at work). 
These two sub-dimensions are usually grouped under a single denominator, i.e. ‘control’ or ‘decision 
latitude’. 
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The model’s simplicity has been criticised (e.g. Johnson & Hall, 1988), because it disregards some 
crucial job dimensions. In a subsequent elaboration of the model, a third dimension was added to the 
two previous ones: the amount of social support within the job environment (Karasek & Theorell, 
1990). This third dimension will not be taken into consideration in this article, however. In this 
contribution, the focus is on the original core model.  
 
Karasek argues that a combination of both dimensions is essential for the development of ‘strain’ and 
‘activity’. An imbalance between psychological job demands and decision latitude causes strain. This 
is evident in the ‘strain’ diagonal, which contrasts ‘low strain’ and ‘high strain’ jobs. The ‘strain 
hypothesis’ states that the most adverse reactions of psychological strain are to be expected in the 
high strain job, which combines high job demands with low job control. A balance between the 
challenges of the situation (e.g. job demands) and the individual’s skill or control in dealing with these 
challenges, results in opportunities to learn and develop. This is evident in the ‘activity or learning’ 
diagonal, which contrasts ‘passive’ and ‘active’ jobs. This results in the ‘learning hypothesis’ or 
‘activation hypothesis’ (e.g. de Lange, Taris, Kompier, Houtman & Bongers, 2003), stating that most 
learning will be found in the active job (e.g. high job demands combined with high job control).  
 
2.2 The strain hypothesis: work can be stressful 
 
Karasek first of all defines a ‘strain-diagonal’: strains are caused by a combination of high job 
demands and low decision latitude (‘strain hypothesis’). High job demands combined with low 
decision latitude constitute the most unfavourable situation within the model, leading to impaired 
well-being and ill health. This combination typifies a ‘high strain job’. A ‘low strain job’ combines low 
job demands with high decision latitude. The model assumes that workers in this job will report fewer 
health or well-being complaints. The core idea behind the strain hypothesis is thus that strains will 
increase when the model’s two dimensions are ‘out of balance’: an increase in job demands is 
problematic when it involves a reduction in decision latitude. The logic behind this assumption is that 
high demands initiate a state of arousal. This arousal will lead to damaging, residual strain when it 
cannot be converted into an effective coping response, due to a lack of discretion, needed to meet 
the demands effectively (Karasek & Theorell, 1990).  
 
The strain hypothesis can be divided into three sub-hypotheses. Firstly, it is assumed that an 
increase in job demands increases strains. Secondly, reducing the decision latitude or the 
possibilities of control likewise involves greater strain. As such, two main effects of the Karasek JDC-
model dimensions are specified. A third assumption specific to the Karasek model is the assumption 
that strains result from the ‘joint effects’ of both job dimensions (job demands and decision latitude; 
see Karasek, 1979). Karasek however remains unclear regarding the precise meaning of this ‘joint 
effect’ (e.g. de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; de Lange et al., 2003). One interpretation is that the mere 
combination of high job demands and low decision latitude leads to the highest strain level (additive 
effect). Another interpretation is that the combination of high job demands and low decision latitude 
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leads to more strain than the mere addition of the two dimensions’ effects taken separately. The 
latter involves an interaction in the statistical sense of the word, which exceeds the additive effect 
discussed above. Both interpretations of the ‘joint effect’ postulated by Karasek are accepted within 
the literature (cf. de Lange et al., 2003).  
 
Karasek’s strain hypothesis has been extensively tested in empirical research (for reviews: de Jonge 
& Kompier, 1997; van der Doef & Maes, 1998 & 1999; de Lange et al., 2003). Also in Belgium and 
the Netherlands, the Karasek model is frequently used to examine the job environment’s negative 
implications for health and well-being (e.g. de Lange, Taris, Kompier, Houtman & Bongers, 2004; 
Proost, De Witte, De Witte & Evers, 2004). The two postulated main effects are generally supported: 
both an increase in job demands and a decrease in the job’s decision latitude are associated with an 
increase in strains, be it in the work context (e.g. job dissatisfaction) or beyond the job context (e.g. 
lower psychological well-being; for reviews, see: de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; van der Doef & Maes, 
1999). A similar conclusion is reached based on large-scale epidemiological studies, focussing on 
various indicators of ill health, such as heart- and vascular diseases (e.g. de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; 
van der Doef & Maes, 1998).  
 
A recent review of longitudinal studies, however, reveals limited empirical evidence for the supposed 
combination effect of job demands and decision latitude on strains at a later date (de Lange et al., 
2003). This review reveals more evidence of separate main effects of both job dimensions. Even 
more problematic is the evidence regarding a possible interaction effect between job demands and 
decision latitude. Such an effect has been found by some researchers (e.g. Karasek, 1979; Parkes & 
Von Rabenau, 1993, both with regard to job satisfaction). In most studies, however, a similar 
interaction effect was not found (de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; van der Doef & Maes, 1998 & 1999; de 
Lange et al., 2003).  
 
2.3 The learning hypothesis: work can activate workers 
 
Karasek (1979) also defines a second diagonal alongside the strain diagonal: the ‘learning’- or 
‘activating’ diagonal. This diagonal defines a (more or less) equal balance between the two job 
dimensions. The core idea is that activation and learning will occur when the challenges of the 
situation (e.g. job demands) are matched by the individual’s skill and control in dealing with these 
challenges. Karasek describes the outcomes ‘activation’ and ‘learning’ as ‘an increase in overall 
activity and in general problem-solving activity’ (Karasek, 1979: 288). Taris and Kompier (2004) 
reviewed several studies on this issue, and concluded that the ‘learning hypothesis’ refers to learning 
new skills and behaviour patterns, effective problem solving (or adaptation to the environment) and 
to work involvement and motivation.  
 
The learning diagonal equally contrasts two job types. The combination of low job demands and low 
decision latitude typifies a ‘passive job’. This job type is unfavourable for learning, since it is 
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characterised by simple tasks and activities, which do not stimulate (problem solving) behaviour. An 
‘active job’, on the contrary, is characterised by high job demands combined with a high level of 
decision latitude. Although this job is very demanding and involves handling a lot of work, it also 
offers a large amount of control, since the workers in this job can work autonomously and are able to 
use all available skills. As a consequence, this job increases the possibility to learn and grow in the 
job. These workers can learn new skills while further developing already existing skills.  
 
The learning hypothesis can also be divided into three separate sub-hypotheses. First, an increase 
in job demands involves an increase in learning possibilities within the job. Second, an increase in 
decision latitude will have a similar effect. Apart from these two main effects, an additional ‘joint 
effect’ is also expected: the highest learning possibilities will occur in the situation characterised by 
high job demands and high decision latitude (the ‘active job’). However, once again Karasek is not 
very clear about the exact meaning of this ‘joint effect’ (e.g. de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; de Lange et 
al., 2003). Two interpretations are possible: the mere combination of both job dimensions leads to 
learning (high job demands combined with a high level of decision latitude; additive effect), or an 
interaction effect in a statistical sense between both dimensions will lead to most job related learning. 
 
It is striking that the learning hypothesis of the JDC-model inspired much less research than the 
strain hypothesis (de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; de Lange et al., 2003). This is particularly notable 
because research into positive job consequences (such as learning and growth) fits in well with the 
call to re-orientate the present research in the field of work and organisational psychology to 
‘positive’ instead of negative outcome variables (e.g. Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004; Schaufeli, 2004). 
Karasek reports a longitudinal study indicating that workers with a passive job become gradually 
more passive as regards recreational and political activities, while the opposite is true for employees 
with an active job (Karasek, 1978).  
 
Little research has analysed the learning hypothesis in a job context, however. In a recent overview, 
Taris and Kompier (2004) report that only 18 such studies could be found. A number of these studies 
do not focus on typical indications of learning or development. Five studies analyse job satisfaction, 
and three others focus on organisational commitment. The results in the remaining studies involve 
relevant outcome variables such as ‘work challenge’ and the motivation to learn. Taris and Kompier 
(2004) conclude their overview with the statement that most studies confirm the learning hypothesis, 
although it is too early for a definite conclusion. Some studies even contradict the learning 
hypothesis. Taris, Kompier, de Lange, Schaufeli and Schreurs (2003) found that teachers in a ‘low 
strain job’ displayed a higher degree of learning behaviour, while their colleagues with a ‘high strain 
job’ reported a lower degree of learning behaviour. It is striking that these effects are found on 
Karasek’s ‘strain diagonal’ instead of on the ‘learning diagonal’, as expected.  
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from Taris and Kompier’s overview (2004) regarding the 
combination of job demands and decision latitude. First of all, the assumed interaction between both 
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job dimensions has rarely been tested. Secondly, it is striking that decision latitude is more strongly 
associated with indicators of learning and activation than job demands. Finally, the (additive) 
combination of both job dimensions had the predicted effect on indicators of learning in almost two 
thirds of the reviewed studies.  
 
2.4 Topics for further research 
 
Two research lacunae are evident from the review of the literature. First, there is a need to test the 
learning hypothesis. Subsequently, the assumed interaction-effect within the strain- and learning 
hypothesis needs to be explored: Does it relate to the ‘mere combination’ of both job dimensions, or 
to an interaction in a statistical sense? The literature discussed above suggests that the evidence 
thus far of both interpretations is weak and ambiguous.  
 
Three other relevant suggestions can be derived from the literature, when testing the learning 
hypothesis. First, it seems essential to make a clear distinction between the dependent and 
independent variables. This is especially important when testing the learning hypothesis. De Jonge 
and Kompier (1997) warn against the danger of contamination, when one tries to predict learning 
(and skill development) on the basis of decision latitude, because the concept of skill utilisation is 
part of the latter. As a consequence, researchers are impelled to limit the decision latitude dimension 
to the concept of ‘autonomy’ only. Next, when testing the learning hypothesis, one should select an 
outcome variable that is clearly related to ‘active learning behaviour’ (Taris & Kompier, 2004). In line 
with their definition, Karasek and Theorell (1990) suggested three possible groups of such variables: 
learning new skills, problem solving behaviour and motivation. Finally, Taris and Kompier (2004) 
found that the majority of studies testing the learning hypothesis were limited to employees in 
‘contactual’ professions, who have to focus on others in performing their job (e.g. nurses and 
teachers). This concentration of research in homogeneous professional groups may have distorted 
the results (see also Houtman & Smulders, 2003), hampering the possibility to draw general 
conclusions. Future studies using more heterogeneous samples are needed, in order to test the 
learning hypothesis more fully. These three suggestions will be taken into account in this study.  
 
 
3  Method 
 
3.1 Design and sample 
 
The data used in this study was collected by the research consortium ‘SONAR’ (SONAR, 2001) in 
Flanders (Belgium). ‘SONAR’ is a Dutch abbreviation (‘Studiegroep van Onderwijs naar 
Arbeidsmarkt’), which can be translated as ‘Research Consortium for the Study of the Transition 
between Education and Labour Market’. The aim of the consortium is to study a representative 
sample of young Flemish adults’ transition from various educational institutions to the labour market. 
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This aim is achieved in two phases. First, a cross-sectional survey of a large and heterogeneous 
sample of young adults of the same age is taken at regular intervals. Next, the same age group is 
surveyed again at a later stage (longitudinal follow-up design).  
 
This study will use the data of the first survey (young adults born in 1976) consisting of 3 010 young 
Flemish adults, interviewed between October 1999 and March 2000 (see Sonar, 2001). At that point 
in time, all the respondents were 23 years old. The sample was randomly selected and trained 
interviewers at the interviewees’ home address performed the oral interviews. About 51% of the 
respondents were male and 49% were female, a ratio which is also found in the Population Statistics. 
At the time of the interview, about 15% of the respondents were still in training (e.g. higher 
education). The others were either unemployed (11,1%) or working (73,4%). In this contribution, the 
data on the first job are used (n=2439)1 even though, at the time of the interview, some of the 
respondents were already working their second (or third) job (n=1115) or were unemployed (n=93). 
The gender division of this sample did not differ from that of the sample survey (51% men as 
opposed to 49% women). About 10,5% of the respondents had obtained a university degree, and 
26,6% had obtained a non-university higher education diploma (amounting to 37% of highly 
educated respondents). More or less 53,5% had obtained the higher secondary education certificate, 
6% had obtained a lower secondary education certificate and 3,4% the primary education certificate. 
Respondents with the lowest degree of schooling were to a certain extent under-represented in this 
sample. About 82% were employed by the private sector (43% as blue-collar workers and 39% as 
white-collar workers), and 12,4% by the public sector. The remaining 5,6% were self-employed. 
About 18% were working part-time and no less than 58% had a fixed term contract (temporary work). 
Only 16% of the respondents were married, and a small number (2%) were not of Belgian nationality.  
 
This particular sample has a number of advantages for the purposes of this study. First, this sample 
is heterogeneous and – apart from the educational level – is also representative for the 23-year old 
population of working young adults. This meets the need for analyses based on non-homogeneous 
samples. The (quasi) representative nature of the data also permits generalisation of the 
conclusions. The use of a large scale data file has enables controlling for a large amount of 
background characteristics, which may confound the association with the dependent variables. 
Focussing on young people working their first job is interesting, because it allows analysing learning 
as well as strain on a category group not yet influenced by other job experiences. This is exactly the 
type of category that still has a lot to learn about job practice, thus constituting an excellent category 
of employees for testing the learning hypothesis. Finally, limiting the category to 23-year olds has the 
advantage of controlling possible confounding variables on a macro level. These young people enter 
the labour market at more or less the same time (standardisation of the economic conjuncture), are 
                                                     
1
 In the ‘SONAR’ survey, the first job is defined as paid employment supported by a job contract (or as self-
employed) for a minimum of one month, and for at least one hour a day and one day per week.   
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present in more or less the same stage of life, and grew up during the same time-period 
(standardisation regarding culture and values).  
 
3.2 Measures 
 
The SONAR questionnaire consists of a large number of questions. Only relevant variables are 
discussed in this section. Several background characteristics (such as gender, age and educational 
level) are recorded, next to questions related to the first job experience.  
 
First of all, a number of aspects of the first job were charted (such as contract duration and the 
amount of hours worked). The respondents were also asked to evaluate about thirty items 
concerning job characteristics on a 5-point scale (ranging from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’). 
These items were used and tested in previous research in Flanders (e.g. De Witte, 1990; Hooge & 
De Witte, 1998). To operationalise job demands and decision latitude, two concepts were selected 
from the list of items: workload and autonomy. Scholars traditionally select both concepts as 
indicators for the two Karasek dimensions (compare e.g. Houtman & Smulders, 2003), and the 
selection of autonomy as indicator for decision latitude meets the need for a clear distinction between 
the dependent and independent variables (de Jonge & Kompier, 1997). A principal component 
analysis (with varimax rotation) was performed on the selected items, and resulted in the two 
expected dimensions. Job autonomy was measured with three items (example: “I can determine the 
way in which I work” and “I can determine the amount of work I do in one day”). Workload was 
measured with two items (“I work at a high pace” and “I work under time constraints”). Note that the 
selection of items also meets the recommendation that both dimensions of the Karasek model must 
refer to one another (van der Doef & Maes, 1999). When operationalising autonomy, reference was 
made to the control of workload. Factor scores, which will be used in all further analyses, were 
calculated for both dimensions.  
 
Job (dis)satisfaction is chosen as indicator for ‘strain’. This concept was measured with one item 
(e.g. “How satisfied are you with your work in general?”), and could be scored on a 5-point scale 
(from ‘very satisfied’ to ‘very dissatisfied’). Most respondents were ‘satisfied’ (39,4%) or ‘very 
satisfied’ (35,5%) with their first job. Only 14,1% scored ‘neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied’ and 7,0% 
were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’. This distribution corresponds with the findings of other 
research in Flanders (e.g. De Witte, Hooge, Vandoorne & Glorieux, 2001). A meta-analysis regarding 
job satisfaction suggests that this concept can be measured with only one item (Wanous, Reichers & 
Hudy, 1997). When analysing the JDC-model, Karasek also suggested using job dissatisfaction as 
indicator of strain (Karasek, 1979).  
 
As suggested above, it is crucial to select a relevant outcome variable in order to test the learning 
hypothesis (Taris & Kompier, 2004). Learning new skills is such a variable, and the data used enable 
to measure this concept. As a criterion for ‘learning in the job’ the following question could be used: 
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“Did you learn a number of new skills in your first job, which you did not possess before?” The 
respondents could only answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. About 76.3% of the respondents declared having learnt 
new skills in their first job, and 23.7% did not.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 
The three sub- hypotheses of the strain hypothesis will be tested first. Hypothesis 1a states that an 
increase in workload is associated with reduced job satisfaction (main effect of workload on job 
satisfaction). Hypothesis 1b states that (job) autonomy is positively associated with job satisfaction 
(main effect of autonomy on job satisfaction). Karasek’s assumption regarding the ‘joint effects’ of 
both job dimensions (hypothesis 1c: interaction effect of workload and autonomy on job satisfaction) 
can be tested in two ways (e.g. de Lange et al., 2003). One can test whether both main effects are 
found simultaneously (‘combination’). The explicit interaction hypothesis sates that the combination 
of high workload with low autonomy leads to a decrease in job satisfaction that exceeds the sum of 
the effects of both dimensions taken separately (‘interaction’).  
 
The learning hypothesis can also be tested by testing three separate sub-hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a 
assumes that an increase in workload is associated with learning new skills. Hypothesis 2b states 
that an increase in autonomy is associated with learning new skills. Next to these two main effects, a 
‘combination effect’ is expected as part of hypothesis 2c (both dimensions together influence the 
learning of new skills). To conclude hypothesis 2c, an explicit interaction between workload and 
autonomy is expected: the combination of both job dimensions will have a more positive impact on 
the learning of new skills in the first job than the mere sum of the effects of the two separate 
dimensions.  
 
3.4 Statistical analysis 
 
To test both hypotheses we opt for a suitable logistic regression analysis.  Since the dependent 
variable to test the strain hypothesis (job satisfaction) is an ordered variable, we use an ordinal logit 
analysis (McCullagh, 1980).  The dependent variable for testing the learning hypothesis (whether or 
not new skills were learned in the course of the first job) is a binary variable, so we perform a binary 
logit model (Greene, 2003).  
 
Job satisfaction and the extent, to which one learned new skills, are of course also influenced by 
other variables. For this reason, various confounding variables are kept under control in the analysis. 
In order to compare the results of both analyses, the same control variables are introduced when 
testing the strain and the learning hypothesis. These are traditional demographic characteristics, 
such as gender and educational level, supplemented with specific occupational characteristics such 
as job level, full-time versus part-time work, job contract shift work, day- or night shifts, net salary, 
and company size. Two variables were especially added because they could play a confounding role 
Testing Karasek’s learning- and strain hypothesis on young workers in their first job                       54 
when testing the learning hypothesis: the extent to which the workers’ level of education is too high 
or too low for their present occupation (subjective assessment of over- versus underemployment; 3 
categories, with ‘just enough training’ as the middle category), and the extent to which people were 
given ‘on the job training’ (yes versus no).  
Next to these, two additional variables are included in the analysis.  The first indicates the duration of 
‘recall bias’, expressing the amount of months that passed since the start of the first job (date of the 
interview minus start date of the first job).  By including this variable, we control for the time span 
since the respondent started to work, because the first job is longer ago for some respondents than 
for others. This difference could affect their recollection of the data.  
Because the sample consists of workers in their first job as well as of workers who already had more 
than one job, we also include a dummy variable which contrasts those working in their first job to 
those who found a second (or third) job.  This variable also covers the influence of job change. To 
test the interaction effect between autonomy and workload, both factor scores were multiplied and 
subsequently added to the analyses. Because factor scores are used, the suggestions by Aiken and 
West (1991) regarding testing interaction terms are met (e.g. the need to centre both variables 
beforehand). All coefficients reported below are unstandardised coefficients.  
 
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Test of the strain hypothesis  
 
The results of the test of the strain hypothesis are reported in Table 1. Because we run a regression 
to estimate the probability of being ‘very satisfied’-, we expect a negative coefficient for workload 
(hypothesis 1a) and a positive coefficient for autonomy (hypothesis 1b). 
 
Table 1 
 
The results in Table 1 indeed show a significant positive sign for autonomy and a significant negative 
one for workload. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are corroborated2. Note that autonomy is more strongly 
associated with job satisfaction than workload. The corroboration of hypothesis 1a and 1b also 
supports the assumption of an additive effect of both job dimensions (‘combination’ interpretation of 
the postulated joint effect of autonomy and workload). The results in Table 1 however also show a 
significant interaction effect. The exact nature of this interaction was examined by splitting both 
                                                     
2
 In another analysis (Verhofstadt & Omey, 2003) a few additional variables, such as the parents’ occupational 
position and various job characteristics (e.g. skills utilisation and task variation), were kept under control when 
predicting job satisfaction. These variables did not, however, modify the correlation with the dimensions 
autonomy and job demands.  
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scales (autonomy and workload) into two, and by cross tabulating both dichotomous scales3. This 
results in Karasek’s four job types: A passive job, an active job, a low strain job and a high strain job. 
Figure 1 reports the percentage of respondents within these four categories who were dissatisfied 
with their job (combination of the ‘dissatisfied’ and the ‘very dissatisfied’ response categories).  
Figure 1. Test of strain hypothesis
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The results in figure 1 confirm hypothesis 1c: The interaction displayed in this figure is in line with 
Karasek’s strain hypothesis. Job dissatisfaction is higher amongst those with low autonomy (main 
effect of autonomy) and amongst those with high workload (main effect of workload). Low job 
autonomy combined with high workload leads to a level of job dissatisfaction which exceeds the 
additive effect of both separate job dimensions, resulting in no less than 20,5% of dissatisfied 
respondents in the ‘high strain’ job. Autonomy thus seems to buffer the negative impact of workload 
on dissatisfaction, as expected in Karasek’s interaction hypothesis.  
 
4.2 Test of the learning hypothesis 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the test of the learning hypothesis. According to hypotheses 2a and 2B, 
a positive coefficient for workload (hypothesis 2a) and a positive coefficient for autonomy (hypothesis 
2b) were expected. 
Table 2 
 
The results in table 2 confirm both hypotheses: a high score on job autonomy and a high workload 
are significantly associated with the acquisition of more new skills in the first job. The association 
between both job dimensions and the acquisition of new skills is roughly of the same magnitude. The 
                                                     
3
 Because factor scores are used, a score above or equal to zero is considered as ‘high’, and a score below zero 
is considered as ‘low’.  
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fact that we find evidence for both main effects (hypothesis 1a and 1b) also corroborates the 
interpretation of a ‘combination effect’ regarding Karasek’s ‘joint effect’ of both job dimensions. 
Hypothesis 2c however also states that an interaction effect will occur between workload and 
autonomy in predicting the acquisition of new skills. This interaction effect is indeed significant. The 
nature of this interaction was examined by splitting both scales in two equal parts, and by cross 
tabulating both dichotomous scales4. Figure 2 reports the percentage of respondents indicating that 
they acquired new skills in their first job within each of the four Karasek job types.  
Figure 2. Test of growth hypothesis
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The results in Figure 2 confirm hypothesis 2c. The extent to which people acquired new skills was 
higher amongst those who score high on autonomy (main effect of autonomy) and amongst those 
working under high workload (main effect of workload). Furthermore, the combination of high 
autonomy and high workload leads to an increase in the percentage of respondents who acquired 
new skills. This effect transcends the mere additive effect of both separate job dimensions. In the 
‘active’ job category, almost 86% indicated having learnt new skills in their new job. Autonomy thus 
appeared to increase the positive impact of workload on learning, as expected in Karasek’s 
interaction hypothesis.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Several aspects of Karasek’s Job-Demand-Control model were tested in this contribution (Karasek, 
1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). In contrast to most studies, both hypotheses of the JDC-model 
                                                     
4
 Because factor scores are used, a score above or equal to zero is considered ‘high’, and a score below zero as 
‘low’. 
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were tested, and not just the strain hypothesis. The strain hypothesis states that an imbalance 
between job demands and job control leads to strain. Consistent with the call to orientate research in 
occupational health psychology to ‘positive’ instead of negative outcomes and processes (e.g. 
Schaufeli, 2004), the learning hypothesis of the JDC-model was tested too. This hypothesis states 
that high demands and high control in the job increase growth, development and learning. 
Remarkably fewer studies are devoted to the test of this ‘positive’ hypothesis (Taris & Kompier, 
2004). As a consequence, testing this hypothesis was the main focus of this article. Many studies are 
limited to the test of the main effects of both job dimensions of the JDC-model. In this contribution, 
however, the focus was on the assumption that the ‘joint effects’ of both job dimensions are of 
particular importance. Karasek remained rather vague regarding the exact nature of this joint effect 
(e.g. de Jonge & Kompier, 1997; de Lange et al., 2003). In line with the literature (de Lange et al., 
2003), two interpretations of this joint effect are tested. The first states that the mere combination of 
both main effects will result in strain or learning. The second implies a statistical interaction: The 
combination of job demands and job control will lead to more strain or learning than the mere 
addition of the effects of both dimensions taken separately.  
The hypotheses were tested using a large-scale dataset of 23-year-old young workers in Flanders 
(Belgium) (n = 2439). The data all referred to their first job. This sample had several advantages. 
First of all, the sample was heterogeneous (except for the age of the respondents). This meets the 
call of Taris and Kompier (2004) to test the learning hypothesis with non-homogeneous samples. 
The focus on young workers in their first job offers the opportunity to test both strain and learning 
among a category at the early stages of their career. This category is not yet influenced by other job 
experiences, and still has a lot to learn. As such, this category thus constitutes an excellent category 
to test whether learning (or strains) is determined by job characteristics, such as autonomy or 
workload. The analysis of the same cohort of young workers also enables to control for several 
confounding contextual variables, like the economic conjuncture at the time of their entry in the 
labour market, or the impact of a specific stage of life.  
In testing the hypotheses of the JDC-model, some additional refinements, suggested in previous 
research are taken into account. The dimension of job control was limited to the aspect of job 
autonomy. This avoids contamination between the measurement of the independent variable 
(control) and that of the dependent variable ‘learning in the job’ (de Jonge & Kompier, 1997). 
Karasek considers the dimension of skill utilisation as an aspect of control, whereas this dimension 
shows a conceptual overlap with the dependent variable ‘learning new skills on the job’. This overlap 
is avoided by limiting the analyses to job autonomy. Next, an attempt is made to conceptually attune 
both dimensions of the JDC-model to one another, as recommended by van der Doef en Maes 
(1999). Finally, in testing the learning hypothesis, the dependent variable needs to be closely related 
to active learning behaviour, as recommended by Taris en Kompier (2004). To meet this 
requirement, the acquisition of new skills while performing the first job was selected.  
 
The results of the analyses corroborated all hypotheses derived from the JDC-model. First of all, all 
aspects of the strain hypothesis were corroborated. A higher degree of autonomy in the job was 
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associated with a higher score on job satisfaction, and a higher level of workload was associated 
with more dissatisfaction about the job. Both main effects were found simultaneously, thus confirming 
the first variant of Karasek’s ‘joint effects’ hypothesis: the mere combination of high workload and low 
autonomy (resulting in a ‘high strain job’) is associated with the highest level of job dissatisfaction. 
Next to this, evidence was also found for a statistical interaction. The combination of both job 
dimensions resulted in a lower score on job satisfaction than the mere addition of the negative 
effects of both dimensions taken separately. Such a statistical interaction is rather scarce (van der 
Doef & Maes, 1999), and suggests that job autonomy moderates the relation between workload and 
job satisfaction, as supposed in the JDC-model (Karasek, 1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). 
Autonomy can thus buffer the negative consequences of workload on job satisfaction. It is 
conspicuous that such an interaction effect is found in this analysis, whereas it remains absent in 
many other studies (see e.g. van der Doef & Maes, 1998 & 1999). This could be due to the specific 
characteristics of the sample: Young workers in their first job. One could assume that this specific 
category constitutes a suitable category for the determination of such an interaction effect. These 
young workers have no other job experience. They are confronted with the consequences of 
(specific) characteristics of their job for the first time, which could lead to the detection of clear 
effects.  
The various assumptions that can be derived from the learning hypothesis were also confirmed. High 
job autonomy was associated with the acquisition of new skills in the (first) job. A higher workload 
was equally associated with the acquisition of new skills. Striking, and in contrast to previous studies 
in this field (see e.g. Taris & Kompier, 2004), was the observation that both job dimensions were 
equally important in determining the learning of new skills. In their review article, Taris & Kompier 
(2004) conclude that job control is more strongly associated with indicators of growth than job 
demands. This differential effect was not found in this study. The finding that the acquisition of new 
skills was associated with both autonomy and workload confirms the ‘combination’ interpretation of 
Karasek’s ‘joint effects’ hypothesis. This interpretation states that jobs that combine high job 
autonomy and high workload (the ‘active jobs’) are characterised by the highest level of growth. In 
this part of the research, the more strict statistical interaction hypothesis is corroborated too. The 
combination of high workload with high autonomy is associated with the highest percentage of 
respondents who acquired new skills. This effect exceeds the mere addition of the positive effect of 
both job dimensions taken separately. This finding suggests that job autonomy moderates the 
relationship between workload and the acquisition of new skills (as an indicator of growth). In this 
study, job autonomy increases the positive impact of workload on learning. This statistical interaction 
corroborates Karasek’s original hypothesis regarding the ‘joint effects’ of demands and control. The 
fact that this interaction is found in this study could be related to the specific characteristics of the 
sample used. Young workers, who recently entered the labour market, are perhaps more sensitive to 
the effects of labour market conditions and job characteristics.  
 
The corroboration of the hypotheses of this study offers some possibilities to ameliorate jobs, in line 
with some suggestions of e.g. Karasek (1979) and Karasek en Theorell (1990). The core idea of 
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these suggestions is the need to increase job control. The confirmation of both hypotheses of the 
JDC-model in the same study underlines the strength of this recommendation. The increase of job 
control enables to achieve a double goal: The increase of job satisfaction and of the possibilities to 
acquire new skills in the job. The finding of an interaction between job control and workload 
strengthens this conclusion even more. The association between job demands and outcomes seems 
to be moderated by the possibility to exert control in the job. Control therefore becomes an important 
tool to realise growth and well-being in jobs. Off course there is no such thing as a free lunch, but as 
Green (2006) argues policies aimed at changing management culture need not be at the expense of 
productivity.  Modern technology doesn’t require firms to choose more regimented forms of work 
control while changing worker’s control has a considerable effect on their well-being.  With respect to 
workload things are different: changing work effort does influence worker’s well-being but for firms it 
might be beneficial to extract more effort from their workers where possible. 
 
The results of this study are encouraging for theory as well as practice in occupational health 
psychology. As a consequence, future research should further focus on the test of Karasek’s 
learning hypothesis, and on the analysis of the interaction between both job dimensions of the JDC-
model in determining learning and growth. Future research is also needed in order to meet some of 
the weaknesses of this study. The two crucial dependent variables (job satisfaction and the 
acquisition of new skills) were measured in a rather crude way, using only one item. It is preferable to 
measure these variables with a larger amount of items in future research, because the reliability of a 
one-item measure is difficult to assess. This was impossible in this study, because an already 
existing database was used (secondary analysis). Future research should not solely rely on self-
reports. Learning and growth in the first job could be assessed by an external observer (such as the 
supervisor). Also the measurement of the two-core job dimensions needs to be strengthened is 
future research. Only a few items were used in this study to measure job control and workload. The 
actual study is limited too, because it is cross-sectional in nature. A longitudinal follow-up of the 
respondents of this study would allow making causal interferences regarding the impact of job 
control and workload in the first job on strains and learning in the future.  
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Table 1. Results of the test of the strain hypothesis (ordinal logit analysis) 
Autonomy and workload  
Autonomy 0.588***(0.056) 
Workload -0.182***(0.047) 
Autonomy * Workload 0.109*(0.046) 
Control variables  
Women (1) 0.290**(0.097) 
Lower education (2) -0.247 (0.286) 
Lower secundary education (2) 0.056 (0.195) 
Higher non-university education (2) -0.283(0.156) 
Higher education: university (2) -0.660**(0.239) 
Qualification: to high (3) -0.976***(0.116) 
Qualification: to low (3) -0.146 (0.197) 
Training ‘on the job’ (4)  0.077(0.105) 
At 23 not any more in first job (5) -0.917***(0.108) 
Duration of ‘recall bias’ 0.005 (0.003) 
N 1871 
Nagelkerke R2  0. 264 
The standard deviation is mentioned between brackets after each coefficient. *: p < .05; **: p < .01; 
***: p < .001 
The reference categories are respectively: (1) men, (2) respondents with a certificate of higher 
secondary education, (3) respondents with the ‘appropriate level’ of qualification to prefer their job (4) 
respondents that did not receive ‘on the job training’ and (5) respondents still working in their first job.   
Other included control variables: full time or part-time work, type of contract, company size, job level, 
shift work and net salary.  The complete tables can be obtained with the authors on request. 
 
Testing Karasek’s learning- and strain hypothesis on young workers in their first job                       63 
Table 2. Results of the test of the learning hypothesis (binary logit analysis).  
Autonomy and workload  
Autonomy 0.165*(0.075) 
Workload 0.201***(0.062) 
Autonomy * workload 0.141*(0.060) 
Control variables  
Women (1) -0.197 (0.128) 
Lower education (2) -0.365 (0.341) 
Lower secundary education (2) -0.281 (0.232) 
Higher non-university education (2) 0.050 (0.210) 
Higher education: university (2) 0.211 (0.335) 
Qualification: to high (3) -0.524***(0.141) 
Qualification: to low (3) 0.268 (0.296) 
Training ‘on the job’ (8)  0.776***(0.158) 
At 23 not any more in first job (5) -0.472***(0.142) 
Duration of ‘recall bias’ 0.006 (0.004) 
N 1879 
Nagelkerke R2  0.154 
The standard deviation is mentioned between brackets after each coefficient. *: p < .05; **: p < .01; 
***: p < .001 
The reference categories are respectively: (1) men, (2) respondents with a certificate of higher 
secondary education, (3) respondents with the ‘appropriate level’ of qualification to prefer their job, 
(4) respondents that did not receive ‘on the job training’ and (5) respondents still working in their first 
job.   
Other included control variables: full time or part-time work, type of contract, company size, job level, 
shift work and net salary.  The complete tables can be obtained with the authors on request. 
Note: One might question the validity of including the variable ‘training in the job to explain ‘learning’ 
for reasons of endogeneity.  Since the correlation between these two variables is only 0.186, we 
keep this variable as independent variable in order to control for a similar set of variables in both 
tests.  Leaving this variable out of the model does not change our main results. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Are young workers compensated for a high strain job? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine whether starters in a stressful job receive a compensation for the burden 
they face. The compensating wage differentials model predicts a wage compensation for accepting a 
job with high workload.  The Karasek model (1979) highlights the importance of a balance between 
demands and control in the job. The combination of both models leads to the hypothesis that the 
wage compensation for high workload will be lower in a job with high autonomy.  The selectivity 
corrected estimations do not confirm this hypothesis.  So, entrants on the labour market who start in 
a stressful job are in a problematic position as they are not compensated for this burden. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we test whether starters in a stressful job receive a compensation for the burden they 
face.  If we consider high workload in a job as a stressor, which constitutes a burden for the worker, 
the compensating wage differentials model predicts that workers accepting a job with high workload 
will receive a wage compensation (Rosen, 1986).  This model has very strict assumptions (e.g. 
perfect information and perfect mobility among workers).  Job search models (Mortensen, 1986; 
Burdett, 1978) offer a possible explanation for the lack of a compensation for high workload.  The 
Karasek model (1979) refines the qualification of ‘workload’ as burdensome aspect of work, by 
highlighting the importance of a balance between demands in the job (i.e. workload) and the control 
one can exercise in that job (i.e. the job autonomy one has).  Especially a job with high workload and 
low autonomy (a ‘high strain job’) is supposed to be stressful, whereas a high demanding job with a 
lot of autonomy (an ‘active job’) results in learning opportunities. So we might expect that the wage 
compensation for high workload, if any, will be lower in a job with high autonomy (active job).  Testing 
this hypothesis is the aim of this paper. 
 
Previous research showed that entrants in a job with high workload and low autonomy (‘high strain 
job’) are less satisfied (De Witte et al., forthcoming). Therefore, it is important to analyse whether 
they receive a compensation for this additional burden in their job.  Without compensation, these 
young workers are really worse off.  If they are compensated, there might be no reason for concern. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Wage compensation 
 
The origins of the compensating wage differentials theory can be found in the work of Adam Smith: 
“The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock 
must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality.  If in the 
same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than 
the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the 
other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments.  This at least would 
be the case in a society were things were left to follow their natural cause, where there was perfect 
liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper 
and to change as often as he thought proper” (Smith, 1776). 
Rees (1973) argues that Smith’s approach is incomplete in one important respect, namely that he 
writes as all workers have identical tastes.   
 
The impact of tastes of workers is integrated by applying the hedonic hypothesis.  This hypothesis 
states that goods are valued for their utility–bearing attributes or characteristics.  Hedonic prices are 
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defined as implicit prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed prices of 
differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics associated with them (Rosen, 
1974). 
 
Rosen (1986) formulated this application of hedonic prices to labour market transactions.  A labour 
market transaction is viewed as a tied sale in which workers simultaneously sell (rent) the services of 
their labour and buy the attributes of their job.  These attributes are fixed for any one job, but may 
vary from job to job.  On the other hand employers simultaneously buy the services and 
characteristics of workers and sell the attributes of jobs offered to the market.  The characteristics of 
a particular worker are fixed, but may differ among workers.  An acceptable match occurs when the 
preferred choices of an employer and an employee are mutually consistent.  The actual wage paid is 
therefore the sum of two conceptually distinct transactions, one for labour services and worker 
characteristics, and another for job attributes.  In this sense the labour market may be viewed as an 
implicit market in job and worker attributes (Rosen, 1986). 
 
According to the basic compensating wage differential model, workers in a job with high workload 
should receive wage compensation.   
Three assumptions at the supply side are needed to arrive at the prediction of the compensating 
wage differential theory (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2003): 
1 Utility maximisation (workers maximise their utility, not their income) 
2 Worker information (workers are aware of the job characteristics of importance for them) 
3 Worker mobility (workers have a range of job offers from which to choose) 
On the demand side also three assumptions are needed (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2003):  
1 It is costly to reduce the “bad” characteristic (in our context this is high workload) 
2 Firms operate at zero profit (due to competitive pressure) 
3 All other job characteristics are already determined 
 
For school-leavers, the assumptions at the supply side are very restrictive.  According to the wage 
search model of Mortensen (1986) and Burdett (1978) the search process for a job stops when the 
wage offered exceeds the reservation wage.  Blau (1991) includes non-pecuniary work 
characteristics as indicators of the search process.   As a consequence, the utility of the job becomes 
the unique determining element in the search process, instead of the wage.  The reservation utility is 
a predetermined minimum acceptable utility level, determined by the level where the benefits of an 
additional search are equal to the benefits of accepting the job with its minimal acceptable utility 
level. When allowing for on-the-job-search, there are two reservation utilities: A and B (with A<B). 
When the respondent receives an offer with a utility that exceeds reservation utility A, the respondent 
accepts the job and continues searching for another job while working. He continues to search with 
an intensity that equals the marginal cost and return to search effort. The respondent quits the job, 
when he receives an offer with a utility equal or larger than the utility of his/her actual job. When the 
respondent receives a job offer of which the utility equals or exceeds reservation utility B, the 
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respondent accepts that job and stops searching for another job (the marginal cost exceeds the 
marginal return of search effort).  In this framework, it is sufficient that the utility of the accepted job 
exceeds the reservation utility level A.  Given the cost of searching, it is not evident that people have 
‘a range of offers’ to choose from, which violates the third assumption at supply side.  In this search 
theoretical framework, we are only sure that people will accept a job with a higher utility than the 
reservation utility level.  This could be a high workload job.  It is uncertain that the school leaver 
receives an alterative low workload job offer at the same moment.  Because of this uncertainty, it is 
not necessary to pay a compensation for high workload. 
 
 
2.2 ‘Job Demand-Control’-Model of Karasek (1979) 
 
The job-demand-control model of Karasek (1979) achieved a dominant position within work and 
organizational psychology.  One of the reasons is it simplicity, since it distinguishes only two basic 
dimensions when analysing jobs.  The combination of psychological job demands and control or 
decision latitude gives rise to four job types, as described in figure 1.  On the basis of the 
combination of both dimensions, Karasek formulated two hypotheses.  The stress-hypothesis states 
that high demands combined with low decision latitude (a ‘high strain’ job) give cause for stress. The 
activity hypothesis states that the combination of high demands with a high level of control (an 
‘active’ job) gives opportunities for growth and for the increase of one’s competencies (Karasek, 
1979).  
 
Fig. 1: Jobtypes in the Karasek model (Karasek, 1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can conclude that, according to the Karasek model, high workload is not per definition negative, 
as it can be a source of motivation when combined with a high level of control.  Expressed in terms of 
preferences, we can summarise the Karasek model as follows: utility is decreasing with an increase 
in demands, and increasing with an increase in control. 
Low strain jobs: 
 low demands  
 high control 
Passive jobs: 
 low demands  
 low control 
 
High strain jobs: 
 high demands  
 low control 
 
Active jobs: 
 high demands  
 high control 
 
Demands 
Control 
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3. Previous empirical research  
 
The Karasek model has been the focus of a large amount of empirical research (e.g. De Jonge & 
Kompier, 1997; Karasek & Theorell, 1990; van der Doef & Maes, 1999).  The main focus is on the 
stress hypothesis. Research concerning the activity hypothesis is rather scarce.  In general, research 
clearly confirms the stress hypothesis.  In their review of 20 years of empirical research on the Job 
Demand Control model, van der Doef and Maes (1999) conclude that most studies support the 
hypothesis that employees in high strain jobs are worse off: they experience a lower level of 
psychological well-being, less job satisfaction, more burnout and more job-related psychological 
distress.  Epidemiological studies equally show that workers in a high strain job exhibit lower levels of 
various aspects of physical health, such as cardiovascular diseases (De Jonge & Kompier, 1997).  
Most studies show that both job characteristics distinguished by Karasek exhibit main effects on 
these (psychological and physical) outcome variables: an increase in job demands is associated with 
a decrease in health and well-being, whereas an increase in job control is associated with an 
increase in these outcome variables.  As a conclusion, research demonstrates that more job 
demands are stressful, whereas more control in the job leads to a decrease in stress among workers.   
A previous test of the Karasek model with the SONAR dataset (i.e. the dataset used in this paper) 
confirms both the stress and the activity hypothesis.  The combination of high demands and low 
control did result in lower overall job satisfaction (De Witte et al., forthcoming). This combination is 
typical for a high strain job, and can be considered as a particularly stressful situation.  
 
A lot of empirical work has been done concerning the compensating wage differentials model.  Most 
work has been done with respect to the risk of injury or death on the job.  Viscusi (1993) gives an 
overview of labour market studies concerning the value of life and job injuries.  Although the 
estimations vary considerably, the hypothesis that wages will be higher when the risks are higher is 
mostly supported.   A variety of other job characteristics have been the focus of research on 
compensating wage differentials.  Wage premiums have been found for night work, inflexible work 
schedules, having to stand a lot and working in a noisy environment (Ehrenberg, 2003).  Smith 
(1979) however summarises that the theory of compensating differentials is only conclusive in case 
the job contains a risk of dying, but inconclusive with respect to other job characteristics.   
 
Recent work estimating a wage differential for high workload work is non-existent.  Two recent 
papers do estimate a price for stress.  Both papers measure stress using respondent answers on the 
question whether their work is ‘mentally stressful’ (French& Dunlap, 1998) or ‘mentally demanding’ 
(Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 1999).  French and Dunlap (1998) estimate compensating wage 
differentials for job stress, using OLS.  Their findings suggest that a compensating wage differential 
does exist in occupations with above-average levels of mental stress.  Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink (1999) include sample selection correction terms and found a compensation of 6-9% for 
workers in stressful jobs.  This means that these workers earn 6-9% more than they would have 
earned in jobs without stress. 
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The main contribution of our work is testing the impact of ‘job control’ on the wage differential for high 
workload.  We define stress in an accurate way by using one of the leading models in job stress 
research and we combine the Karasek model with the predictions of economic models about the 
pricing of job characteristics.  
 
 
4 Data 
 
We will test the hypothesis whether there is a wage compensation for high workload and if so, 
whether it is larger in jobs where high workload is combined with low autonomy.  We test this for the 
Flemish youth labour market using the SONAR data.  The SONAR dataset contains information 
about the transition from school to labour market for 23 years old, resulting from face-to-face 
interviews.  Month to month registrations of the educational and labour market career as well as 
opinions about work in general and background information are available.  For a detailed overview of 
the SONAR dataset we refer to SONAR (2000) and SONAR (2004).  
For this research we will use the second wave of 3.000 23-years-old (born in 1978). We will estimate 
the compensating differential for high demands in the first job, as the dataset contains extended 
information about that job.  
Not all 3.000 individuals are included, as not all of them found work (or had worked) yet when they 
were questioned (i.e. at the age of 23).  We also excluded self-employed people.  As a result the 
sample we use consists of 2093 respondents. 
 
The measurement of job characteristics (such as job demands and control) can be done in two ways: 
observers can rate the job of a specific worker (a so called ‘objective’ measurement), or workers can 
rate their own jobs (‘subjective’ measurement; see e.g. Frese & Zapf, 1988). Both methods are in fact 
‘subjective’, however, as both ratings have to be performed by an individual. The observer ratings 
have the advantage that the rating is performed separately from the respondent, thus excluding 
subjective evaluations and actual mood states of the observed worker. The disadvantage, however, 
is that the observer can only sample a specific (visible) part of the job performed, within a given time 
span. The self-description of the worker has the advantage that he or she can take all possible 
aspects of the job into account, whether or not they are visible or scarce. The correlation between 
both methods, however, is rather high (Fried & Ferris, 1987; O’Brien, 1986).  Fried & Ferris (1987) in 
their analysis of 15 studies handling this problem found a median correlation of 0.63 between the so-
called ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ rating, suggesting that both methods measure the same reality. As 
a consequence, it is warranted to use self-descriptions of workers, collected during interviews.     
We constructed a demand and control variable based on a list of items about different characteristics 
of their job, tested in previous research (e.g. De Witte, 1990; Hooge & De Witte, 1998).  The 
respondents had to rate these items on a 4-point scale, ranging from completely agree, rather agree, 
rather disagree, to completely disagree. 
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We used the items related to job demands and job control.  For job demands we could only use one 
item, asking whether one had to work at a great pace or under time pressure.  To measure job 
control we used an average of three items: were the workers able to decide (a) what to do on a 
particular day, (b) how much work they had to perform that day and (c) how to perform the job.  
Joining these 3 items together is allowed since their internal consistency (measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha) is 0.809.  
For both job characteristics completely and rather agree were considered as ‘high’ and completely 
and rather disagree were considered as ‘low’.  The table shows the distribution of jobs in the sample. 
 
 
Table 1: Number of the different job types in the sample 
 
 low control high control 
low demands Passive jobs: 509 Low strain jobs: 412 
high demands High strain jobs: 832 Active jobs: 338 
 
The wage variable is the (self reported) official monthly net wage, without extralegal advantages or 
advantages in kind. 
 
 
5 Estimation procedure 
 
5.1 Estimation of the wage equation 
 
The standard human capital earnings function as developed by Mincer is of the form (Mincer, 1974):  
α α υ= + +i 0 1 i ilnW X  
where the vector X contains schooling, experience and experience squared.  The constant term α0  
represents the log of the earnings of someone without any additional investment in human capital.  
As we are considering the first job, no experience terms can be added.  In addition to the human 
capital variable schooling we add personal, firm and job characteristics to the vector X. Using the 
semi-logarithmic specification, the coefficients α1 can be interpreted as percentage changes in the 
starting wage for the variable considered. 
As we are interested in comparing the wage between the different job types, we will estimate the 
following equation: 
α α α α υ υ υ υ= + + + + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 1 2 3 4lnW d1 d2 d3 d4 (X d1) (X d2) (X d3) (X d4) d1 d2 d3 d4  
With d1, d2, d3 and d4 dummy variables for the different job types (passive jobs, high strain jobs, low 
strain jobs and active jobs).  A joint test whether the coefficients for the different job types were equal 
or not will be performed. 
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5.2 Sample selection 
 
It is possible that selection over the different job types is not completely random.  Workers selecting 
themselves in a certain job type might be better off in this job type than in alternative ones.  
Therefore, the results from the wage predictions for the different job types might be biased 
(respondents who are not better off in a certain job type are omitted in the estimation; the sample is 
thus censored). Following standard procedures to correct for sample selection, we check if sample 
selection for the job types is significant.  
 
The general idea of correcting sample selection is that the variables causing the specification error 
are estimated.  These estimates are then used as regressors to estimate the wage functions. 
 
A widely used method to correct for sample selection is the Heckman procedure (1979).  Different 
from Groot & Maassen Van den Brink (1999) where the selection equation is binary, we need the 
generalisation of Lee (1983) to polychotomous choice selectivity models. 
However Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001) show that the method of Lee relies on a very 
unlikely particular case and they provide an alternative to get consistent estimates. 
 
 
5.2.1 Estimation procedure based on Lee 
In a first step the job type K (i.e. the four Karasek job types) is estimated for the whole sample using 
the following multinomial logit model: 
δ δ ε= + + =ij 0 j j1 i ijK Y for j 1,...4  
Y: vector of personal and job characteristics 
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood and the probabilities ijP (that an individual i 
chooses job type j) are computed.  Out of these estimates the sample selection correction terms are 
calculated as suggested by Lee (1983).   The log of the hourly wage on a set of personal and job 
characteristics is than regressed, whereby the sample selection correction terms ( ijλ ) are included 
as an additional regressor. 
α α κ λ µ= + + + =ij 0 j 1j i j ij ijlnW X for j 1,...4  
The correct asymptotic covariance matrix for the different wage equations is computed as in 
Heckman (1979).  
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5.2.2 Estimation procedure based on B-F-G 
Bourguignon et al (2001) show that the Heckman based correction term only incorporates the 
correlation betweenυ j  and ε j  for the choice j but neglects the possible correlation of υ j  with ε j  for 
the other possible choices.  They correct this as follows1: 
 
α α σ ρ ρ ρ ρ µ = + + + + + + = ij 0 j 1j i j 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 ijˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlnW X m (P ) m (P ) m (P ) m (P ) for j 1,...4  
ρ υ ε
ε
ε ε−= Φ
*
1 j 1
*
1 1
* 1
1 1
with :  the correlation between  and 
ˆm (P ) :  the conditional expected value of 
(G( )) G(.) is the cumulative of the Gumbel distribution function
 
 
Bourguignon et al (2001) suggest the use of weighted least squares in the second step model to gain 
efficiency.  To obtain consistent standard errors they recommend a bootstrap method. 
 
 
6 Estimation results 
 
6.1 Sample selection 
 
To estimate the job type in the Bourguignon-Fournier-Gurgand model we use a multinomial logit 
model with the parameters of a passive job normalised to zero.  We used educational level of the 
mother, the number of siblings, financial independence of parents, living together, driving license and 
a typology of the place of residence as identifying variables.  Since the selection terms in the 
estimated wage equations are not significant, we do not discuss them.2  
 
6.2 Wage differentials 
 
The estimated wage equation (without sample selection correction) can be found in appendix 1.  We 
test whether the coefficients for the different job types were equal or not.  The joint hypothesis that 
the differences in coefficients equals zero was rejected (p=0.0001). 
Since we only observe the actual wage, we have to calculate the counterfactual wage.  To eliminate 
the effects of the random term, we use the estimates to calculate all the wages (the wage when 
workload is high and the wage when workload is low).  Table 2 offers the mean and median value of 
the predicted wages in all 4 job types. The wages of passive jobs and high strain jobs (the two job 
types in the low control segment) are close to each other.  The same holds for the wages of the job 
types in the high control segment (low strain jobs and active jobs).  It is also clear that the wages in 
the high control segment are higher than those in the lower control segment.  The second part of 
                                                 
1
 For details about the bias in the Heckman type correction and the alternative for it, we refer to 
Bourguignon, Fournier & Gurgand (2001). 
2
 The results of these estimations can be obtained from the authors on request 
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table 2 offers the counterfactual wage for each jobtype: the wage one would have earned if one 
works in a job with high respectively low workload.  So the counterfactual wage for the passive jobs 
is the wage these people would earn in a high strain job.  The counterfactual wage for high strain 
jobs is the wage workers in a high strain job would earn in a passive job. 
 
Table 2: The distribution of the observed and predicted wages for the different job types.  
  predicted wage predicted counterfactual wage 
  passive high strain low strain active passive high strain low strain active 
Mean 1.777 1.772 1.864 1.862 1.772 1.781 1.852 1.871 
Median value 1.770 1.767 1.851 1.871 1.765 1.770 1.861 1.873 
 
Since we are interested whether or not there is a wage differential for high workload, we compute the 
wage differential between working in a high workload job and working in a low workload job.   So we 
calculate the wage difference (d) as the wage that would be earned when one works in a job with 
high workload (H) minus the wage one would get in a low workload job (L): 
= −
H L
i id E(ln(W ) E(ln(W )  
We calculate this wage difference for the low ad high control segment. 
 
The average and median values of the wage differential in both segments are presented in table 3. 
On average, workers in a high workload job earn less than if they would work in a low workload job.  
In the high control segment this average wage loss is higher than in the low control segment (0.56% 
versus 0.41%).  The median values are also negative, which means that more than half of the 
population has a wage loss because of working in a high workload job.   
 
Table 3: Mean and median value of the wage differential (in%) 
 Low control segment High control segment 
Mean value -0.41 -0.56 
Median value -0.49 -0.67 
 
 
In general we can conclude that no evidence is found in favour of a wage differential for high 
workload jobs.  On average there is a wage loss of having a high workload job, in both segments.  
The average penalty of working in a high workload job is higher in the high control segment than in 
the low control segment.  This is in line with the prediction that the wage compensation should be 
lower in the higher control segment.  However we do not find a wage compensation for high 
workload, but a wage penalty. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The main conclusion of our empirical work is that young workers are not compensated for high 
workload in their job.  The compensating wage differentials framework predicts that workers should 
receive a compensation for unattractive features in the job.  We thus hypothesised that workers 
receive a wage compensation for taking a job with high workload.  The combination with the Karasek 
model leads to the hypothesis that the wage compensation for workload should be lower in the high 
control segment (i.e. for the active jobs) than in the low control segment.  Our empirical results do not 
support this hypothesis.  A possible explanation why this theory is not valid for workload in entry jobs 
can be found in the search theoretical framework (Mortensen, 1986; Burdett, 1978 and Blau, 1991).  
This theory predicts that school-leavers accept the first job, which offers a utility higher than a 
predetermined reservation utility level.  Since searching for a job is not ‘a free lunch’, it is plausible 
that people do not have ‘a range of offers’ to choose from.  So they will accept a job with a higher 
utility than the reservation utility level even if this is a high workload job.  It is uncertain that the 
school leaver receives an alterative low workload job offer at the same moment.  The worker will 
continue his search for a better job when working in his first job. 
 
If we combine this with the conclusion that the combination of low autonomy and high workload does 
indeed result in stressful jobs (as witnessed by lower overall job satisfaction, see De Witte et al., 
forthcoming), we can conclude that workers in high strain jobs are really worse off.  First of all, they 
have a stressful job and (as a consequence) feel less satisfied. In addition to this, we have found that 
they are not compensated for this less favourable position.  The other job type that Karasek 
distinguished is the active job (characterised by high workload but also high autonomy). According to 
Karasek, this combination leads to growth.  In this research, we also observe that these young 
workers - and workers in the high control segment in general - are better paid than their counterparts.  
These results lead to the conclusion that our supposed segments according to the control provided in 
the job are a true duality in the labour market for young people.  On the one hand the better paid 
active jobs with on average higher job satisfaction and on the other hand the lower paid dissatisfying 
stressful jobs.   
Two important questions for further research arise.  First of all, we can ask the question if young 
workers try to avoid such an unfavourable position by leaving their stressful job more rapidly than 
their counterparts in other types of jobs (turnover).  Secondly, we have to find out whether stressful 
jobs are only a start position or if they are the start of a career in this type of job? The latter would 
have important policy implications, as in current discussions “stress” is often considered as high 
workload only, without linking this aspect to the control dimension.  Our results seem to suggest that 
first of all high workload combined with autonomy is not per se negative and secondly that jobs with a 
high level of control are better-paid jobs.  
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Appendix 1: Results of the wage equations 
  
 passive jobs high strain jobs low strain jobs active jobs 
     
Constant 1.75***(0.04) 1.78***(0.03) 1.79***(0.04) 1.81***(0.04) 
  
    
Man (ref) 
    
Woman  
-0.06***(0.02) -0.10***(0.02) -0.04**(0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
     
lower education -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) 0.33***(0.09) 
lower secondary education 0.00 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) -0.07*(0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
higher secondary education     
higher education (3 years) 0.11***(0.02) 0.06**(0.02) 0.12***(0.02) 0.06**(0.03) 
higher education (more than 3 years) 0.09*(0.05) 0.11**(0.05) 0.20***(0.03) 0.21***(0.04) 
     
     
Permanent contract (ref) 
    
Temporary contract 
-0.02 (0.02) -0.04**(0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Full-time (ref) 
    
Part time 0.10***(0.02) 0.16***(0.02) 0.16***(0.03) 0.12***(0.04) 
Clerk (ref) 
    
Worker 0.00 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.10***(0.04) 
Small company (<10 employees) 
-0.03 (0.02) -0.04**(0.02) 0.02 (0.03) -0.08***(0.03) 
Medium company (ref) 
    
Large company (>50 employees) 0.05**(0.02) 0.07***(0.02) 0.03*(0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
  
    
Working during the day (ref) 
    
Working during the night 0.09***(0.03) 0.06***(0.02) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 
Not working in shifts (ref) 
    
Working in shifts 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.07**(0.03) 0.06 (0.04) 
  
    
Elementary job level 
    
Lower job level 
-0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 
Intermediate job level (reference) 
-0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
Higher job level 
    
Scientific job level 0.07**(0.03) 0.08***(0.03) 0.08***(0.03) 0.10***(0.03) 
  0.13**(0.06) 0.10*(0.05) 0.12***(0.04) 0.12***(0.04) 
Not giving direction (ref) 
    
Giving direction 
    
  
-0.02 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) 
     
Service sector 
-0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.07**(0.03) -0.06**(0.03) 
Public sector 
-0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.09***(0.03) -0.11***(0.03) 
N: 1954 
Log Likelihood: 587.46 
Standard errors between brackets 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Starting in a high strain job… short pain ? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Karasek (1979) defined a stressful job as a job with an imbalance between the demands of the job 
and the control one can exercise in that job (a ‘high strain job’).  Previous research showed that 
starters in a high strain job are indeed less satisfied.  They are also not compensated for the high 
workload they face.  In this paper, we raise the question whether this strain (‘high strain job’) is only 
temporary.  The results of our duration analysis show that those starting in a high strain job leave 
their job significantly sooner than those in an active job.  However, this is no guarantee that the strain 
is only temporarily, since there is a significant probability of still having a high strain job at the age of 
26. This finding determines our policy implication: the discussion on work stress should focus on 
those trapped in high strain jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Karasek (1979) emphasised the importance of a balance between the demands in the job (i.e. 
workload) and the control one can exercise in that job (i.e. the autonomy one has).  A job with high 
workload and low autonomy (a ‘high strain job’) is supposed to be a stressful job, whereas a high 
demanding job with a lot of autonomy (an ‘active job’) results in learning opportunities.   
Previous research shows that young workers who start in a high strain job are less satisfied than 
their counterparts (De Witte et al., forthcoming) and that they are not compensated for this 
aggravating work situation in terms of a higher wage (Verhofstadt et al., 2004).     
 
Because workers starting in a high strain job seem to be worse off, we want to find out whether this 
strain is temporary.  Do young workers who start in a high strain job leave their job faster than those 
in an active job?  What is the influence of the job type on the probability of being unemployed in the 
near future?  And are these young workers better off later on in their career, or are they ‘locked up’ in 
high strain jobs?  
 
We first of all model job search on the basis of the wage-search model of Mortensen (1986).  We 
incorporated various aspects of the job in this model (by not only considering the wage but also the 
utility of the job).   
 
We will use duration analysis to answer our first research questions.  We compare the job duration of 
high strain and active jobs by using non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric estimations.  
Multinomial logit models will be used to analyse the impact of the first job type on the probability of 
unemployment in the near future and on the probability of still having a high strain job at the age of 
26.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
 
In this theoretical part, we introduce the Karasek Job-Demand-Control model, and the framework 
used to analyse the job duration of the different job types of the first (significant) job. 
 
 2.1 The Karasek Job-Demand-Control model (1979) 
 
The job-demand-control model of Karasek (1979) achieved a dominant position within work and 
organizational psychology.  One of the reasons is it simplicity, since it distinguishes only two basic 
dimensions when analysing jobs.  The combination of psychological job demands and control or 
decision latitude gives rise to four job types, as described in figure 1.  We define both control (C) and 
demand (D) as binary variables.  On the basis of the combination of both dimensions, Karasek 
formulated two hypotheses.  The stress-hypothesis states that high demands combined with low 
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decision latitude (a ‘high strain’ job) causes stress. The learning hypothesis states that the 
combination of high demands with a high level of control (an ‘active’ job) gives opportunities for 
growth and for the increase of one’s competencies (Karasek, 1979).  
 
According to the Karasek model, high workload is not per definition problematic, as it can be a 
source of motivation when combined with a high level of control.  Expressed in terms of preferences, 
we can summarise the Karasek model as follows: the utility is decreasing with an increase in 
demands, and increasing with an increase in control. 
 
Figure 1: Jobtypes in the Karasek model (Karasek, 1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Karasek model has been the focus of a large amount of empirical research (e.g. De Jonge & 
Kompier, 1997; Karasek & Theorell, 1990; van der Doef & Maes, 1999).  The main focus is on the 
stress hypothesis. Research concerning the learning hypothesis is rather scarce.  In general, 
research confirms the stress hypothesis.  In their review of 20 years of empirical research on the Job 
Demand Control model, van der Doef and Maes (1999) conclude that most studies support the 
hypothesis that employees in high strain jobs are worse off: they experience a lower level of 
psychological well-being, less job satisfaction, more burnout and more job-related psychological 
distress.  Epidemiological studies equally show that workers in a high strain job exhibit lower levels of 
various aspects of physical health, such as cardiovascular diseases (De Jonge & Kompier, 1997).  
Most studies show that both job characteristics distinguished by Karasek exhibit main effects on 
these (psychological and physical) outcome variables: an increase in job demands is associated with 
a decrease in health and well-being, whereas an increase in job control is associated with an 
increase in these outcome variables.  As a conclusion, research demonstrates that more job 
demands are stressful, whereas more control in the job leads to a decrease in stress among workers.   
A previous test of the Karasek model with the SONAR dataset (i.e. the dataset used in this paper) 
confirms both the stress and the learning hypothesis.  The combination of high demands and low 
Low strain jobs 
(C=1, D=0): 
 low demands  
 high control 
Passive jobs 
(C=0, D=0): 
 low demands  
 low control 
High strain jobs 
(C=0, D=1): 
 high demands  
 low control 
Active jobs  
(C=1, D=1): 
 high demands  
 high control 
Demands (D) 
Control (C) 
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control did result in lower overall job satisfaction (De Witte et al., forthcoming). This combination is 
typical for a high strain job, and can be considered as a particularly stressful situation.  The 
combination of high demands and high job control (an ‘active job’) resulted in an increase in skills, as 
hypothesised in the learning hypothesis.  The Karasek model has rarely been used to predict 
turnover.  However, some of the outcome variables of the model, such as strain and dissatisfaction 
are often mentioned as antecedents of job mobility (e.g. Maertz & Campion, 2001).  
 
 
 2.2. Modelling job duration 
 
As a starting point for our analysis, we use the wage search model of Mortensen (1986), extended by 
the possibility of workers looking for a job while they are employed (Burdett, 1978). We elaborate this 
model by not only considering the wage of the offered job, but by also including non-pecuniary 
characteristics of the work as indicators for the search process (Blau, 1991).  As a consequence, we 
do not define the wage as the unique determining element in the search process.  We instead 
highlight the utility of the job.  We define ( , ; )   U f C D X= : the utility is determined by the level of 
control (C) and demand (D) in the job and by X, which is a vector of other job and personal 
characteristics (including the wage).  
 
Economic agents spent resources (time, telephone costs, transportation costs, stamps, …) while 
searching for jobs. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of this search is identical for both 
employed and unemployed. An important implication of this assumption is that the reservation utility 
of an unemployed worker is the utility of leisure. Assuming that the cost of job search is the same 
whether one is employed or not, implies that the economic agent accepts the first job which 
compensates for the value of abandoned leisure and continues to search for a better job (i.e. a job 
with a higher utility) while exercising his job. We also assume that the returns to more intensive job 
search diminish.  We incorporate these assumptions in the model by assuming that the offer arrival 
rate is proportional to the worker’s job search effort ( sλ ) and by assuming that the cost of job search 
is an increasing convex function of search effort ( ( )c s ).  
 
We restrict our attention to modelling the probability of leaving the first job.  ( )rU u denotes the 
discounted future utility when the economic agent is employed in a job with utility u , given that the 
optimal job search strategy is followed in the future: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )00 max ,maxsrU u u c s s U u U u U u dF uλ
∞
≥
 
= − + −    ∫ .   (1.1) 
 
The job search effort in the current period only affects the cost of job search in the current period and 
the probability of generating an offer in the next period. So, the optimal value of the job search effort 
maximizes the sum of the utility of the current period (i.e. utility net of search costs in the current 
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period, ( )u c s−  when employed at u ) and the expected utility gain, which is attributable to job 
search. The expected utility gain attributable to job search, consists of the product of the offer arrival 
rate ( sλ ) (which is proportional to the search effort) and the expected difference between the utility 
when accepting and working in a job with utility u and the utility when staying in the job which 
provided the utility u .  
 
The economic agent determines the search intensity so that the optimal job search effort equals the 
marginal returns and costs of continuing the search effort in the next period. The optimal search 
effort can be derived from equation (1.1).  Let ( )*s u be the optimal search intensity choice of the 
economic agent when he is employed in a job with utility u .  The optimal search intensity declines 
with the utility obtained while employed.  So, the higher the utility while employed the lower the 
optimal search intensity ( ( )*s u ). At a certain high level of u , the marginal return of continuing the 
search effort will not be sufficient to compensate for the marginal costs of that search effort (> 0). 
This utility level ( *u ) is the reservation utility. 
 
Formally: 
*
*( / ) ( ) '(0)
u
r u u dF u cλ ∞  − = ∫ . (1.2) 
 
Equation (1.2) suggests that the marginal return of continuing the search effort equates the marginal 
cost of zero search effort ( ( )* 0s u = ). Because C’(s)>0, this equation (1.2) implies that the 
economic agent will not exercise any search effort anymore when he accepts a job offer with a utility 
of *u (the reservation utility). 
 
The probability that an individual working at utility u  will exit the initial state (in our case the first 
significant job) within a short interval, conditional on having survived up to t, the starting time of the 
interval, is expressed by the hazard rate ( ( , ; ), )U C D X tφ . This probability is the product of the rate 
at which the economic agent receives job offers, the optimal search intensity and the probability that 
the offered job is acceptable.  
 
Formally: 
( ) ( )*
*
( ( , ; ), ) ( , ; ), 1 ( , ; ),  ,
with   : the rate of job offers, 
          ( , ): the cumulative job offer distribution
          and s ( , ) :  optimal search effort  when employed at uti
U C D X t s U C D X t F U C D X t
F u t
u t
φ λ
λ
= −  
lity u.
(1.3) 
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Since in equation (1.3) we implicitly assume that all job mobility is voluntary, we will also include ψ  
expressing involuntary mobility.  Gronberg and Reed (1994) introduce involuntary mobility into the 
Mortensen job search model by including the exogenous separation rate of workers from firms into 
the expression for the hazard rate.  We adapt this to our utility framework, but endogenize this term 
because it is reasonable to assume that certain personal and job characteristics will influence the 
probability that one will be forced to leave the company.  So our expression becomes: 
 
( ) ( )*( ( , ; ), ) ( ( , ; ), ) ( , ; ), 1 ( , ; ),    U C D X t C D X t s U C D X t F U C D X tφ ψ λ= + −   . (1.4) 
 
This distinction between voluntary and involuntary mobility is frequently introduced in research, but 
addressed in different ways.  Reed and Dahlquist (1994), van Ommeren et al. (2000), Trevor (2001), 
Ruiz & Gomez (2002), Manning (2003), and Bradley et al. (2004), all distinguish quits and 
separations in their sample.  In their estimations, however, they do not take the hypothesis into 
account that voluntary mobility can be influenced by the probability of forced mobility.  Perticara 
(2004) addresses this issue by including the assumption “that workers are not aware that a layoff is 
coming until they are definitely laid off”.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses and motivation 
 
Young workers starting their career in a high strain job are worse off than their counterparts in active 
jobs.  Therefore, we want to analyse the impact of the job type on the job mobility of young workers.  
Based on the developed framework, we advance the following hypotheses   
 
- Young workers in high strain jobs will leave their job sooner 
Since we assume that according to the Karasek model the utility of a high strain job is lower than that 
of an active job, individuals will want to leave that job sooner in order to obtain an active job.  The 
model discussed above suggests that the utility level of the actual job will be lower for those working 
in a high strain job.  Those in active jobs have already a higher utility level compared to those in a 
high strain job. As a consequence, the job search intensity of respondents in active jobs is lower 
compared to the intensity of respondents in high strain jobs.   
We can thus advance that: ( )( ) ( )( )* *(1,1, ) > (0,1, )  1,1, 0,1,U X U X s U X s U X⇒ < . 
 
- Young workers in active jobs will be the last to be forced to leave their job 
We expect that those in active jobs are not the first victims of forced mobility.   Active jobs are by 
definition jobs with high demands and high autonomy, which results in learning opportunities and the 
development of new skills. An explanation for this reduction in turnover among active jobs can be 
found in human capital theory (Becker, 1964). Firms will only offer learning opportunities if the 
benefits of these jobs are larger than the costs.  Since the benefits are to be found in future 
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productivity, it is less likely that workers in active jobs are the first to be laid off during business 
downturns.  Parsons (1972) found strong support for the hypothesis that in industries where worker- 
and firm financed specific investments are sizeable, average quit and lay-offs rates will be lower. 
Therefore we put forward: (1,1, ) < (0,1, )t tX Xψ ψ .  
 
These hypotheses suggest that those starting their career in a high strain job will have a shorter job 
duration than those starting in an active job.  Next to the test of this main hypothesis, we also want to 
examine whether young workers who quit their jobs are better off further on in their career.      
 
For those who were forced to leave their job, we test the probability to end up in an unemployment 
spell.  Previous research (e.g. Mc Donald and Felmingham, 1999) suggests that the incidence of 
unemployment is high for workers who involuntary left their jobs. Combined with our hypothesis that 
involuntary mobility occurs sooner for those in high strain jobs, we wonder whether young workers 
starting in a high strain job have a higher probability of becoming unemployed after their first job.  
For those who choose to leave their job, our theoretical model suggests that they get a better job.  
Therefore we test the hypothesis of job mobility from high strain jobs to active jobs.   
 
 
4. Econometric specifications 
 
4.1 Survival analysis 
 
The hazard function ( )tφ  1is the probability of exit from a state in the short interval of length dt after t, 
conditional on the state still being occupied at t (Lancaster, 1990). 
 
In terms of the distribution function this probability equals: 
( ) ( )( )   with ( ) :  density function of  T
1 ( ) ( )
                                      and ( ) ( ) the cumulative distribution function of T.
f t f t
t f t
F t S t
F t P T t
φ = =
−
= ≤
 
T is a nonnegative random variable that represents the failure time, in our case job duration.  S(t) is 
the survivor function of T.  This function gives the probability of survival beyond t or the probability 
that there is no failure event prior to t.  
 
The analysis of survival data can be done in three ways: nonparametric, semi-parametric and 
parametric.  Nonparametric analysis allows the dataset ‘to speak for itself’ without making 
assumptions about the functional form of the survivor function.   Effects of covariates are not included 
in this kind of analysis.   
                                                 
1
 For notational simplicity we write ( )tφ  instead of ( ( , ; ), )U C D X tφ in the remaining of the paper. 
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Non-parametric estimation of the survivor function is done by using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, 
which is given by (Cleves et al., 2002): 
j
j
ˆ( ) ( )  with t observed failure time,
                                         = the number of individuals at risk at time t ,
                                        and  the n
j j
j t j
t j
t j
t t
t t
n d
S t
n
n
d
≤
−
= =
=
∏
jumber of failures at time t .
 
 
Since we are interested in the different survival function for high strain and active jobs, we will 
estimate a survival function for each job type.  We test the equality of the survivor functions across 
the job types by running a log-rank and a Wilcoxon test.  Both are global tests, which means that 
they compare the overall survival functions and not at a specific time point.  The tests compare the 
expected versus the observed number of failures for each group and combine these comparisons 
over all observed failure times.   The difference between both tests is the weight they give to the 
contingency tables obtained at every failure time.  The Wilcoxon test places additional weight to 
tables at earlier failure times (Cleves et al., 2002). 
 
When we want to incorporate explanatory variables in the model, we have to conduct a parametric or 
semi-parametric analysis.  Parametric analysis assumes a specific parametric family for the 
distribution of the failure times.  Two specifications are possible.  
A proportional hazard model has the following specification (Kiefer, 1988): ( ) ( ) βφ φ= 0 Xt t e  with 
( )0 tφ : the baseline hazard function, X the vector of explanatory variables and β  the corresponding 
vector of coefficients. 
In this model it is assumed that the hazard function is influenced proportionally by a change in the 
value of an independent variable.  A proportional hazards parametric model gives a functional form to 
( )0 tφ .  When no particular parameterisation is given to the baseline hazard, we have the popular 
Cox model, which is called semi-parametric. 
The alternative specification is the accelerated failure time (AFT) specification.  Here we assume that 
rescaling time can capture the effect of explanatory variables on the failure time: β= 0e XT T ,  
with 0T : the baseline failure time, X the vector of explanatory variables and β  the corresponding 
vector of coefficients. 
 
The β−exp( )X  is also called the acceleration parameter and is assumed to be constant. If this 
acceleration parameter is larger than 1, failure would be expected to occur sooner (time is 
accelerated).  The time scale for someone with characteristics X is β 0e X T , whereas the time scale for 
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someone with characteristics X=0 is 0T .  If the acceleration parameter is smaller than 1, time is 
decelerated (failure would be expected to occur later).  
 
For the distribution of the failure time, we opt for the Generalized Gamma specification.  The 
generalised gamma distribution is a three-parameter distribution β κ σ0( , , )  permitting a variable 
hazard shape.   The exponential (constant hazard), Weibull (monotonically increasing or decreasing 
hazard) and log-normal (non-monotonic hazard) are all special cases of this distribution.  Since it is 
not straightforward to predict duration dependence for job duration, we opt for this flexible 
Generalized Gamma specification.   
 
To check whether this generalised gamma model is indeed the most adequate model (among all 
possible parametric models), we will run two tests.  For testing whether the gamma model is 
preferred over the exponential, Weibull and log-normal model (which are nested in the gamma 
model) we will run a Wald and likelihood ratio test.  We test the following hypotheses: 
(1)  κ =0 : 0H    if this is true, then the model is log-normal, 
(2)  κ =0 : 1H    if this is true, then the model is Weibull, 
(3)  κ σ= =0 : 1, 1H   if this is true, then the model is exponential. 
To make a choice between non nested models, the use of the Akaike Information Criteria is 
suggested (Cleves et all., 2002): = − + +2ln 2( )AIC L k c , with L the likelihood of the model, k the 
number of covariates in the model and c the number of model-specific distributional parameters.   
The first term of the AIC measures the goodness-of-fit of the model to the data, the second term is a 
penalty for an increasing number of parameters.  The preferred model is the one with the lowest 
value of the AIC (Sawa, 1978). 
 
We will provide the non-parametric Kaplan Meier estimation, the semi-parametric COX proportional 
hazard estimations and the (parametric) generalised gamma model.   
 
 
4.2 Binary and multinomial logit models 
 
To test our additional research question, whether young workers are better off further on in their 
career, we make use of a number of limited dependent variables models.  When testing the 
probability of working or not, the dependent variable is a binary variable, by means of which we are 
opting for a binary logit model (Greene, 2003):   
exp( )(working) .
1 exp( )
xP
x
β
β= +  
 
We use a multinomial logit model to model the reason for leaving the first job and to estimate the 
impact of the first job on the situation at the age of 26 (in order to check whether the job type 
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ameliorated over time).  This kind of model is used since there are more than two alternatives without 
natural ordering.  A convenient approach is to assume that all error terms (of the underlying relations 
between the latent variables and the observed characteristics) are mutually independent with a log 
Weibull distribution.  This generates the multinomial logit model (Greene,2003).  
The assumption of independent error terms is an important drawback of this method.  In the literature 
this is known as the ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA).  This property means that the ratio 
of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the attributes of any other 
alternative in the choice set (Hausman, 1984). Therefore, we will also run the Hausman test to check 
whether the multinomial logit specification is correct.  This test examines whether the parameter 
estimates of the unrestricted and the restricted choice set (the choice set in which one or more 
alternatives are eliminated) are approximately the same.  If this is the case, then the multinomial logit 
specification is not rejected (Hausman, 1984). 
 
 
5. Data  
 
The empirical analysis is based on the SONAR-data.  We use the birth cohort of 1976.  A sample of 
3000 Flemish youth was surveyed at the age of 23 and a follow-up was realised when they were 26 
years old.  2060 of them also participated in the follow-up survey.  For a detailed overview of the 
SONAR dataset we refer to SONAR (2000) and SONAR (2004).  
We calculated the duration of the first job by using the month-to-month registration of their labour 
market activities.  In the SONAR-data, the first job is defined as the first job of at least one hour a 
week and with tenure of at least one month. The observations of the job duration are right censored, 
since not all respondents already left their first job at the moment of the follow-up survey. 
 
In general, one can measure job characteristics (such as job demands and job control) in two ways: 
observers can rate the job of a specific worker (a so called ‘objective’ measurement), or workers can 
rate their own jobs (‘subjective’ measurement; see e.g. Frese & Zapf, 1988). Both methods are in fact 
‘subjective’, however, as both ratings have to be performed by an individual. The observer ratings 
have the advantage that the rating is performed separately from the respondent, thus excluding 
subjective evaluations and actual mood states. The disadvantage, however, is that the observer can 
only sample a specific (visible) part of the job performed, within a given time span. The self-
assessment of the worker has the advantage that he or she can take all possible aspects of the job 
into account, whether or not they are visible or scarce. The correlation between both methods, 
however, is rather high (Fried & Ferris, 1987; O’Brien, 1986).  Fried & Ferris (1987) in their analysis 
of 15 studies analysing this issue found a median correlation of 0.63 between the so called ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’ rating, suggesting that both methods measure the same reality. As a consequence, it 
is warranted to use self descriptions of workers, collected during interviews.     
We constructed a demand and control variable based on a list of items about different job 
characteristics, tested in previous research (e.g. De Witte, 1990; Hooge & De Witte, 1998).  The 
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respondents had to rate these items on a 4-point scale, ranging from completely agree, rather agree, 
rather disagree, to completely disagree. 
We used the items related to job demands and job control.  For job demands we could use only one 
item, asking whether they had to work at a great pace or under time pressure2.  To measure job 
control, we used an average of three items: were the interviewees able to decide (a) what to do on a 
particular day, (b) how much work they had to perform that day and (c) how to perform the job.  For 
both job characteristics the answers “completely agree” and “rather agree” were considered as “high” 
and the answers “completely disagree” and “rather disagree” were considered as “low”.   
 
The vector X (i.e. the control variables) consists mainly of dummy variables, which were 
straightforward to construct and interpret.  For the wage variable, we had different types of 
registrations.  For some respondents the exact wage (point data) was available, while for others only 
the interval in which the wage was situated (in which the first and last wage interval were open-
ended) was known.  We constructed a wage variable, which is the log of the hourly wage, based on 
the different registrations using maximum likelihood3. 
 
The SONAR dataset contains detailed information about the first and the actual job, including the 
reason why people left their job.  For the whole period up to the moment they were surveyed, 
information is available about their position (employed or not).  Since no detailed data about the 
second job is available, we cannot apply the Karasek typology to this second job.  Therefore, we 
have to restrict the analysis to a comparison of the first and the actual job in order to test whether 
people succeed in getting a better job in terms of the Karasek typology. 
 
 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Descriptive results 
 
In table 1, the mean duration for the different job types is presented.  This mean duration is not 
corrected for censoring (i.e. some people are still in their job).  One can see that the mean duration is 
significantly higher for active jobs than for high strain jobs.  Since the highest proportion of censored 
cases can be found within the active jobs category, this result is already a reliable indication that high 
strain jobs have a shorter duration than active jobs. 
 
                                                 
2
 In the first survey two items were used.  In the follow-up survey, these were collapsed into one item.  The two 
items in the first survey were reduced to one by strictly interpreting the ‘or’.   
3
 See Stewart (1983) for details.   
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Table 1: Mean duration of the first job for the different Karasek job types  
Karasek Job type Mean Job duration Number of observations 
Passive jobs 16.3 451 
High strain jobs 19.3 1237 
Low strain jobs 22.9 390 
Active jobs 25.9 678 
 
 
6.2 Results of the survival analysis 
 
Non-parametric estimations 
 
Figure 2: Estimated cumulative survival for active and high strain jobs 
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Figure 2 presents the cumulative survival function for the active and the high strain jobs with their 
95% confidence interval. In the calculation of the survivor functions, censoring is taken into account.  
The cumulative survival function is the probability of leaving the job after t.   The figure shows that 
the survival for active jobs is always higher than the survival for high strain jobs.  This confirms our 
main hypothesis. 
 
The probability of having an active job for more than t months is always higher than the probability of 
having a high strain job for more than t months. The results from both tests (log-rank and the 
Wilcoxon test) are identical: the probability that the observed differences occur by chance is less than 
1%. So, the reported result is statistically significant. 
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Semi-parametric estimations 
In table 2, the results of the semi-parametric Cox regression are reported.  The interpretation is the 
easiest in terms of the hazard.  For example, having a high strain job instead of an active job 
increases the hazard by 55%, because exp(0.44)=1.55.  So the results confirm our hypothesis that 
those in high strain jobs will leave their job faster than those in an active job.  Since the impact of 
other covariates is not the focus of our study, we do not report and discuss these results. 
 
Table 2: Results of the Cox regression 
 Coefficient St. error Hazard ratio St. error 
passive job 0.56*** 0.09 1.75 0.16 
high strain job 0.44*** 0.08 1.55 0.12 
low strain job 0.19* 0.1 1.21 0.12 
active job (reference)         
     
Number of observations 1933 
Log Likelihood -9266.36 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Included control variables: gender, number of children, living together with partner, ethnicity, educational level, 
subjective evaluation of educational level, working in the same region as one lives, contract type, hourly wage, 
percentage of a full time job one works, night work, shift work, company size, sector of employment. 
 
Parametric estimations 
Table 3 presents the results of the Generalized Gamma regression.  The active job is considered as 
reference group, to enable a comparison with the high strain jobs.  We report the coefficients as well 
as the time ratios.  A positive coefficient means a longer survival time, whereas a negative coefficient 
implies a shorter survival time than the reference group.  The time ratios express the delay of the 
failure compared to the reference group.  For example, if someone in an active job quits his job at 
t=1, than someone in a high strain job will do so at t=0.58 (=exp(-0.55)). 
 
Again, our hypothesis that those in high strain jobs will leave their job sooner than those in an active 
job, is confirmed.  As the non-parametric and semi-parametric estimations suggested, passive jobs 
have the shortest duration and active job the longest.  The time ratios in table 3 show that if an 
interviewee in an active job leaves his job at t=1, an interviewee in a passive job will do so at t=0.52, 
an interviewee in a high strain job at t=0.58 and an interviewee in a low strain job at t=0.77.   
 
As discussed in the econometric part, we test whether this generalised gamma specification is 
indeed the most adequate parametric model.  The test results (reported in appendix 1) support our 
model selection.  
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Table 3: Results of the generalized gamma regression  
 
Coefficient St. error Time ratio St. error 
passive job -0.66*** 0.11 0.52 0.06 
high strain job -0.55*** 0.09 0.58 0.05 
low strain job -0.26** 0.12 0.77 0.09 
active job (ref)         
          
constant 2.91*** 0.52   
       
Number of observations 1933 
Log Likelihood -2770.54 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Included control variables: gender, number of children, living together with partner, ethnicity, educational level, 
subjective evaluation of educational level, working in the same region as one lives, contract type, hourly wage, 
percentage of a full time job one works, night work, shift work, company size, sector of employment. 
 
Conclusion 
The non-parametric, semi parametric and parametric estimations all support our hypotheses.  Young 
workers starting in a high strain job will leave this job sooner than their counterparts starting in an 
active job.  Thus far, however, we did not distinguish between leaving voluntary or involuntary. 
Therefore, we will examine the reasons for leaving the first job in the next section. 
 
 
6.3 Reasons for leaving the first job  
 
To examine the impact of the job type on the reasons for leaving the first job, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model.  The Hausman test provides evidence for the hypothesis that the odds of two 
outcomes are independent of other alternatives.  The results of the multinomial logit model are 
presented in appendix 2.  There is no significant impact of being in a high strain job compared with 
being in an active one.   Based on the estimated coefficients, we calculated the probability for 
starters in the different job types that they will leave that job for a certain reason.  So, the probabilities 
in table 4 are the probabilities of a man, without children, who does not live with a partner and who 
completed higher secondary education, to end his job for a certain reason.  This probability is 
calculated for four cases, depending on his first job.  The differences between the high strain and 
active job type are rather small.4  This suggests that young workers in high strain jobs do not leave 
their first job more often because of a specific reason.  The already discussed hazard estimates have 
                                                 
4
 The reported probabilities depend strongly on the considered reference person.  The estimates (appendix 3) 
suggest a large impact of the educational level and so the probabilities differ remarkably for persons with 
different educational levels. Lower educated have a higher probability of lay off and higher educated get more 
job offers.  Despite these differences, according to reference person, the comparison over the different job types 
is very similar. 
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shown that those in high strain jobs leave their job sooner.  So, if we consider a short time spell, 
those in high strain jobs will experience more voluntary as well as involuntary job mobility compared 
to their colleagues in other job types in that time spell.  In the next section, we will examine whether 
they are better off later in their career.  
 
Table 4: Estimated probabilities to end the first job for the different reasons 
  Reason of leaving the first job 
  
End of 
temporary 
contract 
Individual 
lay off 
Collective 
lay off Resign 
Another 
job offer 
Personal or 
other reason 
Passive 24.19% 13.34% 11.03% 27.21% 15.24% 8.99% 
High strain 14.58% 15.56% 9.50% 33.06% 14.76% 12.56% 
Low strain 18.84% 16.28% 16.98% 22.76% 14.46% 10.67% 
Active 11.52% 12.37% 17.08% 30.30% 15.01% 13.73% 
 
 
6.4 What after the first job?  
 
According to our theoretical model, young workers will leave their first job if they have a better 
alternative (voluntary mobility) or if they have to leave their job (forced mobility).  For those who 
voluntary left their job, we thus assume that they have a better job immediately after leaving their first 
job.  For those who were victims of forced mobility, this is not necessarily the case.  For this sub 
sample, we estimate the probability of working one month after they had to leave their first job.  The 
results (appendix 3) show no significant impact of the job type of the first job. 5  The educational level 
appears to be the most important determinant of the probability of working after one had to leave the 
job. Lower educated interviewees have a significant lower probability of working and higher educated 
interviewees a significant higher probability, compared to the reference group of middle educated 
interviewees. So, although young workers in high strain jobs are premature victims of involuntary 
mobility, they are not more often confronted with unemployment after their lay off.   
 
For those who voluntary left their job, we cannot compare the Karasek job types of the first and the 
second job, since we only have data about the first and the actual situation (see data description).  
Therefore, we estimate the impact of the type of the first job on the situation at the age of 26, using a 
multinomial logit model.  Our theoretical model predicts that voluntary job changes occur in order to 
obtain a better job.  As a consequence, we use no unemployment spells between the different jobs 
as a proxy for voluntary job changes.  For those who had one or more months of unemployment after 
leaving a job, the reservation utility equals the utility of not working and not the utility of the previous 
job.  So, only for those who had no unemployment spells, we expect a better job at the age of 26.  
                                                 
5
 Individual lay off, collective lay off and end of temporary contract are considered as forced mobility.  Leaving 
out the respondents who left because of end of temporary contract did not influence the result that there is no 
significant impact from the job type on the probability of having a job. 
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The probabilities to be in a certain situation at the age of 26 can be found in appendix 4.  We 
distinguish between the different job types, unemployment and studying.  The reported results are for 
a reference man without children who does not live with a partner. 
The probability for the reference man starting in a high strain job to obtain an active job, strongly 
depends on his educational level.  For lower educated interviewees, this probability is considerable 
lower than for higher educated interviewees.  The probability of obtaining an active job at the age of 
26 is always higher when the first job was also an active job.  So, although we can assume that 
people leave their job to obtain a better one, the results indicate only limited job mobility from high 
strain jobs to active jobs.  At the same time, a considerable group are ‘locked up’ in a high strain job 
later in their career. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Previous research suggested that young workers with a high strain job (according to the Job-
Demand Control model of Karasek) are less satisfied with their job and do not get a wage 
compensation for the strain that is associated with their job.  We therefore raised the question 
whether they leave their job sooner than their colleagues in active jobs.  Our results confirm this 
hypothesis.  Using different models for estimating duration data (non-parametric, semi-parametric 
and parametric), we consistently find that young workers leave their high strain jobs sooner 
compared with those in active jobs.  
Next to the test of our main hypothesis (do starters in high strain jobs leave their jobs sooner?), we 
also examined whether they were better off later on in their career.  The theoretical model predicts 
that young workers will leave their first job if they have a better alternative.  Due to a lack of data, we 
could not test if this was true.  Data only permitted comparison of the job type of the first job with the 
job type at the age of 26.  The results of this comparison show that a considerable proportion of the 
young starters in high strain jobs remain in a high strain job later on.   
For those who had to leave their first job, we examined whether their job type also influenced the 
probability of being unemployed later on in their career.  The estimation showed that this was not the 
case.  So, although starters in high strain jobs are premature victims of forced mobility, their initial job 
type does not affect their probability of becoming unemployed afterwards.  Only the educational level 
was a relevant determinant of that probability.   
We can thus conclude that the strain of a high strain first job is only temporary.  There is however a 
significant probability to remain in a high strain job later on in the career.   
 
The results of our study add to the current discussion on stress at work.  First of all, not all jobs with a 
high workload seem to be stressful.  Only jobs with an imbalance between the demands and the 
control one has, cause stress.  Secondly, we found that a considerable part of those starting in a high 
strain job, obtain a “better” job later on in their career.  So, a high strain first job seems to be 
temporary for some young workers, and could be a stepping stone to a ‘better’ job later on.  We do 
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not want to minimize the current problem of job stress among young starters with this statement.  
Stress is indeed a problem, but mostly for those who are not able to escape to another job and stay 
in high strain jobs or become unemployed.  As a consequence, it is important to target these young 
workers, in order to get some understanding of the antecedents of those who are more prone to stay 
in high strain jobs.  Some of our findings suggested that the lower educated who start in a high strain 
job are particularly vulnerable.  Further research should therefore focus on the characteristics and 
antecedents of young workers who are unable to leave high strain jobs on their own.  
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 Appendix 1: Testing the parametric model choice 
 
Wald test and Likelihood-ratio test for the nested models 
 p-value of Wald test p-value of likelihood-ratio 
test 
κ =0 : 0H  (log-normal) 0.050 0.048 
κ =0 : 1H  (Weibull) 0.000 0.000 
κ σ= =0 : 1, 1H  (exponential) 0.000 0.000 
 
 
AIC for the different parametric estimations  
Distribution Log Likelihood k c AIC 
Exponential -2865.499 23 1 5779.00 
Weibull -2848.8725 23 2 5747.75 
Gompertz -2821.3567 23 2 5692.71 
Generalised gamma -2770.5405 23 3 5593.08 
Log-normal -2772.4949 23 2 5594.99 
Log-logistic -2791.8799 23 2 5633.76 
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Appendix 2: Results of the multinomial logit model on the reason of leaving the job   
 Coefficient Std. Error Sig. 
Individual lay off       
Intercept -0.194 0.455 0.670 
less than higher secondary education 0.582 0.316 0.065 
higher secondary education (ref) 
      
higher education 
-1.876 0.343 0.000 
passive job 0.061 0.401 0.879 
high strain job 0.246 0.340 0.469 
low strain job 0.312 0.454 0.491 
active job (ref)       
Collective lay off       
Intercept 0.129 0.541 0.812 
less than higher secondary education 0.518 0.378 0.171 
higher secondary education (ref) 
      
higher education 
-2.893 0.626 0.000 
passive job -0.452 0.465 0.331 
high strain job -0.570 0.389 0.143 
low strain job 0.032 0.528 0.952 
active job (ref)       
Resign       
Intercept 0.702 0.329 0.033 
less than higher secondary education 0.396 0.285 0.165 
higher secondary education (ref) 
      
higher education 
-0.214 0.195 0.274 
passive job -0.123 0.279 0.660 
high strain job 0.104 0.228 0.649 
low strain job -0.249 0.316 0.431 
active job (ref)       
End of temporary contract       
Intercept -0.265 0.327 0.417 
less than higher secondary education 0.807 0.270 0.003 
higher secondary education (ref) 
      
higher education 
-0.394 0.186 0.034 
passive job 0.727 0.262 0.006 
high strain job 0.253 0.228 0.267 
low strain job 0.530 0.290 0.067 
active job (ref)       
Personal or other reason       
Intercept -0.089 0.363 0.806 
less than higher secondary education 0.762 0.295 0.010 
higher secondary education (ref) 
      
higher education 
-0.313 0.218 0.150 
passive job -0.439 0.310 0.157 
high strain job -0.072 0.247 0.769 
low strain job -0.215 0.336 0.522 
active job (ref)       
Another job offer (ref)       
Number of observations 1574 
Log Likelihood -536.27 
Other included control variables: gender, number of children and living together 
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Appendix 3: Results of the binary logit model on the probability of working after 
involuntary leaving the first job 
 
  
Coefficient Odds Standard Error 
Constant 0.422  0.366 
Passive job at 23 (ref) 
  
 
  
High strain job at 23 0.128 1.14 0.287 
Low strain job at 23 0.366 1.44 0.267 
Active job at 23 0.411 1.51 0.329 
Man (ref) 
  
 
  
Woman 
-0.183 0.83 0.179 
Less than higher secondary education 
-0.842*** 0.43 0.209 
Higher secondary education (ref) 
  
 
  
Higher education 0.618*** 1.86 0.229 
Number of children at 26 
-0.122 0.89 0.2 
Not living together with partner (ref) 
  
 
  
Living together with partner  
-0.187 0.83 0.19 
    
 
  
Number of observations 673 
Log Likelihood -438.08 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
 
Appendix 4: Estimated probabilities for the situation at 26  
Only for those who had no unemployment spell between their jobs 
  
Situation at 26 
  Passive High 
strain 
Low strain Active Unemployed Studying 
lower educated 
with... first job 
            
Passive 19.55% 22.04% 29.00% 18.98% 10.43% 0.00% 
High strain 10.65% 30.27% 19.76% 28.41% 10.90% 0.00% 
Low strain 10.67% 9.20% 44.50% 31.98% 3.65% 0.00% 
Active 6.78% 12.34% 23.62% 46.73% 10.53% 0.00% 
  
            
middle educated 
with... first job 
            
Passive 15.83% 24.09% 29.47% 28.48% 2.06% 0.08% 
High strain 8.08% 31.00% 18.82% 39.95% 2.02% 0.13% 
Low strain 7.67% 8.92% 40.13% 42.59% 0.64% 0.05% 
Active 4.76% 11.71% 20.84% 60.86% 1.81% 0.02% 
  
            
higher educated 
with... first job 
            
Passive 7.29% 16.42% 22.93% 52.40% 0.57% 0.38% 
High strain 3.26% 18.50% 12.82% 64.37% 0.49% 0.55% 
Low strain 2.95% 5.09% 26.10% 65.52% 0.15% 0.19% 
Active 1.58% 5.74% 11.66% 80.57% 0.36% 0.08% 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
The role of temporary employment for the integration  
of school-leavers into permanent employment  
 
 
Abstract 
Many school-leavers enter the labour market in temporary employment.  In this paper we investigate 
the impact of a temporary employment spell at the start of the career on the transition rate into 
permanent employment.  We compare the case of temporary employment with the hypothetical case 
of a direct transition from unemployment to permanent employment.  Using a multivariate grouped 
duration model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity we control for observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the workers. Simulation results give more insights into the effect of temporary work.  
For a large sample of Flemish school-leavers we find that in the short run temporary employment 
delays the school leaver’s transition to permanent employment.  However, in the long run temporary 
employment acts as a stepping stone and decreases the duration until permanent employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we study the impact of a temporary employment spell on the transition rate into 
permanent employment for school-leavers in Flanders.1  We investigate if temporary employment 
shortens the duration until permanent employment - or in other words: Is temporary employment a 
stepping stone to permanent employment for school-leavers?  To answer this question we contrast 
the case of temporary employment to the hypothetical case of a direct transition from unemployment 
to permanent employment. We control for observed and unobserved characteristics of the workers 
on the basis of a multivariate grouped duration model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity. 
Simulation results give more insights into the effect of temporary work.  We find that in the short run 
temporary employment delays the school leaver’s transition to permanent employment.  However, in 
the long run temporary employment acts as a stepping stone and decreases the duration until 
permanent employment. 
 
School-leavers are the new human capital to fulfil the needs of companies.  If and how these new 
entrants are efficiently included in the production processes is important for the welfare of a country.  
Also from the point of view of the well-being of youth in their way to adulthood this transition period 
from school to work is an important period in life. It influences the further course of life and well-being 
substantially (SONAR, 2001).  Unemployment figures (table 1) indicate that unemployment is much 
higher among younger people.  In 2005 unemployment of people younger than 25 was roughly two 
(Europe) till three (Flanders) times higher then the unemployment rate for the over 25 years’ old. 
 
Table 1: Unemployment in Europe and Flanders (2005) 
(Eurostat, LFS adjusted series) 
 
Besides the fact that youth seems to have more problems of entering the labour market, they enter 
the labour market more often through temporary employment (Ryan, 2001).  More than one quarter 
of the workforce below 24 has a temporary job in Flanders, indicating the important role of temporary 
employment in the transition from school to work (Steunpunt WAV).2 
                                                 
1
 Temporary employment is defined as employment with a temporary employment contract. Permanent 
employment is defined as employment with a permanent employment contract.  
2
 In Europe about 30% of the total number of employees are on a temporary basis for the age group younger 
than 25.  For the older working population (+25 year) about 10% of the total number of employees are temporary 
ones. (Eurostat, LSF series, 2005) 
(%)
EU 15 Flanders
-25 year 16.9 14.2
+25 year 7.1 4.5
2005
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Research into the grounds of accepting temporary job shows that labour market related motives are 
much more important than personal reasons.  De Witte et all. (2001) indicate that people accept a 
temporary contract mainly in the absence of a permanent one.  Guest (2004) summarises a number 
of studies in different European countries, which indicate that a large majority of temporary workers 
prefer a permanent one.  Further research also offered the differentiation that people work in 
temporary employment not only because they cannot find a permanent job but also because one 
hopes to find a permanent job through a temporary job (Declerck at al., 2006). 
 
The question we want to answer is therefore whether temporary employment helps school-leavers to 
find a permanent job.  From a theoretical point of view two different approaches of temporary 
employment are possible.  Temporary employment is sometimes seen as a ‘bad’ characteristic.  
Adam Smith (1776) already suggested that the agreeableness of the job depends on ‘the constancy 
of employment’.  In the dual labour market hypothesis temporary employment is seen as employment 
in the secondary segment.  According to this hypothesis the labour market consists of two tiers: the 
primary segment with “good jobs” and the secondary segment with “bad jobs”. The secondary market 
has less attractive jobs with low wages, poor working conditions and little opportunity to advance" 
(Piore, 1970).  Also the insider-outsider argument offers grounds to expect lower wages and less 
training and career opportunities for temporary workers (Lindbeck & Snower, 2002).  The permanent 
workers will, as insiders, negotiate better conditions for them than for the outsiders (the temporary 
workers). Empirical research seems to confirm that temporary workers have, compared to permanent 
workers, lower wages (Sels et al, 2002) and a lower training probability (Forrier et al., 2003; Verhaest 
et al., 2006).  The relation between temporary employment and job satisfaction is not clear (see De 
Cuyper et al., 2005).  Job satisfaction research on part of the used school-leavers’ data shows no 
significant effect (at 5% level) of the contract type on job satisfaction (Verhofstadt et all, 2003). 
On the other hand there are economic theories that offer some possible explanations why temporary 
employment could increase the transition rate into permanent employment.  Human capital theory 
(Becker, 1986) explains that human capital declines when staying unemployed.  Taking a temporary 
employment can be a way to increase the human capital through work experience.  Taking a 
temporary job can also enlarge the network and thus offer more opportunities to get a permanent job.  
Signalling (Spence, 1973) and screening (Stiglitz, 1975) theory offer an alternative argument in 
favour of temporary contracts.  Temporary contracts are seen as possible signals of willing to work 
(i.e. a signal of motivation).  Or they can be used as a screening device.  The employer can hire the 
employee on a temporary basis during which he gets insight in the productivity of the potential 
permanent worker. 
 
We evaluate the stepping stone question for school-leavers in this paper. Does taking a temporary 
job help them in finding a permanent job?  To answer this question we use the “timing of events” 
approach (Abbring and van den Berg,2003) and estimate a multistate duration model.  We model the 
transition from unemployment to temporary employment, from temporary employment to permanent 
employment and from unemployment directly to permanent employment.  The transition rates 
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depend on observed and unobserved characteristics as well as on the elapsed time spent in the 
current state.  Simulations allow a comparison in probability of having a permanent job between 
taking a temporary job and staying unemployed.  We estimate the different transitions for school-
leavers using survey data for Flanders, which is the Northern part of Belgium.  These Flemish data 
have been especially collected to investigate the entry into the labour market for school-leavers.  
These data allow us to construct the labour market trajectory on a monthly basis.3  The database is 
exceptionally rich on details and contains a whole range of possible explanatory variables (which are 
often not available), for example information on parents’ education, financial independence, driving 
license, regional unemployment and the pollster’s impression of the respondent. 
 
The first main contribution of our work is that we do the relative evaluation of temporary employment.  
We compare the duration to a permanent job when taking a temporary job to a direct transition from 
unemployment to permanent employment.  This differs from the majority of the literature concerning 
temporary employment.  Most papers consider the probability of getting a temporary or permanent 
contract4, the subsequent labour market outcomes of temporary workers5, or estimate the duration in 
temporary employment before finding a permanent job.6  Our approach to compare the duration to 
permanent employment for individuals between taking a temporary employment and the 
counterfactual situation of staying unemployed has got less attention.  Research of this kind for 
Germany (Hagen, 2003), the Netherlands (Zijl et al., 2004) and Italy (Ichino et al., 2005) has 
indicated that temporary work accelerates the transition to permanent work in these countries.7 
Two different methods are used to handle our question (i.e. the potential stepping stone effect of 
temporary employment for unemployed): propensity score matching and duration analysis.  Hagen 
(2003) and Ichino et al. (2005) use the first method, which has as disadvantage that it rules out a 
possible impact of unobserved characteristics.8  In our context it is reasonable to assume that 
                                                 
3
 Since the data set contains monthly information for some key variables, we have the contract type for every 
job.  This is an advantage compared to the paper of Zijl et al. (2004), who use a similar method, because they 
have to infer the contract type of jobs between interview times from other variables. 
4
 e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Morris & Vekker (2001), Caparros Ruiz & Navarra Gomez (2003), Giesecke & 
Gross, (2003) and Kahn (2005) 
5
 e.g. Korpi & Levin (2001), Booth et all. (2002), Giesecke & Gross, (2003), Steijn & Need (2003), Michaud & 
Roger (2003), McGinnity et al.(2004), Scherer (2004), Casquet and Cunyat (2004), D’Addio & Rosholm (2005) 
and Gagliarducci (2005) 
6
 e.g.. Booth et all. (2002), Guëll and Petrongolo (2003) 
7
 Zijl et al. (2005) summarize the research with respect to the intermediate position of temporary employment 
(between unemployment and permanent employment).  They conclude that in France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy and the Netherlands temporary employment is often an intermediate position between unemployment and 
permanent employment.  The exception is Spain where segmentation is found.  The fact that temporary 
employment is often an intermediate position does not necessarily imply that a temporary job is a stepping stone 
to permanent employment. 
8
 See the papers of Hagen (2003) and Ichino et al. (2005) for more details about the propensity score matching 
approach. 
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unobserved characteristics such as motivation and effort affect both the probability to get a 
temporary contract and the probability of getting a permanent contract.  In the method we use (a 
duration model), which joins in with the approach of Zijl et al. (2004), we control for both selection in 
observable and unobservable characteristics.   
The second main contribution of our work is that we evaluate temporary employment for school-
leavers.  None of the mentioned studies that compare the duration to a permanent employment when 
taking a temporary job to a direct transition from unemployment to permanent employment focus on 
school-leavers.  Scherer (2004) and McGinnity et al. (2005) focus on this specific group in their 
research about temporary employment but they tackle a different question.  McGinnity et al. (2005) 
compare the probability of future unemployment while Scherer (2004) only considers the 
occupational status of future employment.  
 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides background information on 
the situation and legislation concerning school-leavers and temporary employment in Flanders.  
Section 3 provides some details about the used data and the considered sample.  Afterwards section 
4 gives a brief description of the sample.  In section 5 we explain the econometric model and in 
section 6 we provide the key results.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Flemish context 
 
Flemish school-leavers  
In Flanders there is compulsory education until the age of eighteen.  From the age of fifteen or 
sixteen only part-time compulsory education is applicable.  There is no obligatory military service and 
school-leavers enter the labour market directly after the end of schooling.  
Different from other countries is the Flemish system of waiting period before school-leavers can claim 
unemployment benefits.  This period starts wit the registration at the employment office after the end 
of the last school year.  During this period (233 days for school-leavers between 18 and 26 year) the 
unemployed school-leaver only gets a waiting period benefit, which is lower than the regular 
unemployment benefits.  The waiting period also runs during working days.  So school-leavers 
should register in the employment office even if they have already an employment contract after 
leaving school.  This gives them the advantage to claim unemployment benefits earlier in the event of 
a subsequent unemployment spell. 
The most important labour market policy for unemployed Flemish school-leavers is the First Job 
Agreement.  This program offers employers a reduction in social security contributions (up to 1.000 
EURO quarterly).  For larger companies (more then 50 employees) there is also an obligation of 
achieving a youth quota of at least 3% of their work force. 
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Employment contracts in Flanders 
Labour regulation distinguishes two types of employment contracts: with or without time stipulation.  
The latter are permanent contracts. Employment contracts with a time stipulation are what we call 
‘temporary employment’.  Temporary employment contracts can be concluded between employee 
and employer or through intermediation of a temporary employment agency.  
Several consecutive temporary employment contracts between employee and employer are in 
principle considered as being a permanent contract, unless they are justified through the nature of 
the job or other legal reasons. A departure form the general rule is possible (given permission of the 
Social Inspection Law) in the case of consecutive fixed-term contracts of at least 6 months with a 
total duration of maximum 3 years.   
 
A temporary contract has a starting date and an ending date and will end automatically on the date 
agreed. This means that there is no dismissal procedure involved. The option for termination of the 
contract before the final date has to be part of the contract.  A permanent labour contract can be 
ended by one of the parties whereby the legal terms of notice need to be respected (depending on 
the duration of the contract).  The rules are different for employers and employees. The employee 
has the right to end the contract without a procedure, but he or she has to respect the legal and 
agreed determination period, which usually is a one-month notice minimum.   
 
 
3. Flemish school-leavers data 
 
Sonar data 
We use a survey database for Flanders (SONAR). The database had been created to study the 
transition from education to the labour market.  Therefore the database is exceptionally rich on labour 
market information for school-leavers in their first working experiences.  The database contains 
monthly information on the labour market status from the moment one leaves school until the 
moment of the last interview as well as a whole range of socio economic variables.  As a 
consequence the dataset contains information, which is often not available in other samples. 
 
This data collection has been achieved in two phases. First, a survey of a large and heterogeneous 
sample of young adults of the same age is taken at regular intervals. Next, the same age group is 
surveyed again at a later stage (longitudinal follow-up design).  This study will use the longitudinal 
data of two birth cohorts (young adults born in 1976 and in 1978). These young Flemish adults were 
questioned a first time when they were 23 years old and a second time when they were 26 year old. 
The samples were randomly selected and trained interviewers performed the oral interviews at the 
interviewees’ home address.  The dataset is thus based on self-reported information of the 
respondents.  
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The SONAR group tries to investigate the representativity of the database. (SONAR, 2000) The 
sample consists of 51% men and 49% of women, which is a similar proportion as in national 
population statistics.  Comparing the sample with respect to other characteristics is more difficult 
because of a lack of comparable data.  A cautious comparison tells that the sample is 
representatitive with respect to family formation.  In line with response in other surveys, lower 
educated, unemployed and respondents from lower social classes are somewhat underrepresented.   
 
Sample  
The original database consists of 5909 respondents.  Since we concentrate at school-leavers, 
respondents (421) still studying at the moment of the last interview9 are left out.  Those who have a 
direct transition to self-employment at the end of schooling or who reported that they never looked for 
a job as employee (179) are also left out.  In the present paper we study the effect of temporary 
employment on the transition to permanent employment.  We keep only those who did not yet have 
permanent employment at the start. The resulting sample contains information on 4277 school-
leavers. 
We will provide estimates for two samples.  For the first sample we consider all school-leavers 
seeking for permanent employment (we will refer to it as ‘all school-leavers’).  The second sample 
contains unemployed school-leavers seeking for permanent employment (referred to by ‘unemployed 
school-leavers’).  The first sample provides insights into the general role of temporary employment as 
an intermediate state to permanent employment for school-leavers.  This sample contains all 4277 
school-leavers.   The latter sample is useful to study the role of temporary employment for school-
leavers who can be supposed to look actively for a job at the end of schooling.  About 90% of school-
leavers end school in June but the first employment typically starts in September or October. So 
school-leavers who have already found a job at the end of schooling report either inactivity or 
unemployment for these months between the end of schooling and the start of the contract. 10  To be 
sure that somebody is actively looking for a permanent employment, we therefore restrict this second 
sample to school-leavers who are unemployed in the third month after leaving school.   This 
approach restricts the sample of unemployed school-leavers to 1542 individuals.   
 
 
4. Description of the sample 
 
A complete overview of the explanatory variables and some summary statistics can be found in 
appendix 1.  In this description part we will first explain the meaning of the different explanatory 
                                                 
9
 Either at age 23 or at age 26. The response rate for the follow up interview was about 70%.  So for about 30% 
of the original sample at 23 year the information stops at the age of 23. 
10
 The empirical test of Flinn and Heckman (1983) support our view that unemployed are more actively looking 
for a job. Flinn and Heckman tested empirically whether the exit rate from unemployment to employment is the 
same as that from out of the labour force to employment, while examining observed and unobserved individual 
differences in explanatory variables.   
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variables.  In a second part we compare the two samples: ‘all school-leavers’ and ‘unemployed 
school-leavers’.  The first two columns of appendix 1 show the statistics for these two samples. 
Thirdly we distinguish between workers who have a transition to temporary employment and workers 
with a direct transition from unemployment to permanent employment (last two columns of appendix 
1).  This distinction is only made for the sample of all school-leavers.11   
 
As already mentioned the used dataset is exceptionally rich on possible explanatory variables.  
Beside gender and the nationality of the respondent, the data also include the nationality of the 
grandmother (on mother’s side) of the respondent.  This variable is often used for determining the 
ethnical background.  The statistics show a higher percentage of respondents who have a not 
Belgian grandmother (about 10%) while the percentage of not Belgian respondents is hardly 3%.  
The educational level of the mother can be used as an indicator for social background.  Together 
with the educational degree of the respondents, we have three additional variables reflecting the 
educational career of the respondents (apprenticeship, student work, vocational education).   
The following two variables (membership of club and pollster’s impression) are included in the 
database to capture some characteristics of the school-leavers which might influence their potential 
on the labour market but which are not often available for empirical research.  The first one gives an 
indication of the social capital of the respondents.  More of half from the 23 years old population in 
our sample was member of some club (youth movement, sports club, political movement) in the last 
five years. The second variable helps to include unmeasured characteristics of the respondents in 
the data.  The pollsters had to answer 8 questions to get insight in how they experience the 
respondent. Therefore the pollsters have to score the respondents to which account they are 
energetic, active, calm, friendly, cheerful, open, optimistic an motivated to answer.  Using factor 
analysis we created a single variable indicating how others perceive the respondents.  We only used 
the items calm, friendly and open since we believe that these variables are unlikely to change over 
time.12   
A welfare typology is calculated based on the place of residence (which is only known at the age of 
23)  
Among the time-dependent variables are the regional unemployment rate and variables indicating 
the living and family situation of the individual.  We have information when respondents succeeded in 
acquiring their driving license.  These variables are either measured at the start of the period (month 
after leaving school in the first sample, third month after leaving school for the second sample) or at 
the start of the temporary employment spell.   
 
When we compare the two samples, the composition of both seems to differ significantly on a 
number of variables.  The sample of unemployed school-leavers contains more respondents with a 
non-Belgian grandmother (12.3%) and more lower educated.  This sample of unemployed school-
                                                 
11 Comparable statistics for the second sample are available on request, from the authors. 
12
 Variables like optimistic or motivated could be the outcome of the labour market history. We exclude these 
variables to avoid endogeneity bias. 
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leavers has also a lower proportion of respondents who had done some student work during their 
education (36.3% against 41.9% in sample of all school-leavers) as well as a lower proportion of 
individuals who are member of a club (52.8% against 58% in sample of all school-leavers).  As 
expected the sample of unemployed school-leavers has unfavourable labour market characteristics 
compared to the sample of all school-leavers.  The fact that this sample of unemployed school-
leavers is less in the possession of a driving license adds to this view. 
 
Between workers with a transition to temporary employment and respondents who get permanent 
employment without intermediate temporary employment we also find some differences.  The most 
remarkable is the large gender difference.  Where in the general sample the preponderance of 
women over men is relatively small (1.5%), it is more pronounced in the subgroup of the workers with 
a transition to temporary employment participants (5%).  In the other subgroup (transition to 
permanent employment) men have a clear preponderance.  The variables referring to ethnicity, 
social background of the individual and the number of siblings are very similar in both groups. 
Regarding the educational degree it are especially those with a lower tertiary degree who are over 
represented in the subgroup of temporary workers.  Respondents with a higher secondary degree 
are somewhat overrepresented in the subgroup of permanent workers.  Temporary workers have 
also a higher fraction of apprenticeships (67.5%) but a lower fraction of ending education in a 
vocational type (6.2%) than permanent workers.  The distribution for the welfare typology also differs 
significantly between both subgroups.  A transition to temporary employment seems more common 
in urbanised areas. In living areas the fraction of a transition to permanent employment is higher than 
among those with a transition to temporary employment. 
When contrasting the descriptive statistics for the two subgroups for the sample of unemployed 
school-leavers, we find similar differences.13  
 
 
5. Econometric model 
 
The idea behind our approach is to consider a transition to temporary employment as a treatment 
that applies to school-leavers, and considering if this treatment accelerates the transition into 
permanent employment (compared to the counterfactual situation without a “treatment”).  
In our empirical model school-leavers either have a transition to temporary employment or to 
permanent employment. For school-leavers who have a transition into temporary employment, we 
consider the subsequent duration until a transition into permanent employment.  The latter duration is 
permitted to be composed of several temporary employment or unemployment periods. 
                                                 
13
 the differences with respect to the education of the respondent are less clear. 
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The observed spells can be censored for various reasons. If we don’t observe a transition out of the 
respective labour market state then the spell is censored at the end of the observation period. 
Moreover, if a worker has a transition into an active labour market program, self-employment or full 
time education, then the spells are censored at the end of the time-period just before this transition is 
observed.   
 
In order to identify the causal effect of a transition into temporary employment on the duration until a 
transition into permanent employment we apply the “timing of events” approach (Abbring and van 
den Berg, 2003). This approach is able to solve the endogeneity problem caused by selective 
treatment, without the need of exclusion restrictions. Instead, the variation in the timing of the 
transition to temporary employment is exploited, in order to identify the effect on the duration of 
interest.14 Roughly speaking, this is achieved in a duration model, where the selection process and 
the transition of interest can be related via a multivariate error-term.   
 
To estimate the causal effect of temporary employment we have to consider that the characteristics 
of school-leavers who have a transition to temporary employment might be systematically different 
from those with a direct transition to permanent employment without intermediate temporary 
employment. Therefore, we have to take observed and unobserved characteristics of the individuals 
into account.  To control for selection in observed characteristics we include a large set of 
explanatory variables in our duration model.  These variables (cf. appendix 1) include individual 
characteristics, information on the socio economic background of the individuals and information 
about the local labour market conditions.   
In order to control for selection in unobserved characteristics we proceed in two steps. First we test 
the presence of remaining unobserved heterogeneity for each of the transition rates in a model with 
independent transition rates. Given that we find unobserved heterogeneity for the two destination 
states, we estimate a model with dependent unobserved characteristics between the transition rates, 
in a second step.   
 
Identification of the mixed proportional hazard model 
In this section we are going to discuss some key assumptions, which are required for the 
identification of causal effects within our empirical model.15 
                                                 
14
 The identification of the “timing-of-events” approach relies on various assumptions (Abbring and van den 
Berg, 2003). Several of these assumptions are discussed in the next subsection.    
15
 For a detailed discussion of the identification of the timing-of-events approach we refer to Abbring and Van 
den Berg (2003). 
temporary employment 
unemployment permanent employment 
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In order to be able to identify this model it is necessary to assume independence between the vector 
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms and the observed characteristics.16 In addition, we have to 
include at least two continuous explanatory variables that affect the competing transition rates in 
different ways and that are not collinear. In the present paper we include several continuous 
explanatory variables: the regional unemployment rate, the subjective impression that the pollster 
has from the school-leaver and the age of the worker. The age of the worker is available in grouped 
form (i.e. month of age) and provides a mere proxy for a real continuous variable. However, 
arguments in the literature on the identification of MMPH models suggest that also this type of 
variable is useful for identification.  Furthermore, we need variation in the timing of the transitions. In 
the data we have considerable variation in the timing of the transitions into the various transitions. 
Moreover, it is likely that there exists considerable randomness in the timing of the job offers for 
unemployed workers.17  
An important condition for identification is the absence of anticipation of the timing of treatment. To 
satisfy this condition we need either that workers do not know the exact moment of a transition to 
temporary employment in advance or that they do not change their behaviour conditional on this 
information.  
We argue that the plausibility of this assumption depends on the selected sample. The sample of all 
school-leavers contains some workers who have a transition into temporary employment shortly after 
the end of schooling. A part of these workers can be expected to know the exact timing of a transition 
into temporary employment in advance e.g. in the case where they got a job offer during schooling 
time. Unfortunately we don’t observe if this information changes the searching behaviour of school-
leavers. However, the induced bias can be expected to be small, since the workers who have 
accepted a job offer during schooling-time can be expected to leave the risk set shortly after the end 
of schooling.  
 
For workers in the sample of unemployed school-leavers it is unlikely that the timing of a transition 
into temporary employment is known much in advance. By definition, these workers are still 
unemployed in the third month after the end of schooling. For this group it is unlikely that they have 
accepted a job offer during schooling time, since these jobs would typically start during the first three 
months after the end of schooling.18 For the school-leavers in this sample it is consequently unlikely 
that anticipation effects play a noteworthy role.  
                                                 
16
 In the absence of repeated observation of the same transition for one individual, this type of assumption is 
required for the identification of the parameters that are associated to the observed characteristics in a 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard (MMPH)-model (Abbring, 2006).  
17
 The idea of random job offer rates is also present in the job-search literature (e.g. Mortensen, 1986) 
18
 In Belgium, like in most European countries, it is not uncommon to have a short spell of inactivity or 
unemployment between the end of schooling and the start of the first employment, even for the case where the 
workers have already accepted a job offer during their schooling time. 
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To summarise, the assumption of non-anticipation can be put into question for the sample of all 
school-leavers. However, it is plausible to assume that non-anticipation is satisfied for the sample of 
unemployed school-leavers.  
 
Specification of the likelihood-function  
 
In our empirical model we allow for three different labour market states: unemployment u, temporary 
employment t and permanent employment p.   The model is of the multivariate mixed proportional 
hazard (MMPH) type (see also van den Berg 2001).  The equations for the different transition rates 
are estimated simultaneously by the means of maximum likelihood. In this model the observed 
explanatory variables X and the unobserved characteristic V shift the baseline hazard function λ(t)  
proportionally.  The transition rates out of unemployment can be written as: 
θ λ β= ⋅ +uq q uq uq q(t x,V ) (t) exp(x ' V ) , for { }∈q t,p .  The transition rate from temporary employment to 
permanent employment as: θ λ β= ⋅ +tp ut p tp tp p(t t x,V ) (t) exp(x ' V ) . 
We specify piecewise constant baseline hazards λ α= lm,k(t) exp( ) where k indicates the month in 
origin state l. We impose the following normalisation: α α α= = =up,1 ut,1 tp,1 1 . For details on the 
derivation of the individual likelihood contributions we refer to appendix 2. 
 
Using u kS (t )  to note the survival rate at the end of the k-th period in unemployment and t lS (t ) for the 
survival rate at the end of the l-th period after the transition to temporary employment, we can write 
the individual likelihood contribution as: 
{ }
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 (1) 
 
Equation 1 represents all possible trajectories the individual can have in our model.  Although for 
notational simplicity not explicitly written, all components used in equation 1 are conditional on a set 
of explanatory variables.  Censoring in the respective states (unemployment and temporary 
employment) is indicated by uc and tc .   A transition to temporary employment is indicated by utp . 
 
We specify the unobserved heterogeneity terms by a multivariate discrete distribution. Van den Berg 
(2001) argues that discrete distributions provide flexibility while limiting the computational costs of the 
estimation. We suppose that the unobserved component, qv  with { }∈q t,p , can take two values 
q1v and q2v for each possible destination state q.   
The resulting individual likelihood contribution can then be written as:  
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= =
= ⋅∑∑
2 2
m ab m ta pb
a 1 b 1
l P l (v ,v ) , where abP  is the associated probability to each combination of these 
values. The probabilities are specified as multinomial logit. 
 
Details on the specification of the unobserved heterogeneity can be found in appendix 3.  In the 
given framework, no selection in unobserved characteristics is equivalent to independence between 
the unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two possible transition rates (temporary employment and 
permanent employment).  Finally, the lack of unobserved heterogeneity for at least one of the two 
destination states would indicate the absence of relevant selection in unobserved characteristics. In 
this case, either unobserved heterogeneity is not important for the selection into temporary 
employment or unobserved heterogeneity is not important to explain the duration of interest (the 
duration until a transition into permanent employment). In both cases selection in unobserved 
characteristics would not be relevant for our evaluation.  
 
 
6. Results  
 
Piecewise constant baseline hazard 
Figures 1 and 2 show the baseline hazards for the three transition rates: the rate at which an 
individual flows from one state to another given that he/she survives in this state until the current 
moment.  Figure 1 is for the sample of all school-leavers, figure 2 for the sample of unemployed 
school-leavers.  For both samples we see in the short run a negative duration dependence for the 
transition out of unemployment (transition to temporary employment and to permanent employment) 
but less pronounced for the sample of all school-leavers.  In the long run there seems to be no 
duration dependence.  For the sample of all school-leavers we notice a very high transition rate from 
unemployment to temporary employment during the first months.  Also the transition from 
unemployment to permanent employment is rather high the first months.  In the sample of 
unemployed school-leavers there is less time dependence. The transition from temporary 
employment to permanent employment has a peak at 6 and 12 months.  This points to the fact that 6 
and 12 months are common contract durations for temporary employment. 
 
No selection in unobserved characteristics 
Our estimates indicate that there is no selection in unobserved characteristics.  When we estimate 
the model with independent unobserved heterogeneity distribution, the two possible values for the 
transition to temporary employment converge to one point.19  In the reported results in appendix 4 
and 5 we therefore restrict the two possible values for the transition to temporary employment 
( t1v and t2v ) to be equal.  We find there is unobserved heterogeneity for the transition to permanent.  
                                                 
19
 This is independent of the starting values we have chosen. 
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Since there is no unobserved heterogeneity in the transition to temporary employment, selection in 
unobserved characteristics is ruled out.  The reason why we do not have unobserved heterogeneity 
is probably due to the very rich dataset.  As already said our database contains many variables not 
available in other research.  Variables like club membership and pollster’s impression of the 
respondent might reflect the unobserved characteristics of the workers rather well. 
 
Effect of covariates 
Appendices 4 (for all school-leavers) and 5 (for unemployed school-leavers) give the results of the 
covariates on the different transitions.  Since most of the variables have the expected sign, we only 
present the most interesting variables.  Having a tertiary degree and apprenticeships increase the 
probability of leaving unemployment.  A higher unemployment rate and a non-Belgian nationality 
reduce as expected the probability of leaving unemployment.  A driving license increases all 
transition probabilities.  Female respondents have lower transition rates to permanent employment.   
Membership of a club, student work and living in an urbanised area increase the transition from 
unemployment to temporary employment.  The transition from unemployment to permanent 
employment is higher for those who end their education in a vocational type.   
 
Simulations 
To get more insight into what the estimates actually mean, we elaborate some simulations.  The 
general idea is to use the estimates of our model to simulate durations to permanent employment for 
the case of taking a temporary employment and for the case of staying unemployed.  For details 
about the simulation process we refer to appendix 6.   
 
To check if our model together with the simulations is able to reproduce the observed outcomes, 
figures 3 and 4 compare the fraction of individuals in permanent employment after t months from the 
real data with that fraction obtained from the simulation.  We simulated the data 400 times and 
calculated always the same fraction of workers who had already a transition to permanent 
employment after t months.  The line represents the median value of the simulations with its 
confidence intervals.  The simulated fractions are close to the observed ones.  Notice also that the 
observed fractions are never outside the 95% bounds of our simulations.   
Figure 5 adds the simulation for the hypothetical case of staying unemployed (and not taking 
temporary employment).  This figure thus presents the simulated fractions for temporary workers 
versus non-temporary workers.  In the short run the fraction (of individuals in permanent employment 
after t months) for non-temporary workers seems higher than the fraction for temporary workers.  In 
the longer run the difference between the fraction of both groups is small.  Figure 6 also presents the 
simulated data for temporary workers and non-temporary workers for the sample of unemployed 
school-leavers.  For this sample we observe a similar behaviour for non-temporary workers versus 
temporary workers in the short run.  In the long run, however, the opposite is true. The fraction of 
individuals in permanent employment after t months is higher for temporary workers than for non-
temporary workers. 
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Stepping stone effect 
To get the simulated difference caused by temporary employment (i.e. the possible stepping stone 
effect), we have to compute the difference in the fraction for each draw of the data.  Figures 7 and 8 
show the median of the difference and 95% bounds for both samples.  Figure 7 shows no clear 
stepping stone of temporary employment for school-leavers.  Until 40 months after the month of 
transition to temporary employment the median of the fraction of workers in temporary employment 
who obtain permanent employment is lower than the median of the fraction of non- temporary 
workers who obtain permanent employment. Only after 40 months workers in temporary employment 
do better.  A different picture is obtained when we consider the sample of unemployed school-
leavers. For this sample we see a stepping stone effect of temporary employment (figure 8).  Again 
there is a negative effect of temporary employment during the first months, but from 21 months on 
workers in temporary employment perform better compared to the hypothetical situation where they 
stayed unemployed and looked for permanent employment directly. 
A negative effect during the first month can be explained by the fact that workers who accept a 
temporary job are initially strongly attached to that job because of contractual reasons for example.  
These temporary contracts explain the jumps at 6 and 12 months as 6 and 12 months are typical 
contract duration for temporary jobs.  In addition to the contractual reasons the negative effect during 
the first months could be due to the limited time temporary workers might have to devote on job 
search (compared with unemployed school-leavers).  In the long run we find a positive effect of 
temporary employment for both samples, especially for the sample of unemployed school-leavers.  
Different from the comparable empirical work for other countries (cfr. introduction), we thus find a 
stepping stone effect in the long run for the specific group of school-leavers.  Especially for 
unemployed school-leavers temporary employment is a possible stepping stone to permanent 
employment. 
The different results between both samples seem to indicate that the group of school-leavers who 
find a job within the first three months after school has less advantage by taking a temporary job in 
order to achieve a permanent one afterwards.  Most of these school-leavers might already have a 
permanent contract by the end of schooling.  The sample description suggests that the sample of 
unemployed school-leavers contains more lower educated and more respondents with a non-Belgian 
grandmother.  The descriptive statistics also reflect a smaller social network for the sample of 
unemployed school-leavers, given for example the different figures for membership of a club.  We 
could conclude that temporary employment, as a stepping stone is really important for the high risk 
groups with respect to unemployment. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate whether temporary employment can act as a stepping stone for school-
leavers.  We compare the transition rate into permanent employment between school-leavers who 
stay unemployed and those taking up temporary employment.  We contribute to literature by 
investigating this question for school-leavers, controlling for possible selection in unobserved 
characteristics. 
Our estimation results indicate that there is no selection in unobserved characteristics.  We argue 
that this is due to our exceptionally rich database containing variables, which are often not observed 
(like the pollster’s impression an club membership).  Our database contains detailed information on 
the labour market history of school-leavers and we use a large set of explanatory variables.   
Simulations are used to investigate the effect of temporary employment on the transition to 
permanent employment.  The results differ for our two samples but for both we observe a time 
varying effect.  Workers who accept a temporary job have a low transition rate into permanent 
employment at the start of the temporary employment spell, which results in a lower fraction of those 
obtaining a permanent contract in the short run (compared with the hypothetical situation where 
these individuals remained unemployed).  In the long run (from 40 months in the sample of all 
school-leavers, 21 months in the sample of unemployed school-leavers) participants in temporary 
employment do better than school-leavers who remain unemployed during their search for a 
permanent job.  So we can conclude that on average for all school-leavers taking a temporary job 
delays the transition to a permanent job for the observed sample.  We do find a strong stepping 
stone effect for our sample of unemployed school-leavers. 
This stepping stone effect of temporary employment should encourage employment offices to help 
young unemployed to find a job as soon as possible even if it is a temporary job since it increases 
their chances afterwards.  The recent OECD report ‘Jobs for Youth’ for Belgium also suggest to 
‘eventually abolish the waiting allowance and at the same time modify substantially the rules applying 
to new entrants to the unemployment offices’ in order to reduce youth unemployment.  For the 
unemployed individual school leaver this would increase his search effort and the likelihood to accept 
a temporary job, which ceteris paribus, shortens his duration to get a permanent job afterwards.  
However it is not sure that the same results would appear given a different school to work context.  
Therefore one should also take the macro effects of such a reform into account.  
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Figure 1: Baseline hazard for sample of all school-leavers 
Note: the duration starting point is always the start of the initial state.  For the transitions from 
unemployment to temporary and permanent employment this is the month after leaving school.  For 
the transition from temporary to permanent employment this is the start of the temporary employment 
spell. 
 
 
Figure 2: Baseline hazard for sample of unemployed school-leavers 
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Note: the duration starting point is always the start of the initial state.  For the transitions from 
unemployment to temporary and permanent employment this is the third month after leaving school.  
For the transition from temporary to permanent employment this is the start of the temporary 
employment spell. 
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Figure 3: Simulated versus real data for the sample of all school-leavers 
 
 
Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
 
Figure 4: Simulated versus real data for the sample of unemployed school-leavers  
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Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
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Figure 5: Simulation of the counterfactual situation for the sample of all school-leavers  
 
 
Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment (TE) spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
 
Figure 6: Simulation of the counterfactual situation for the sample of unemployed school-
leavers 
 
Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment (TE) spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
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Figure 7: Stepping stone effect for all school-leavers  
 
Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulated differences are within the confidence bounds 
 
 
Figure 8: Stepping stone effect for the sample of unemployed school-leavers 
Note:  time start with the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulated differences are within the confidence bounds 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Sample 1: all school-leavers seeking for permanent employment  
Sample 2: unemployed school-leavers seeking for permanent employment 
 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 
Variables 
All All Transition 
to PE 
(without TE) 
Transition 
to TE 
Number of observations 4277 1542 1079 2514 
      
Time independent variables     
Women 51.5% 53.6% 45.1% 55.0% 
Age in months 
253.85 
(25.85) 
253.88 
(26.95) 
251.07 
(25.61) 
253.33 
(24.75) 
Respondent Belgian 97.4% 97.0% 97.7% 97.9% 
Respondent not Belgian 2.6% 3.0% 2.3% 2.1% 
Number of brothers and sisters 1.72 (1.49) 1.78 (1.51) 1.71 (1.45) 1.69 (1.46) 
Mother primary or lower secondary education 36.1% 35.9% 34.2% 37.2% 
Mother higher secondary education 30.7% 29.8% 31.2% 31.5% 
Mother tertiary education 22.8% 21.7% 24.7% 21.4% 
Mother unknown education 10.5% 12.6% 9.9% 9.9% 
Grandmother of respondent Belgian 89.9% 87.7% 91.2% 89.9% 
Grandmother of respondent not Belgian 10.2% 12.3% 8.8% 10.1% 
Respondent primary education 3.9% 5.6% 4.3% 3.4% 
Respondent lower secondary education 7.7% 9.3% 8.1% 7.8% 
Respondent higher secondary education 43.6% 47.0% 47.2% 42.9% 
Respondent lower tertiary education 27.0% 19.2% 20.9% 30.0% 
Respondent higher tertiary education 17.8% 18.9% 19.6% 15.9% 
Any apprenticeships during education 65.1% 60.6% 63.0% 67.5% 
Any student work during education 41.9% 36.3% 45.0% 44.9% 
End education in vocational type (part time learning 
part time work) 6.6% 6.9% 8.1% 6.2% 
Member of any kind of club (youth movement, sports 
club, political movement) 58.0% 52.8% 56.5% 58.4% 
Pollsters impression of the respondent (only based on: 
calm, friendly and open) 0.060 (2.34) 0.038 (0.96) 0.068 (3.18) 0.061 (2.18) 
Welfare typology (based on place of residence at 23)     
Living residentials 9.4% 11.0% 12.0% 7.6% 
Urban living with average welfare 26.0% 23.8% 26.5% 24.6% 
Older industrial and working-class residential  
areas 26.0% 28.3% 26.9% 26.1% 
Modern urbanised areas 25.2% 25.2% 22.6% 26.6% 
Traditional rural areas with recent 
urbanisation'. 13.3% 11.7% 12.0% 15.1% 
      
Time dependent variables     
Financial independent of parents at t0 7.5% 9.1% 5.3% 7.3% 
Living together at t0 5.3% 5.8% 4.8% 5.1% 
Number of children at t0 0.012 (0.13) 0.018 (0.16) 0.008 (0.10) 0.012 (0.13) 
Driving license at t0 50.1% 44.3% 49.3% 49.6% 
Unemployment rate at t0 10.23 (3.46) 10.14 (3.40) 10.14 (3.44) 10.20 (3.47) 
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Financial independent of parents at start TE    13.9% 
Living together at start TE    7.7% 
Number of children at start TE    0.023 (0.19) 
Driving license at start TE    53.0% 
Unemployment rate at start TE    9.68 (3.28) 
   
 
  
Note:  
- The number of respondents with a transition to permanent employment –PE- (1079) and those 
with a transition to temporary employment –TE- (2514) together with the 684 censored 
individuals (not yet a transition to temporary employment or permanent employment at the 
moment of the last interview) sum ut to the first sample size (4277) 
- t0 is for the sample of all school-leavers the first month after leaving school, for the sample of 
unemployed school-leavers it is the third month after leaving school 
- Significant differences are indicated in Bold Italic.  We compare the two samples (column 1 
and 2) and transition to permanent employment with transition to temporary employment 
(column 3 and 4). 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: The likelihood function of the duration model 
First we consider the state of unemployment. For this state we define two random durations uqT : the 
random duration from unemployment to state q (with { }∈q t,p ).  Similarly for the temporary 
employment state we define tpT : the random duration in temporary employment until permanent 
employment 
We assume that all individual differences in the joint distribution = ut up tpT (T ,T ,T )  can be characterised 
by explanatory variables X, V where X is observed and V is not. 
 
This joint distribution T|X, V can be expressed in terms of the distributions =ut(T X x,V) , 
=up(T X x,V)  
and = =tp up up(T T t ,X x,V) .  The latter distributions are characterised by their transition 
rates:θut (t x,V) , θup (t x,V)  and θ tp ut(t t ,x,V) . 
Let V = t p(V ,V )  be a (2 × 1)-vector of unobserved (destination specific) covariates, implying that: 
θut (t x,V)  = θut t(t x,V ) , 
θup (t x,V)  = θup p(t x,V ) , 
θ tp ut(t t ,x,V)  = θ tp ut p(t t ,x,V ) . 
 
The role of temporary employment for the integration of school-leavers into permanent employment            123 
Individual contributions to the likelihood function 
Now, we consider the individual contributions to the likelihood function. 
Consider an individual in the flow sample and consider the likelihood contribution. We can distinguish 
the following cases: 
 
1. right censored at unemployment duration kt :  
= > > ⋅
= ⋅
1 ut k up k
u k
l (V) P(T t ,T t )
S (t )        
 
2. leaving first unemployment for temporary employment within [ ]
−k 1 kt ,t  and right censored during 
temporary employment after lt months:  
{ }
[ ]θ θ
−
−
∈
= < ≤ > ⋅
  
= − ⋅ 
  ∑
2 k 1 ut k tp l
ut k
u k 1 u k t l
uq kq t,p
l (V) P(t T t ,T t )
(t ) S (t ) S (t ) S (t )(t )
    
 
 3. leaving unemployment for temporary employment within [ ]
−k 1 kt ,t  and leaving for permanent 
employment within [ ]
−l 1 lt ,t . 
{ }
[ ] [ ]θ θ
− −
− −
∈
= < ≤ < ≤
  
= − × − 
  ∑
3 k 1 ut k l 1 tp l
ut k
u k 1 u k t l 1 t l
uq kq t,p
l (V) P(t T t ,t T t )
(t ) S (t ) S (t ) S (t ) S (t )(t )
   
 
4. leaving first unemployment for permanent employment within [ ]
−k 1 kt ,t . 
{ }
[ ]θ θ
−
−
∈
= < ≤ > ⋅
  
= − 
  ∑
4 k 1 up k ut k
up k
u k 1 u k
uq kq t,p
l (V) P(t T t ,T t )
(t )
S (t ) S (t )(t )
     
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Specification of the heterogeneity distribution 
 
Suppose that { }( )∈qV q t,p can take two values q1v and q2v for each possible destination state q.   
In the case of independence between the unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two possible 
destinations (temporary employment and permanent employment) we estimate the probabilities for 
the two points of support independently by a binomial logit model:  
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λ
λ= = −+
1t
1t 2t 1t
1t
exp( )p p 1 p
1 exp( )   and  
λ
λ= = −+
1p
1p 2p 1p
1p
exp( )
p p 1 p
1 exp( )  
  
 
Then the joint probabilities for the independent UH can be written as the product of these 
independent probabilities:  
 
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
11 t t1 p p1 1t 1p
12 t t1 p p2 1t 2p
21 t t2 p p1 2t 1p
22 t t2 p p2 2t 2p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
   
 
In the case of a model with multivariate dependent UH we have a joint heterogeneity distribution with 
4 points of support and the following probabilities associated to these: 
 
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
11 t t1 p p1 1
12 t t1 p p2 2
21 t t2 p p1 3
22 t t2 p p2 4
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
    
 
Or in a shortcut notation = = = =ab t ta p pb jP P(V v ,V v ) p  where each of the elements a, b can take one 
of the values 1,2 (which results in 22 different combinations), each unique combination is named by 
jp where j = 1,…,4.  
 
 We specify the probabilities by a multinomial logit model: 
λ
λ
=
=
+∑
j
j 3
i
i 1
exp( )
p
1 exp( )
    
 
 for j = 1,2,3 and 
λ
λ=
=
= − =
+
∑
∑
3
4 j 3
j 1
i
i 1
1p 1 exp( )
1 exp( )
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Appendix 4: Estimation results for sample of all school-leavers 
  b se t 
Transition     
U-TE woman 0.015 0.044 0.333 
 age (in months) -0.004 0.002 -2.467 
 not Belgian -0.414 0.141 -2.936 
 number siblings -0.035 0.015 -2.313 
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education -0.047 0.052 -0.904 
 mother tertiary education -0.190 0.062 -3.065 
 mother unknown education -0.138 0.074 -1.871 
 not Belgian. grandmother -0.011 0.079 -0.134 
 primary education -0.455 0.130 -3.497 
 lower secondary education -0.121 0.082 -1.474 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.342 0.067 5.134 
 no apprenticeship -0.199 0.047 -4.236 
 no student work -0.323 0.064 -5.060 
 no vocational training -0.142 0.087 -1.643 
 not member club -0.151 0.045 -3.365 
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.011 0.009 1.233 
 living residentials -0.280 0.087 -3.226 
 urban living with average welfare 0.025 0.059 0.419 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.156 0.062 2.530 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.218 0.069 3.170 
 financial independent of parents 0.176 0.084 2.103 
 living together -0.028 0.102 -0.270 
 number children -0.068 0.152 -0.450 
 driving license 0.144 0.048 3.008 
 regional unemployment rate -0.027 0.009 -2.871 
 cohort1976 -0.351 0.067 -5.278 
     
U-PE woman -0.472 0.081 -5.852 
 age (in months) -0.011 0.003 -3.964 
 not Belgian -0.438 0.261 -1.680 
 number siblings -0.021 0.026 -0.813 
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.047 0.093 0.501 
 mother tertiary education 0.010 0.105 0.098 
 mother unknown education -0.150 0.132 -1.137 
 not Belgian grandmother -0.326 0.146 -2.230 
 primary education -0.759 0.211 -3.604 
 lower secondary education -0.528 0.158 -3.347 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.433 0.113 3.818 
 no apprenticeship -0.241 0.081 -2.979 
 no student work -0.177 0.109 -1.619 
 no vocational training -0.524 0.151 -3.471 
 not member club -0.051 0.079 -0.649 
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.032 0.033 0.943 
 living residentials 0.128 0.131 0.979 
 urban living with average welfare 0.116 0.101 1.151 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.077 0.111 0.689 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. -0.029 0.130 -0.223 
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 financial independent of parents -0.181 0.187 -0.969 
 living together 0.203 0.186 1.091 
 number children -0.453 0.365 -1.242 
 driving license 0.421 0.088 4.789 
 regional unemployment rate -0.055 0.017 -3.254 
 cohort1976 -0.203 0.114 -1.781 
     
TE-PE woman -0.337 0.062 -5.472 
 age (in months) -0.001 0.002 -0.591 
 not Belgian 0.047 0.217 0.216 
 number siblings -0.025 0.021 -1.205 
 Mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education -0.037 0.070 -0.532 
 mother tertiary education -0.102 0.084 -1.209 
 mother unknown education -0.080 0.094 -0.849 
 not Belgian grandmother -0.170 0.108 -1.574 
 primary education -0.632 0.173 -3.649 
 lower secondary education -0.252 0.117 -2.156 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education -0.372 0.092 -4.058 
 no apprenticeship 0.146 0.064 2.279 
 no student work -0.163 0.087 -1.874 
 no vocational training 0.124 0.123 1.008 
 not member club 0.017 0.060 0.282 
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.008 0.013 0.597 
 living residentials 0.100 0.119 0.844 
 urban living with average welfare 0.107 0.082 1.308 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas -0.055 0.082 -0.672 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.116 0.087 1.341 
 financial independent of parents 0.102 0.087 1.167 
 living together -0.192 0.120 -1.594 
 number children -0.324 0.223 -1.452 
 driving license 0.212 0.065 3.271 
 regional unemployment rate -0.005 0.012 -0.382 
 cohort1976 -0.036 0.091 -0.392 
     
Baseline hazard    
U-TE month 2 -1.055 0.072 -14.761 
 month 3 -0.292 0.060 -4.852 
 month 4 -0.481 0.074 -6.506 
 month 5 -0.806 0.095 -8.466 
 month 6 -1.094 0.119 -9.227 
 month 7 -0.841 0.116 -7.281 
 month 8-11 -1.311 0.090 -14.578 
 month 12 -2.515 0.340 -7.392 
 month 13-15 -1.376 0.127 -10.850 
 month 16-24 -2.007 0.127 -15.767 
 month 25-36 -2.504 0.181 -13.857 
 month 37-84 -2.752 0.190 -14.514 
     
U-PE month 3 0.791 0.122 6.464 
 month 4-5 0.790 0.158 5.017 
 month 6-15 0.103 0.174 0.591 
 month 16-36 -0.292 0.203 -1.436 
 month 37-84 -0.553 0.268 -2.068 
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TE-PE month 2-5 0.738 0.167 4.413 
 month 6 1.458 0.195 7.464 
 month 7-11 0.657 0.191 3.444 
 month 12 1.562 0.210 7.445 
 month 13-30 0.746 0.188 3.966 
 month 31-60 0.515 0.198 2.608 
 month 61-83 0.932 0.253 3.691 
     
Unobserved heterogeneity    
const U-TE vt1 -0.250 0.214 -1.168 
 vt2    
const U-PE vp1 0.608 0.453 1.344 
 vp2 -1.805 0.391 -4.617 
mult TE-PE multiTP -2.175 0.493 -4.413 
prob lam1t    
 lam1p -2.304 0.340 -6.776 
     
 -Log(likelihood) 18138.5   
 number of parameters 107   
 number of school-leavers 4277   
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Estimation results for sample of unemployed school-leavers 
  b se t 
Transition     
U-TE woman 0.1075 0.0834 1.28897 
 age (in months) -0.0036 0.0028 -1.2857 
 not Belgian -0.6876 0.2495 -2.7559 
 number siblings -0.0534 0.0291 -1.8351 
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.1527 0.0959 1.59228 
 mother tertiary education -0.1733 0.1243 -1.3942 
 mother unknown education -0.0444 0.1277 -0.3477 
 not Belgian grandmother 0.1189 0.1342 0.88599 
 primary education -0.2386 0.2063 -1.1566 
 lower secondary education -0.2868 0.1502 -1.9095 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.683 0.1208 5.65397 
 no apprenticeship -0.2304 0.0863 -2.6698 
 no student work -0.3944 0.1194 -3.3032 
 no vocational training -0.2389 0.1719 -1.3898 
 not member club -0.0824 0.0833 -0.9892 
 pollster's impression of respondent -0.0521 0.0408 -1.277 
 living residentials -0.3844 0.1578 -2.436 
 urban living with average welfare -0.1748 0.1123 -1.5565 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.0268 0.1121 0.23907 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.2917 0.128 2.27891 
 financial independent of parents -0.0111 0.14 -0.0793 
 living together -0.0432 0.1945 -0.2221 
 number children -0.2164 0.2679 -0.8078 
 driving license 0.2684 0.0933 2.87674 
 regional unemployment rate -0.0136 0.0186 -0.7312 
 cohort1976 -0.2555 0.1241 -2.0588 
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U-PE woman -0.4188 0.127 -3.2976 
 age (in months) -0.0076 0.0041 -1.8537 
 not Belgian -0.7749 0.4139 -1.8722 
 number siblings 0.0176 0.0424 0.41509 
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.0961 0.1559 0.61642 
 mother tertiary education 0.18 0.1703 1.05696 
 mother unknown education -0.163 0.1935 -0.8424 
 not Belgian grandmother -0.4137 0.2192 -1.8873 
 primary education -0.2601 0.2694 -0.9655 
 lower secondary education -0.3065 0.2319 -1.3217 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.4248 0.1836 2.31373 
 no apprenticeship -0.4029 0.1292 -3.1184 
 no student work -0.1742 0.169 -1.0308 
 no vocational training -0.3898 0.2526 -1.5432 
 not member club -0.2706 0.1258 -2.151 
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.0327 0.0612 0.53431 
 living residentials 0.4006 0.1934 2.07135 
 urban living with average welfare 0.136 0.1628 0.83538 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas -0.0065 0.1798 -0.0362 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.0889 0.1985 0.44786 
 financial independent of parents -0.5001 0.2511 -1.9916 
 living together -0.0278 0.2982 -0.0932 
 number children -0.0186 0.3529 -0.0527 
 driving license 0.4401 0.1455 3.02474 
 regional unemployment rate -0.0575 0.0269 -2.1375 
 cohort1976 -0.1544 0.17 -0.9082 
     
TE-PE woman -0.6154 0.1538 -4.0013 
 age (in months) -0.0067 0.0051 -1.3137 
 not Belgian -0.2699 0.4943 -0.546 
 number siblings -0.0773 0.053 -1.4585 
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.0279 0.164 0.17012 
 mother tertiary education -0.129 0.1981 -0.6512 
 mother unknown education -0.0629 0.2026 -0.3105 
 not Belgian grandmother -0.3469 0.2594 -1.3373 
 primary education -0.5075 0.3013 -1.6844 
 lower secondary education -0.2714 0.2699 -1.0056 
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education -0.1794 0.2183 -0.8218 
 no apprenticeship 0.3336 0.1452 2.29752 
 no student work -0.1984 0.2133 -0.9301 
 no vocational training 0.2462 0.2853 0.86295 
 not member club 0.073 0.1399 0.5218 
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.1802 0.073 2.46849 
 living residentials 0.5521 0.2669 2.06857 
 urban living with average welfare 0.4774 0.1963 2.43199 
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.0786 0.1865 0.42145 
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.3802 0.2115 1.79764 
 financial independent of parents 0.1828 0.1823 1.00274 
 living together -0.2385 0.2513 -0.9491 
 number children -0.0404 0.4413 -0.0915 
 driving license 0.3119 0.1489 2.09469 
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 regional unemployment rate -0.0393 0.0295 -1.3322 
 cohort1976 -0.0222 0.219 -0.1014 
     
Baseline hazard    
U-TE month 3 -0.2189 0.123 -1.7797 
 month 4-5 -0.2721 0.1149 -2.3681 
 month 6-9 -0.5225 0.1177 -4.4393 
 month 10 -1.9548 0.4286 -4.5609 
 month 11-14 -0.8877 0.1602 -5.5412 
 month 15-27 -1.3853 0.1569 -8.8292 
 month 28-84 -2.0707 0.2079 -9.9601 
     
U-PE month 3 -0.0244 0.1553 -0.1571 
 month 4-12 -0.5558 0.1482 -3.7503 
 month 13-30 -0.6891 0.2225 -3.0971 
 month 31-84 -1.2636 0.3447 -3.6658 
     
TE-PE month 2 0.6223 0.4154 1.49807 
 month 3-5 0.8814 0.3619 2.43548 
 month 6 1.3331 0.3876 3.43937 
 month 7-11 0.8445 0.3613 2.33739 
 month 12 1.5818 0.4098 3.85993 
 month 13-24 1.0227 0.3697 2.7663 
 month 25-82 1.1852 0.3967 2.98765 
Unobserved heterogeneity    
const U-TE vt1 -1.1686 0.4255 -2.7464 
 vt2    
const U-PE vp1 -0.5739 0.6297 -0.9114 
 vp2 -2.0984 0.6446 -3.2554 
mult TE-PE multiTP -2.7488 0.9411 -2.9208 
prob lam1t    
 lam1p -0.1013 0.5185 -0.1954 
     
 -Log(likelihood) 6254.35   
 number of parameters 101   
 number of school-leavers 1542   
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Appendix 6: Simulation of the effect of temporary employment 
For the simulation we proceed like follows: 
1. Make a random draw from estimated parameters for each individual. (Assuming that the 
parameters are distributed normally and have the mean equal to the parameter estimate and the 
standard deviation equal to the standard error of the parameters) 
2. Using the parameter estimates and the characteristics of the individuals to compute the (random) 
transition rate for each individual and for each possible transition. We have performed an auxiliary 
estimation for the transition rates of censoring. 
3. Given the transition rates, draw a random durations for all possible transitions 
4. The smallest durations for transitions are assumed to be realized 
5. The remaining random draws are used to obtain the duration for the counterfactual case of no 
transition to temporary employment  
6. Use the simulated data to compute the statistics (the fraction who had a transition to permanent 
employment)  
(7. Optional: Check if the model is able to reproduce the real data (e.g. see figure 2)) 
(8. Optional: Contrast the simulated participation with the simulated counterfactual (e.g. see figure 3 
and figure 5) 
9. Compute the differences: this is the effect of temporary employment on the fraction of people who 
had a transition to permanent employment (e.g. see figure 4 and figure 6) 
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